Format:
1 Online-Ressource (288 Seiten)
Edition:
1st ed
ISBN:
9783748933366
Series Statement:
Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht v.73
Note:
Cover -- I) Introduction -- II) Innovation Competition: The Dow/DuPont Decision -- A) Innovation, competition and the internal market -- 1) The internal market -- (a) Definition and guiding principles -- (b) The notion of competition in the internal market -- 2) Innovation and the internal market -- (a) Research and development as an objective in the EU Treaties -- (b) European research area -- (c) Competitiveness of the Union -- (d) Research and development vs. innovation -- 3) The Position of Competition Law: Innovation as a Driving Force -- (a) Background: The process of creative destruction -- (b) Competition Rules in the Treaties -- (c) Secondary Competition Law: EC Merger Regulation -- (d) Guidelines and approaches from other jurisdictions and areas of law -- 4) Intermediate result -- B) The Dow/DuPont Decision -- 1) Overview of the Decision -- 2) The Commission's legal basis for innovation concerns in merger control -- (a) Legal basis in EC Merger Regulation -- (b) The Commission's Horizontal Merger Guidelines and innovation -- (c) The Commission refers to US Guidelines and EU Technology Transfer Guidelines -- 3) Theory of harm in Dow/DuPont -- 4) Underlying rationale -- C) Classification and appraisal -- 1) Theory of harm and underlying rationale -- 2) Unilateral Effects Analysis -- 3) Protective purpose and time horizon -- 4) Innovation markets, innovation spaces and innovation competition -- 5) No product/pipeline analysis -- 6) Importance of specific industry features -- 7) Written evidence of reducing innovation efforts -- 8) Integration of the Commission's approach into the existing legal framework -- D) Economic foundation -- 1) Annex 4 of the Dow/DuPont Decision -- (a) Competition in innovation -- (b) Product market competition -- (c) Efficiencies: Focus on Appropriability -- (d) Dynamic market features
,
2) The Federico / Langus / Valletti papers -- 3) Intermediate result -- E) Remedies: Divestment of R& -- D organization -- F) What is new in Dow/DuPont? -- 1) Preceding Innovation Cases -- (a) Cases incorporating innovation competition aspects -- (b) Intermediate result -- 2) Innovation Market Analysis -- (a) Concept of the Innovation Market Analysis -- (b) Intermediate result -- (c) Critique on the Innovation Market approach -- G) In need of a new theory? -- 1) The potential competition doctrine -- 2) The future markets concept -- 3) Innovation competition -- H) Is the innovation competition approach valid? -- 1) Link between innovation and competition -- (a) Standard for incorporating economic reasoning in competition law -- (b) The Schumpeter/Arrow controversy -- (c) Notion of appropriability -- (d) Additional factors determining the relation between innovation and competition -- (e) Intermediate result -- 2) Measuring innovation capacity -- 3) Differences between price and innovation -- 4) Presumption towards decreased innovation incentives: weighing of other factors -- 5) Efficiencies -- (a) Efficiencies in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines -- (b) Efficiency assessment in Dow/DuPont -- (c) Appraisal -- (1) Efficiencies are part of the underlying theory of harm: no burden of proof with the parties -- (2) Efficiency criteria of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines are not fit for innovation competition -- (d) Conclusion on efficiencies -- 6) General requirements of the SIEC test -- 7) Legal Certainty and the right to realize concentrations of undertakings -- (a) Constitutional basis -- (b) Application in Dow/DuPont -- 8) Appropriate remedies -- I) Conclusion -- III) Innovation Competition and the scope of its application in EU Competition Law -- A) Restrictive Agreements according to Article 101 TFEU.
,
1) Possible starting points for innovation competition concerns in Article 101 TFEU -- (a) Innovation aspects in Article 101 TFEU -- (b) Competition in innovation in Regulations and Guidelines on Article 101 TFEU -- (c) Innovation Markets in U.S. Guidelines -- (d) Differences between existing concepts and innovation competition approach in Dow/DuPont -- 2) Applicability of innovation competition in the scope of Article 101 TFEU -- (a) R& -- D cooperation -- (1) Negative effects on innovation incentives -- (aa) Innovation incentives of the cooperating parties -- (bb) Third party incentives -- (cc) Economic findings on the interrelation between cooperation and innovation -- (2) Reduced number of entities performing R& -- D -- (3) No adjustment of Guidelines -- (b) Technology transfer -- 3) Conclusion -- B) Abuse of a dominant position according to Article 102 TFEU -- 1) Possible starting points for innovation competition concerns in Article 102 TFEU -- (a) Legal basis for incorporating innovation concerns -- (b) Factors determining market power -- (c) Innovation-driven competitive pressure in German law -- (1) Application in practice -- (2) Appraisal -- 2) Incorporating innovation competition into Article 102 TFEU -- (a) The rationale behind Dow/DuPont and Article 102 TFEU: assessment criteria -- (b) Oligopolistic market structure -- (c) SIEC test versus dominant position -- (d) Dynamic aspects in Article 102 TFEU -- 3) Kinds of abusive behavior that interrelate with innovation capacity -- (a) Definition of abusive behavior -- (b) Kinds of abusive behavior impacting innovation incentives -- (1) Refusal to supply -- (2) Misuse of regulatory framework -- (3) Discrimination -- (4) Treatment of those and other kinds of conduct -- 4) Powers of the Commission with respect to important innovators -- (a) Fines and procedural principles
,
(b) Other Commission powers -- 5) Conclusion -- C) Allocation of the result in primary law -- 1) Function of Article 101 and 102 TFEU in the internal market -- 2) Development of the EC Merger Regulation -- 3) Interrelation between Article 101 and 102 TFEU and the EC Merger Regulation -- 4) Innovation competition and Article 101 and 102 TFEU -- 5) Conclusion -- IV) Summary -- A) Innovation Competition in Dow/DuPont -- 1) Rationale in Dow/DuPont -- 2) Protective purpose and time horizon -- 3) Innovation competition and innovation spaces -- 4) The approach in Dow/DuPont is novel and necessary -- 5) Under certain circumstances, a link between innovation and competition may be established to the requisite legal standard -- 6) Other factors impacting innovation must be taken into account -- 7) The treatment of efficiencies must be altered with respect to innovation -- 8) Dow/DuPont is anchored in primary law -- B) Innovation Competition and the scope of its application in EU Competition Law -- 1) Restrictive agreements according to Article 101 TFEU -- (a) Starting points for an assessment under Article 101 TFEU -- (b) No application of the innovation competition approach in case of R& -- D cooperation -- (c) No application of the innovation competition approach in cooperation settings in general -- 2) Abuse of a dominant position according to Article 102 TFEU -- (a) Starting points for the assessment under Article 102 TFEU -- (b) The notion of an "important innovator" developed in Dow/DuPont may be used to determine market dominance -- (c) The importance of innovation capacity in abuse of dominance cases is restricted to certain kinds of abusive behavior -- (d) The powers of the Commission may be restricted in settings involving important innovators
,
(e) The criteria set up in Dow/DuPont for determining an important innovator may be used in the context of abuse of dominance -- 3) Allocation of the result in primary law -- Bibliography
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Kurz, Katrin Silja Innovation Competition Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,c2022 ISBN 9783848787692
Language:
English
Subjects:
Law
Keywords:
Europäische Union
;
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
;
Dow Chemical Co.
;
Unternehmenszusammenschluss
;
Marktbeherrschung
;
Missbrauchsverbot
;
Innovation
;
Fusionskontrolle
;
Hochschulschrift
;
Hochschulschrift
Bookmarklink
