UID:
kobvindex_HPB1053904820
Format:
1 online resource
Edition:
First edition.
ISBN:
9783845284576
,
3845284579
,
3848741881
,
9783848741885
Content:
Eine Vielzahl organisatorischer Reformen scheitert aufgrund des Widerstandes der Mitarbeiter (resistance to change). Veränderungen erfordern Offenheit gegenüber Neuem, und viele Menschen empfinden Angst vor dem Ungewissen. Mit Hilfe eines ökonomischen Laborexperimentes untersucht Jan Philipp Krügel die Umstände, unter denen die Akzeptanz für Wandel hoch und gleichzeitig Widerstände gering ausfallen. Die Ergebnisse der Studie legen nahe, dass Mitarbeiter strukturelle Reformen insbesondere dann unterstützen, wenn sie vom Unternehmen im Vorfeld gut behandelt wurden und als fair empfundene Löhne erhalten. Jan Philipp Krügel ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Behavioral Economics, an der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität in Hamburg. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte liegen in den Bereichen experimentelle Ökonomie, Spieltheorie und Verhaltensökonomik. Many organisational changes fail because of resistance to change by employees. Changes require new ways of thinking, and the general uncertainty that surrounds them tends to make people uncomfortable. Jan Philipp Krügel examines the circumstances under which employees are more accepting of change with a laboratory experiment. His findings suggest that if employees are treated well by their employer in the first place, they are also more willing to help implement changes. The general uncertainty about the outcome of change, however, does not necessarily lead to strong resistance. Jan Philipp Krügel is currently working as a research assistant for the chair of behavioural economics at Helmut-Schmidt-University in Hamburg. His research focuses on experimental economics, game theory and behavioural economics.
Note:
Cover; Chapter 1: Introduction; I State of the Art; Chapter 2: Resistance to Change: A Survey; 1 Definitions; 2 Causes; 2.1 Social Psychology; 2.2 Management Science; 2.3 Political Economy; 3 Relevance; 4 Overcoming Resistance; Chapter 3: Theoretical Background; 1 Threshold Contribution Games; 2 Voter Participation Games; 3 Efficiency Wages; 3.1 The Shirking Model; 3.2 Empirical Studies; 3.3 The Fair-Wage Effort Hypothesis; 4 The Gift Exchange Game; 5 Upshot; II Resistance to Change: An Experimental Study; Chapter 4: Theory and Hypotheses.
,
1 A Model with Self-Regarding Preferences1.1 Assumptions; 1.2 Nash-Equilibria; 1.3 Equilibrium Selection; 2 Incorporating Reciprocity; 2.1 Basic Design; 2.2 Equilibrium Analysis; 3 Alternative Specifications; 3.1 Social Preferences; 3.2 Beliefs and Risk Aversion; Chapter 5: Methodology; 1 Overview; 2 Mechanism and Procedures; 3 Limitations; Chapter 6: Experimental Design; 1 The Baseline Treatment; 2 Treatment Variations; 3 Elicitation of Social Preferences and Risk Attitudes; 4 Procedure; Chapter 7: Results; 1 Descriptive Statistics; 2 Group Outcomes.
,
2.1 Reciprocity and Efficiency2.2 Coordination; 2.3 Free Riding; 3 Individual Outcomes; Chapter 8: Implications; Bibliography; Appendix; A. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria; B. Additional Regressions; C. Instructions.
Additional Edition:
Print version: Krügel, Jan Philipp. Explaining resistance to change. Baden-Baden : Nomos, [2017] ISBN 9783848741885
Additional Edition:
ISBN 3848741881
Language:
English
URL:
ProQuest Ebook Central
Bookmarklink
