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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    How do treasury systems operate in sub-Saharan francophone Africa? (2003)
    Paris : OECD Publishing
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    UID:
    gbv_730015459
    Format: 37 p
    ISSN: 1681-2336
    Content: Treasury systems in sub-Saharan Francophone African countries share many features with the French public expenditure management system of the 1960s on which they were modelled. However, in a different economic and institutional environment, key elements of this framework have evolved in unexpected, unwelcome directions. This paper critically examines two main features of the French system in the sub-Saharan Francophone African context: the strict separation between the person ordering payment and the one disbursing funds, and the centralisation of funds in the treasury. This examination calls attention to – and suggests remedies for – the specific flaws that have evolved from the traditional framework.
    In: OECD, OECD journal on budgeting, Paris : Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001, Vol. 2, no. 4, p. 49-83, 1681-2336
    Additional Edition: Parallelausg. Comment fonctionnent les systèmes du Trésor dans les pays francophones de l'Afrique subsaharienne
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1787/budget-v2-art22-en
    URL: Volltext
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries (2007)
    Paris : OECD Publishing
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    UID:
    gbv_730022781
    Format: 30 p
    ISSN: 1681-2336
    Content: A well-functioning public expenditure management system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency. This article discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, the authors analyse the benefits derived from the use by the ministry of finance of ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. The authors derive a set of possible “control regimes” which can be used by the ministry of finance.
    In: OECD, OECD journal on budgeting, Paris : Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001, Vol. 7, no. 3, p. 1-29, 1681-2336
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1787/budget-v7-art16-en
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  • 3
    Online Resource
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    Comment fonctionnent les systèmes du Trésor dans les pays francophones de l'Afrique subsaharienne (2003)
    Paris : OECD Publishing
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    UID:
    gbv_730015610
    Format: 40 p
    ISSN: 1684-3525
    Content: Les systèmes du trésor dans les pays francophones de l’Afrique subsaharienne s’apparentent à bien des égards au système français de gestion des dépenses publiques des années 60, car celui-ci leur a servi de modèle. Toutefois, en raison de certaines différences liées au contexte économique et au cadre administratif, certains éléments clés de ce système ont évolué de manière inattendue et malencontreuse. Le présent document jette un regard critique sur deux aspects importants du système français dans le contexte des pays francophones de l’Afrique subsaharienne : d’une part la séparation stricte entre la fonction d’ordonnancement, qui consiste à ordonner qu’un paiement soit effectué, et celle de paiement, qui consiste à verser les fonds, et d’autre part la centralisation des fonds dans le trésor. Le présent examen met en relief certaines lacunes particulières apparues depuis la mise en place du cadre traditionnel et propose des solutions.
    In: OECD, Revue de l'OCDE sur la gestion budgétaire, Paris : OCDE, 2001, Vol. 2, no. 4, p. 57-95, 1684-3525
    Additional Edition: Parallelausg. How do treasury systems operate in sub-Saharan francophone Africa?
    Language: French
    DOI: 10.1787/budget-v2-art22-fr
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  • 4
    Online Resource
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    A principal-agent theory approach to public expenditure management systems in developing countries / (2006)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958074015402883
    Format: 1 online resource (45 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4623-8814-0 , 1-4519-8834-6 , 1-283-51214-9 , 1-4519-9323-4 , 9786613824592
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/06/204
    Content: A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of two control instruments; ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible "control regimes" which can be used by the MoF. Although we illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, it is also relevant to developed economies.
    Note: "September 2006." , ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. INTERPRETATION OF PEM UNDER THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL ""; ""IV. EX POST AUDITS""; ""V. EX ANTE CONTROLS""; ""VI. CONCLUSION""; ""REFERENCES"" , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6464-7
    Language: English
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  • 5
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    Online Resource
    Towards a principal-agent based typology of risks in public-private partnerships / (2009)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958078123502883
    Format: 1 online resource (25 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4623-4164-0 , 1-4527-6015-2 , 9786612843884 , 1-4518-7324-7 , 1-282-84388-5
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/09/177
    Content: There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered.
    Note: At head of title: Offices in Europe. , "August 2009." , Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4519-1750-3
    Language: English
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  • 6
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    Online Resource
    The Complier Pays Principle : The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management (2000)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_845865560
    Format: Online-Ressource (28 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451847106 , 9781451847109
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 00/51
    Content: This paper examines the role and impact of taxation on sustainable forest management. It is shown that fiscal instruments neither reinforce nor substitute for traditional regulatory approaches. Far from encouraging more sustainable forest management, fiscal instruments such as an inappropriate tax policy can actually undermine it. The paper uses the arguments at the root of the Faustmann solution to draw conclusions on the incentives for sustainable tropical forest exploitation. The paper also proposes a bond mechanism as an alternative market-based instrument to encourage sustainable forest logging while reducing monitoring costs
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Leruth, Luc The Complier Pays Principle: The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000 ISBN 9781451847109
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781451847109.001
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    How Do Treasury Systems Operate in Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa? (2002)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_845864262
    Format: Online-Ressource (36 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451847874 , 9781451847871
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 02/58
    Content: Treasury systems in sub-Saharan francophone African countries share many features with the French public expenditure management system of the sixties on which they were modeled. However, in a different economic and institutional environment, key elements of this framework have evolved in unexpected, unwelcome directions. This paper critically examines two main features of the French system in the sub-Saharan francophone African context: the strict separation between the person ordering payment and the one disbursing funds, and the centralization of funds in the treasury. This examination calls attention to—and suggests remedies for—the specific flaws that have evolved from the traditional framework
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Leruth, Luc How Do Treasury Systems Operate in Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa? Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002 ISBN 9781451847871
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781451847871.001
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Crisis and Miss Emily's Perceptions (2010)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_845887068
    Format: Online-Ressource (31 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1462327338 , 9781462327331
    Series Statement: Departmental Papers
    Content: The Crisis and Miss Emily's Perceptions draws an analogy between the theme and the characters in Faulkner's short story ""A Rose for Emily"" and the global financial crisis. In Faulkner's story, all the characters try to deny realities, thus allowing an unstable situation to last longer than it should have. The paper briefly reviews the literature on perception biases and argues that all economic actors have, to some degree, been refusing to face realities, which helped the crisis to unfold
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Leruth, Luc The Crisis and Miss Emily's Perceptions Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2010 ISBN 9781462327331
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781462327331.087
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Corporate Performance and Governance in Malaysia (2002)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_845883836
    Format: Online-Ressource (24 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451857101 , 9781451857108
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 02/152
    Content: This paper measures corporate sector performance (efficiency) and empirically examines the role of corporate governance. A stochastic frontier with inefficiency effects is fitted to a panel dataset of 31 of the largest nonfinancial companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange for the period 1995 to 1999. Focusing specifically on the impact of the system of corporate governance and the level of control on firm-level performance, results show an underlying vulnerability in these firms, exacerbated by their reliance on bank-based borrowing and a highly concentrated shareholding structure with complex cross holdings. Furthermore, debt does not appear to have the control features present in outsider systems of corporate governance
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Leruth, Luc Corporate Performance and Governance in Malaysia Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002 ISBN 9781451857108
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781451857108.001
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries (2006)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_84589739X
    Format: Online-Ressource (43 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451864647 , 9781451864649
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 06/204
    Content: A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of two control instruments; ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible ""control regimes"" which can be used by the MoF. Although we illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, it is also relevant to developed economies
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Leruth, Luc A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006 ISBN 9781451864649
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781451864649.001
    URL: kostenfrei
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