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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Chile's Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule : A Model-Based Evaluation (2009)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_845888765
    Format: Online-Ressource (54 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451872356 , 9781451872354
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/88
    Content: The paper analyzes Chile''s structural balance fiscal rule in the face of copper price shocks originating in foreign copper demand. It uses a version of the IMF''s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) that includes a copper sector. Two results are obtained. First, Chile''s current fiscal rule performs well if the policymaker puts a small weight on output volatility (relative to inflation volatility) in his/her objective function. A more aggressive countercyclical fiscal rule can attain lower output volatility, but there is a trade-off with (somewhat) higher inflation volatility and (much) higher volatility of fiscal variables. Second, given its current stock of government assets, Chile''s adoption of a 0.5% surplus target starting in 2008 is desirable from a business cycle perspective. This is because the earlier 1% target would have required significant further asset accumulation that could only have been accomplished at the expense of greater volatility in fiscal instruments and therefore in GDP
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Kumhof, Michael Chile's Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule: A Model-Based Evaluation Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009 ISBN 9781451872354
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781451872354.001
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Inequality, leverage and crises / (2010)
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edoccha_9958121125802883
    Format: 1 online resource (55 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-8902-3 , 1-4552-6294-3 , 1-283-55643-X , 1-4552-1151-6 , 9786613868886
    Series Statement: IMF working papers ; WP/10/268
    Content: The paper studies how high leverage and crises can arise as a result of changes in the income distribution. Empirically, the periods 1920-1929 and 1983-2008 both exhibited a large increase in the income share of the rich, a large increase in leverage for the remainder, and an eventual financial and real crisis. The paper presents a theoretical model where these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in bargaining powers over incomes. A financial crisis can reduce leverage if it is very large and not accompanied by a real contraction. But restoration of the lower income group's bargaining power is more effective.
    Note: "November 2010." , Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Stylized Facts; 1. Income Inequality and Household Leverage; 2. Real Income Inequality; 3. Income Inequality and Consumption Inequality; 4. The Variance of Annual, Permanent, and Transitory (log) Earnings; 5. Debt to Income Ratios; 6. The Size of the U.S. Financial Sector; 7. Mortgage Debt and Subprime Borrowing; 8. Mortgage Default - Share of Past Due Loans; III. The Model; A. Investors; B. Workers; C. Technology; D. Equilibrium; E. Calibration; 9. Leverage and Crisis Probability in the Model; F. Solution Methods , IV. Simulated Scenarios10. Baseline Scenario; 11. Less Capital Investment; 12. Nearly Permanent Change in Bargaining Power; 13. High Variable instead of Low Fixed Subsistence Consumption; 14. Orderly Debt Restructuring; 15. Restoration of Workers' Bargaining Power; A. Baseline Scenario; B. Uncertainty; C. High Leverage - Aggravating Factors; D. High Leverage - Solutions; E. Further Discussion; V. Conclusions; References; Footnotes , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4552-1075-7
    Language: English
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  • 3
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    Online Resource
    Politically optimal fiscal policy / (2007)
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958108186302883
    Format: 1 online resource (28 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-3767-8 , 1-4527-3801-7 , 1-283-51625-X , 9786613828705 , 1-4519-1085-1
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/07/68
    Content: Why do governments issue large amounts of debt? In what sense and for whom is such a policy optimal? We show that twisting the optimal taxation paradigm produces very reasonable predictions for debt and real interest rates. Adding an extra dimension of uncertainty about the political planning horizon gives rise to a positive and very plausible government debt-to-GDP ratio of about 55 percent in a model that otherwise predicts negative government debt. We quantify the impact of political uncertainty on steady state and business cycle dynamics. We illustrate how populist tax cuts can cause business cycle fluctuations.
    Note: "March 2007." , At head of title: Research Department, IMF Institute. , Contents; I. Introduction; II. TheModel; A. Decentralized Economy; 1. Households; 2. Firms; 3. Financial Intermediary; 4. Government; 5. Competitive Equilibrium; B. The Political Planner; III. Political Equilibrium- The Results; A. Calibration; B. The Non-Stochastic Steady State; C. The Stochastic Steady State; D. Transition to the Stochastic Steady State; Tables; 1. Long Run Characteristics of the Model; Figures; 1. Transition to the Stochastic Steady State for a Given History of Shocks; E. Optimal Policy froma Timeless Perspective; 1. Precautionary Government Saving , 2. Perfect Foresight Transition to the Deterministic Steady State3. Steady State Effects for the Case of No Transaction Costs and Long Policy Horizon; 2. The Effect of Planning Horizons; 4. Permanent Reduction in the Planning Horizon from 15 to 10 Years; 5. Steady State Effects of Varying the Planning Horizon; F. Political Instability; 6. Stochastic Steady State Debt-to-GDP Ratios as a Function of the Planning Horizon and Adjustment Costs; G. The Cyclical Properties of Optimal Fiscal Policy; 7. Temporary Shock to the Planning Horizon; 8. Budgetary Implications of a Government Spending Shock , 9. Serial Correlation of Taxes as a Function of Persistence of ShocksIV. Conclusion; Appendices; 1. Appendix 1. The Non-Stochastic Steady State; 2. Appendix 2. Solving the Model Using a Global Method; References , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6632-1
    Language: English
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Simple monetary rules under fiscal dominance / (2007)
    [Washington, D.C.?] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958061617602883
    Format: 1 online resource (27 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-8608-3 , 1-4527-6322-4 , 1-282-54245-1 , 1-4519-1287-0 , 9786613822109
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/07/271
    Content: Is aggressive monetary policy response to inflation feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance? We find that if nominal interest rates are allowed to respond to government debt, even aggressive rules that satisfy the Taylor principle can produce unique equilibria. However, resulting inflation is extremely volatile and zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is frequently violated. Within the set of feasible rules the optimal response to inflation is highly negative, and more aggressive inflation fighting is inferior from a welfare point of view. The welfare gain from responding to fiscal variables is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance.
    Note: "December 2007." , At head of title: Research Department and IMF Institute. , Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; III. Monetary Policy in a Ricardian World; IV. Monetary Policy under Fiscal Dominance; A. Government Spending in the Interest Rate Rule; B. Government Liabilities in the Interest Rate Rule; V. Conclusion; References; Figures; 1 Ricardian Fiscal Policy and the Taylor Rule; 2a Productivity Shock under Ricardian Fiscal Policy; 2b Government Spending Shock under Ricardian Fiscal Policy; 3 Fiscal Dominance and Interest Rate Feedback to Government Spending; 4 Fiscal Dominance and Interest Rate Feedback to Government Liabilities , 5a Productivity Shock under Fiscal Dominance5b Government Spending Shock under Fiscal Dominance , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6834-0
    Language: English
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  • 5
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    Online Resource
    Balance of payments crises under inflation targeting / (2007)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958074021802883
    Format: 1 online resource (28 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-8307-6 , 1-4527-6727-0 , 1-283-51172-X , 9786613824172 , 1-4519-1101-7
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/07/084
    Content: This paper analyzes a small open economy model under inflation targeting. It shows why such a monetary regime is vulnerable to speculative attacks that take place over a short period rather than instantaneously. The speed at which the regime collapses, and the extent of reserve losses, are increasing in the central bank's explicit or implicit commitment to intervene in the foreign exchange market. Attacks are therefore ranked, from most to least severe, as follows: Exchange rate targeting, CPI inflation targeting, domestic nontradables inflation targeting, and money targeting. Under inflation targeting the size of the attack is increasing in the tradables consumption share.
    Note: "April 2007". , Contents; I. Introduction; II. TheModel; A. Households; B. Firms; C. Government; D. Equilibrium; E. Unsustainable Policy; III. Model Solution; A. Parameter Values; B. SolutionMethod; IV. The Dynamics of Speculative Attacks; A. Model Dynamics; Figures; 1. (a) Overview (Full Accommodation); 1. (b) LaborMarket (Full Accommodation); 1. (c) Price Levels and Inflation Rates (Full Accommodation); 1. (d) Government Budget (Full Accommodation); Tables; 1. Reserve Loss Ratios - Central Bank Accommodates Money Demand at t=0; 2. Reserve Loss Ratios - Central Bank Ensures Smooth Target Paths at t=0 , 2. Overview (Smooth Target Paths)B. Two Examples - Chile 1998 and Brazil 2001/2; V. Conclusion; 3. Chile 1997 - 1999; 4. Brazil 2001 - 2003; References , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6648-8
    Language: English
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    To starve or not to starve the beast? / (2010)
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958063775202883
    Format: 1 online resource (59 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-0326-9 , 1-4552-6268-4 , 1-282-84743-0 , 9786612847431 , 1-4552-0529-X
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/10/199
    Content: For thirty years prominent voices have advocated a policy of starving the beast cutting taxes to force government spending cuts. This paper analyzes the macroeconomic and welfare consequences of this policy using a two-country general equilibrium model. Under several strong assumptions the policy, if fully implemented, produces domestic output and welfare gains accompanied by losses elsewhere. But negative effects can easily arise in the presence of longer policy implementation lags, utility-enhancing government spending, and productive government capital. Overall, the analysis finds no support for the idea that starving the beast is a foolproof way towards higher output and welfare.
    Note: "August 2010." , At head of title: Research Department. , Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Households; B. Firms; 1. Manufacturers; 2. Distributors; 3. Retailers; C. Government; 1. Fiscal Policy; 2. Starving-the-Beast; 3. Monetary Policy; III. Calibration; IV. Welfare; A. Benchmark Welfare: No Government Spending in Utility; B. Alternative Welfare: With Government Spending in Utility; V. Results; 1. Base Case; 2. Slower Expenditure Adjustment; 3. Government Investment Cut; 4. Capital Income Tax Cut; 5. Longer Planning Horizons; 6. Inelastic Labor Supply; 7. Undoing the Tax Cut , 1. Macroeconomic Effects (in percent deviation from initial steady state)2. Benchmark Welfare - No Government Spending in Utility Function; 3. Alternative Welfare - With Government Spending in Utility Function; A. Baseline Experiment; B. Sensitivity Analysis; 1. Slower Expenditure Adjustment; 2. Government Investment Cut; 3. Capital Income Tax Cut; 4. Longer Planning Horizons; 5. Inelastic Labor Supply; 6. Undoing the Tax Cut; C. The Relationship between Welfare and Discount Rates; VI. Conclusions; References; Footnotes
    Language: English
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Monetary policy in an equilibrium portfolio balance model / (2007)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958074024702883
    Format: 1 online resource (33 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-9316-0 , 1-4527-0774-X , 1-283-51161-4 , 1-4519-1089-4 , 9786613824066
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/07/72
    Content: Standard theory shows that sterilized foreign exchange interventions do not affect equilibrium prices and quantities, and that domestic and foreign currency denominated bonds are perfect substitutes. This paper shows that when fiscal policy is not sufficiently flexible in response to spending shocks, perfect substitutability breaks down and uncovered interest rate parity no longer holds. Government balance sheet operations can be used as an independent policy instrument to target interest rates. Sterilized foreign exchange interventions should be most effective in developing countries, where fiscal volatility is large and where the fraction of domestic currency denominated government liabilities is small.
    Note: "March 2007". , Contents; I. Introduction; II. TheModel; A. Uncertainty; B. Households; Figures; 1. Foreign Holdings of Mexican Peso Denominated Government Securities, Percent of Total; Source: Banco deMexico; C. Government; D. Equilibrium, Current Account and Interest Rate Differential; III. Policy Implications; A. Calibration and Estimation; B. Monetary Policy; 2. Unsterilized Foreign Exchange Purchase and Open Market Sale; 3. Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention - Baseline Case; 4. Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention - Low Volatility of Fiscal Shocks; IV. Conclusion , 5. Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention - High Volatility of Fiscal ShocksAppendices; 1: Returns on Assets; 2: The Value Function; References , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6636-4
    Language: English
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Government debt : a key role in financial intermediation (2005)
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund, Research Dept.,
    Details
    UID:
    edoccha_9958116107202883
    Format: 1 online resource (30 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-3874-7 , 1-4527-5622-8 , 1-282-05095-8 , 9786613798404 , 1-4519-0612-9
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/05/57
    Content: The literature on optimal fiscal policy finds that highly volatile real returns on government debt, for example through surprise inflation, have very low costs. However, policymakers are almost always very apprehensive of this option. The paper discusses evidence concerning features of developing country financial markets that are missing in existing models, and that may suggest why this policy is considered so costly in practice. Most importantly, domestic banks choose to be highly exposed to government debt because the alternative, private lending, is more risky under existing legal and institutional imperfections. This exposure makes banks and their borrowers vulnerable to the government's debt policy.
    Note: "March 2005." , ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. GOVERNMENT DEBT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES""; ""III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES"" , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6076-5
    Language: English
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  • 9
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    Online Resource
    International currency portfolios / (2009)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958108340402883
    Format: 1 online resource (37 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4623-3660-4 , 1-4527-3292-2 , 1-4518-7196-1 , 9786612842702 , 1-282-84270-6
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/09/48
    Content: This paper develops a theory of international currency portfolios that holds in general equilibrium, and that is therefore not subject to the criticisms directed at the portfolio balance literature of the 1980s. It shows that, under plausible assumptions about fiscal policy, the relationship between the rates of return of different currency bonds is not correctly described by an arbitrage relationship but instead also depends on outstanding bond stocks. Other findings are: (1) There is a monotonically increasing relationship between domestic interest rates and the portfolio share of domestic currency denominated assets. This relationship is steep at low levels of government debt, and almost flat at high levels of government debt. (2) Optimal private sector foreign currency positions are negative, and their size is decreasing in exchange rate volatility. Under volatile exchange rates large negative aggregate net foreign asset positions can only be rationalized by assuming large public sector borrowing from foreign governments. (3) For a baseline economy with zero net foreign assets, open market sales of domestic government debt lead to valuation gains (losses) when the country as a whole has a short (long) position in foreign currency. (4) A fiscal theory of exchange rate determination is compatible with general equilibrium in a two-country world. (5) Equilibria are determinate when both fiscal and monetary policy are passive.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Uncertainty; 1. Exogenous Processes; 2. Endogenous Processes; B. Households; C. Government; D. Equilibrium and Current Account; E. Interpretation of the Portfolio Share Equations; F. Equilibrium Diffusions; G. Computation of Equilibrium; H. Government Bond Market Interventions; III. The Baseline Economy; A. Calibration; B. Baseline Portfolio Equilibrium; IV. Comparing Alternative Economies; A. Standard Deviation of Monetary Shocks; B. Standard Deviation of Fiscal Shocks; C. Government Debt to GDP Ratios; V. Open Market Operations in Government Debt , VI. Conclusions Figures; 1. Household and Government Balance Sheets; 2. Effects of Money Supply Volatility, phi=phistar=1; 3. Effects of Money Supply Volatility, phi=phistar=0; 4. Effects of Government Spending Volatility, phi=phistar=1; 5. Effects of Government Debt, phi=phistar=1; 6. Home Open Market Operations, phi=phistar=1; 7. Home Open Market Operations, phi=phistar=0; 8. Home Open Market Operations, Large Gross FX Positions; References , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4519-1631-0
    Language: English
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  • 10
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    Online Resource
    Jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules under borrowing constraints / (2009)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958068440902883
    Format: 39 p.
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4623-5071-2 , 1-4518-7431-6 , 1-4527-2886-0 , 9786612844737 , 1-282-84473-3
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/09/286
    Content: We study the welfare properties of an economy where both monetary and fiscal policy follow simple rules, and where a subset of agents is borrowing constrained. The optimized fiscal rule is far more aggressive than automatic stabilizers, and stabilizes the income of borrowingconstrained agents, rather than output. The optimized monetary rule features super-inertia and a very low coefficient on inflation, which minimizes real wage volatility. The welfare gains of optimizing the fiscal rule are far larger than the welfare gains of optimizing the monetary rule. The preferred fiscal instruments are government spending and transfers targeted to borrowing-constrained agents.
    Note: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph , Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. The Model -- A. Infinitely-Lived Households -- B. Borrowing-Constrained Households -- C. Firms -- D. Government -- 1. Monetary Policy -- 2. Budget Constraint -- 3. Fiscal Policy -- E. Competitive Equilibrium -- F. Aggregate Welfare -- III. Calibration -- IV. Results -- A. Impulse Responses -- 1. Fiscal Policy Rule Parameters -- 2. Monetary Policy Rule Parameters -- B. Welfare under Different Shocks -- C. Welfare and Volatility -- 1. Welfare and Volatility of Policy Instruments -- 2. Efficiency Frontiers -- 3. Alternative Fiscal Instruments -- 4. Alternative Fiscal Rules -- 5. Comparison with the Canonical Infinite-Horizon Case -- V. Conclusion -- References -- Tables -- 1. Moments of the Data and the Model -- Figures -- 1. Positive Technology Shock, Different dtax -- 2. Negative Investment Shock, Different dtax -- 3. Positive Consumption Shock, Different dtax -- 4. Positive Technology Shock, Different dpie -- 5. Positive Technology Shock, Different dpie, No Liquidity-Constrained Agents . -- 6. Positive Technology Shock, Different di -- 7. Welfare - Technology Shock -- 8. Welfare - Investment Shock -- 9. Welfare - Consumption Shock -- 10. Welfare - All Shocks -- 11. Welfare and Policy Instrument Volatility -- 12. Welfare-Fiscal Volatility Efficiency Frontier -- 13. Welfare Comparison across Fiscal Instruments -- 14. 100 Percent Infinitely-Lived Agents - Welfare - 2 Dimensional -- 15. 100 Percent Infinitely-Lived Agents - Welfare - 1 Dimensional. , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4519-1847-X
    Language: English
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