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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Bank competition, asset allocations and risk of failure : an empirical investigation (2010)
    Munich :CESifo,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_BV026958793
    Format: 34 S.
    Series Statement: CESifo working papers 3198 : Category 11, Industrial organisation
    Note: Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com, www.RePEc.org und www.CESifo.de verfügbar
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    QB 910
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bank risk-taking and competition revisited : new theory and new evidence (2006)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958073087102883
    Format: 1 online resource (51 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4623-4777-0 , 1-4527-7939-2 , 1-283-45039-9 , 9786613823663 , 1-4519-1010-X
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/06/297
    Content: This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.
    Note: "December 2006." , ""Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence""; ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THEORY""; ""III. EVIDENCE""; ""IV. CONCLUSION""; ""Appendix I. Pareto Dominant Equilibria""; ""References"" , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6557-0
    Language: English
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    FU Berlin
    Charité
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bank competition, risk, and asset allocations / (2009)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958078133902883
    Format: 1 online resource (37 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4623-7595-2 , 1-4527-9648-3 , 1-282-84357-5 , 1-4518-7290-9 , 9786612843570
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/09/143
    Content: We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
    Note: "July 2009." , Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; Entrepreneurs; Depositors; Banks; Equilibrium; III. Evidence; A. Measurement of competition; B. Measurement of risk; C. Samples; D. Results for the U.S. Sample; E. Results for the International Sample; IV. Alternative Risk Measures; A. Loan Loss Measures of Risk; B. Actual Failures (or near failures) as the Dependent Variable; V. Conclusion; References; Tables; 1. U.S. Sample; 2. U.S. Sample Regressions; 3. International Sample; 4. International Sample Regressions; 5. U.S. Sample Loan Loss Measures; 6. International Sample Loan Loss Measures , 7. International Sample: Proxy Measures of (near) Failure , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4519-1719-8
    Language: English
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    Online Resource
    FU Berlin
    Charité
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bank risk-taking and competition revisited : new theory and new evidence (2006)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    almahu_9948321252302882
    Format: 49 p. : , ill.
    Edition: Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/06/297
    Note: "December 2006."
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books.
    URL: Click to View
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    Online Resource
    HU Berlin
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bank competition, risk, and asset allocations (2009)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.,
    Details
    UID:
    almahu_9948319609302882
    Format: 35 p.
    Edition: Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/09/143
    Note: "July 2009."
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books.
    URL: Click to View
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    Online Resource
    HU Berlin
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bank Competition, Risk and Asset Allocations (2009)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_845892835
    Format: Online-Ressource (35 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451872909 , 9781451872903
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/143
    Content: We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks'' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks'' willingness to lend
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Boyd, John Bank Competition, Risk, and Asset Allocations Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009 ISBN 9781451872903
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781451872903.001
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited : New Theory and New Evidence (2006)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_845864009
    Format: Online-Ressource (49 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451865570 , 9781451865578
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 06/297
    Content: This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks'' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks'' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe De Nicolo, Gianni Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006 ISBN 9781451865578
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781451865578.001
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
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