Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: XXIII, 346 Seiten : , Illustrationen.

ISBN: 978-0-691-14604-1 , 978-0-691-14603-4

Language: English

Subjects: Economics , Geography , General works

Keywords: Allmende ; Management ; Methode ; Natürliche Ressourcen ; Management ; Methode ; Bibliographie enthalten

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

Author information: Ostrom, Elinor, 1933-2012

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ISBN: 9780444512536

Content: Social-ecological systems are complex adaptive systems where social and biophysical agents are interacting at multiple temporal and spatial scales. The main challenge for the study of governance of social-ecological systems is improving our understanding of the conditions under which cooperative solutions are sustained, how social actors can make robust decisions in the face of uncertainty and how the topology of interactions between social and biophysical actors affect governance. We review the contributions of agent-based modeling to these challenges for theoretical studies, studies which combines models with laboratory experiments and applications of practical case studies. Empirical studies from laboratory experiments and field work have challenged the predictions of the conventional model of the selfish rational agent for common pool resources and public-good games. Agent-based models have been used to test alternative models of decision-making which are more in line with the empirical record. Those models include bounded rationality, other regarding preferences and heterogeneity among the attributes of agents. Uncertainty and incomplete knowledge are directly related to the study of governance of social-ecological systems. Agent-based models have been developed to explore the consequences of incomplete knowledge and to identify adaptive responses that limited the undesirable consequences of uncertainties. Finally, the studies on the topology of agent interactions mainly focus on land use change, in which models of decision-making are combined with geographical information systems. Conventional approaches in environmental economics do not explicitly include non-convex dynamics of ecosystems, non-random interactions of agents, incomplete understanding, and empirically based models of behavior in collective action. Although agent-based modeling for social-ecological systems is in its infancy, it addresses the above features explicitly and is therefore potentially useful to address the current challenges in the study of governance of social-ecological systems.

In: Handbook of computational economics, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2006, (2006), Seite 1465-1509, 9780444512536

In: 0444512535

In: year:2006

In: pages:1465-1509

Language: English

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0021(05)02030-7

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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Format: XIII, 344 S. , Ill., graph. Darst.

ISBN: 1843760614

Note: Literaturverz. S. 314 - 342

Language: English

Subjects: Economics , Biology , General works

Keywords: Umweltbezogenes Management ; Ökosystem ; Kongress ; Konferenzschrift

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

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Format: 1 online resource

Content: This textbook discusses the main framework, concepts and applications of the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues for an undergraduate audience. We began teaching a course on collective and the commons in 2007 at Arizona State University. Initially we made use of Ostrom's classic book “Governing the Commons”, but this book was not written for an undergraduate audience. Moreover, many new insights have been developed since the 1990 publication of “Governing the Commons”. Therefore we decided to write our own textbook, which we have been using since the Spring of 2012. In this book you will learn about institutions–the rules and norms that guide the interactions among us. Those rules and norms can be found from traffic rules, rules in sports, regulations on when and where alcohol can be consumed, to constitutional rules that define who can become president of the United States of America. Rules and norms guide us to cooperative outcomes of so-called collective action problems. If we rely on voluntary contributions only to get anything done, this may not lead to the best results. But research also shows that coercion of people to comply to strict rules do not necessary lead to good outcomes. What combination of sticks and carrots is needed to be successful to solve collective action problems such as sustaining the commons? The book is based on the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. Ostrom is best known as the 2009 co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”. Elinor Ostrom was a professor at Indiana University since the mid 1960s, and a part-time research professor at Arizona State University since 2006. She was active in research and teaching until her death at the age of 78 on June 12, 2012.

Note: I THEORETICAL BACKGROUND -- 1 Why Study the Commons? -- 2 Defining Institutions -- 3 Action Arenas and Action Situations -- 4 Social Dilemmas -- II CASE STUDIES -- 5 Water Governance -- 6 Harvesting From the Commons -- 7 Design Principles to Sustain the Commons -- III HUMAN BEHAVIOR -- 8 Social Dilemmas in the Laboratory -- 9 Self-governance in the Laboratory -- IV RULES OF THE GAMES -- 10 Classifying Rules -- 11 Rules, Norms and Shared Strategies -- V A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE -- 12 Feedbacks and Stability -- 13 Coupled Infrastructure Systems -- 14 Think Globally, Act Locally? -- 15 Challenges Ahead , In English.

Language: English

UID:

Format: 1 online resource

Content: This textbook discusses the main framework, concepts and applications of the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues for an undergraduate audience. We began teaching a course on collective and the commons in 2007 at Arizona State University. Initially we made use of Ostrom's classic book “Governing the Commons”, but this book was not written for an undergraduate audience. Moreover, many new insights have been developed since the 1990 publication of “Governing the Commons”. Therefore we decided to write our own textbook, which we have been using since the Spring of 2012. In this book you will learn about institutions–the rules and norms that guide the interactions among us. Those rules and norms can be found from traffic rules, rules in sports, regulations on when and where alcohol can be consumed, to constitutional rules that define who can become president of the United States of America. Rules and norms guide us to cooperative outcomes of so-called collective action problems. If we rely on voluntary contributions only to get anything done, this may not lead to the best results. But research also shows that coercion of people to comply to strict rules do not necessary lead to good outcomes. What combination of sticks and carrots is needed to be successful to solve collective action problems such as sustaining the commons? The book is based on the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. Ostrom is best known as the 2009 co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”. Elinor Ostrom was a professor at Indiana University since the mid 1960s, and a part-time research professor at Arizona State University since 2006. She was active in research and teaching until her death at the age of 78 on June 12, 2012.

Note: I THEORETICAL BACKGROUND -- 1 Why Study the Commons? -- 2 Defining Institutions -- 3 Action Arenas and Action Situations -- 4 Social Dilemmas -- II CASE STUDIES -- 5 Water Governance -- 6 Harvesting From the Commons -- 7 Design Principles to Sustain the Commons -- III HUMAN BEHAVIOR -- 8 Social Dilemmas in the Laboratory -- 9 Self-governance in the Laboratory -- IV RULES OF THE GAMES -- 10 Classifying Rules -- 11 Rules, Norms and Shared Strategies -- V A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE -- 12 Feedbacks and Stability -- 13 Coupled Infrastructure Systems -- 14 Think Globally, Act Locally? -- 15 Challenges Ahead , In English.

Language: English

UID:

Format: 1 online resource

Content: This textbook discusses the main framework, concepts and applications of the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues for an undergraduate audience. We began teaching a course on collective and the commons in 2007 at Arizona State University. Initially we made use of Ostrom's classic book “Governing the Commons”, but this book was not written for an undergraduate audience. Moreover, many new insights have been developed since the 1990 publication of “Governing the Commons”. Therefore we decided to write our own textbook, which we have been using since the Spring of 2012. In this book you will learn about institutions–the rules and norms that guide the interactions among us. Those rules and norms can be found from traffic rules, rules in sports, regulations on when and where alcohol can be consumed, to constitutional rules that define who can become president of the United States of America. Rules and norms guide us to cooperative outcomes of so-called collective action problems. If we rely on voluntary contributions only to get anything done, this may not lead to the best results. But research also shows that coercion of people to comply to strict rules do not necessary lead to good outcomes. What combination of sticks and carrots is needed to be successful to solve collective action problems such as sustaining the commons? The book is based on the work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. Ostrom is best known as the 2009 co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”. Elinor Ostrom was a professor at Indiana University since the mid 1960s, and a part-time research professor at Arizona State University since 2006. She was active in research and teaching until her death at the age of 78 on June 12, 2012.

Note: I THEORETICAL BACKGROUND -- 1 Why Study the Commons? -- 2 Defining Institutions -- 3 Action Arenas and Action Situations -- 4 Social Dilemmas -- II CASE STUDIES -- 5 Water Governance -- 6 Harvesting From the Commons -- 7 Design Principles to Sustain the Commons -- III HUMAN BEHAVIOR -- 8 Social Dilemmas in the Laboratory -- 9 Self-governance in the Laboratory -- IV RULES OF THE GAMES -- 10 Classifying Rules -- 11 Rules, Norms and Shared Strategies -- V A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE -- 12 Feedbacks and Stability -- 13 Coupled Infrastructure Systems -- 14 Think Globally, Act Locally? -- 15 Challenges Ahead , In English.

Language: English

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Format: XIII, 262 S. , graph. Darst.

ISBN: 1858987636

Series Statement: Advances in ecological economics

Note: Literaturverz. S. 240 - 259 , Literaturverz. S. 240 - 259

Language: English

Subjects: Economics , Geography , General works

Keywords: Anthropogene Klimaänderung ; Modell ; Anthropogene Klimaänderung ; Umweltpolitik ; Modell ; Umweltökonomie ; Klimaänderung ; Mathematisches Modell ; Umweltpolitik ; Bibliographie enthalten

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Format: 1 online resource (376 pages) : , illustrations.

Edition: Course Book.

Edition: Electronic reproduction. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2010. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Edition: System requirements: Web browser.

Edition: Access may be restricted to users at subscribing institutions.

ISBN: 9781400835157

Content: Advances in the social sciences have emerged through a variety of research methods: field-based research, laboratory and field experiments, and agent-based models. However, which research method or approach is best suited to a particular inquiry is frequently debated and discussed. Working Together examines how different methods have promoted various theoretical developments related to collective action and the commons, and demonstrates the importance of cross-fertilization involving multimethod research across traditional boundaries. The authors look at why cross-fertilization is difficult to achieve, and they show ways to overcome these challenges through collaboration. The authors provide numerous examples of collaborative, multimethod research related to collective action and the commons. They examine the pros and cons of case studies, meta-analyses, large-N field research, experiments and modeling, and empirically grounded agent-based models, and they consider how these methods contribute to research on collective action for the management of natural resources. Using their findings, the authors outline a revised theory of collective action that includes three elements: individual decision making, microsituational conditions, and features of the broader social-ecological context. Acknowledging the academic incentives that influence and constrain how research is conducted, Working Together reworks the theory of collective action and offers practical solutions for researchers and students across a spectrum of disciplines.

Note: Frontmatter -- , Contents -- , List of Illustrations -- , List of Tables -- , Acknowledgments -- , Prologue -- , Chapter One. Overcoming Methodological Challenges -- , Chapter Two. Small-N Case Studies: Putting the Commons under a Magnifying Glass -- , Chapter Three. Broadly Comparative Field-Based Research -- , Chapter Four. Meta-Analysis: Getting the Big Picture through Synthesis -- , Chapter Five. Collaborative Field Studies -- , Chapter Six. Experiments in the Laboratory and the Field -- , Chapter Seven. Agent-Based Models of Collective Action -- , Chapter Eight. Building Empirically Grounded Agent-Based Models -- , Chapter Nine. Pushing the Frontiers of the Theory of Collective Action and the Commons -- , Appendix 9.1: A Theoretical Puzzle: Why Do Some Resource Users Self-Organize and Others Do Not? -- , Chapter Ten. Learning from Multiple Methods -- , Notes -- , References -- , Index. , In English.

Language: English

DOI: 10.1515/9781400835157

URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400835157

URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400835157