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  • 1
    UID:
    almahu_BV042612984
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (XVI, 143 S.) : , graph. Darst.
    Edition: Online_Ausgabe Berlin Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek 2015 Online-Ausg.
    Edition: Nach einem Exemplar der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek mit der Signatur: 2015 B 244
    Note: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2015
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Lee, Miyu Three essays on the effectiveness of merger control 2014
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Three essays on the effectiveness of merger control / von Miyu Choon-Kyong Lee
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Hochschulschrift
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    almahu_BV042621774
    Format: XVI, 143 S. : , graph. Darst.
    Note: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2015
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe Three essays on the effectiveness of merger control / von Miyu Choon-Kyong Lee
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Hochschulschrift
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Berlin : Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
    UID:
    edochu_18452_5220
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (52 Seiten)
    ISSN: 1860-5664
    Series Statement: 2015,11
    Content: There are legal grounds to hear competitors in merger control proceedings, and competitor involvement has gained significance. To what extent this is economically sensible is our question. The competition authority applies some welfare standard while the competitor cares about its own profit. In general, but not always, this implies a conflict of interest. We formally model this setting with cheap talk signaling games, where hearing the competitor might convey valuable information to the authority, but also serve the competitor’s own interests. We find that the authority will mostly have to ignore the competitor but, depending on the authority’s own prior information, strictly following the competitor’s selfish recommendation will improve the authority’s decision. Complementary to our analysis, we provide empirical data of competitor involvement in EU merger cases and give an overview of the legal discussion in the EU and US.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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