Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: xi, 312 Seiten : , Diagramme.

ISBN: 978-1-316-64903-9 , 978-1-107-19982-8

Language: English

Subjects: Political Science

Keywords: Demokratie ; Autoritärer Staat ; Diktatur ; Totalitarismus ; Politische Elite

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Format: 1 online resource (xiii, 401 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

ISBN: 1-316-67896-2 , 1-316-68015-0 , 1-316-48153-0

Series Statement: Business and public policy

Content: The ʽresource curseʼ is the view that countries with extensive natural resources tend to suffer from a host of undesirable outcomes, including the weakening of state capacity, authoritarianism, fewer public goods, war, and economic stagnation. This book debunks this view, arguing that there is an ʽinstitutions curseʼ rather than a resource curse. Legacies endemic to the developing world have impelled many countries to develop natural resources as a default sector in lieu of cultivating modern and diversified economies, and bad institutions have also condemned nations to suffer from ills unduly attributed to minerals and oil. Victor Menaldo also argues that natural resources can actually play an integral role in stimulating state capacity, capitalism, industrialization, and democracy, even if resources are themselves often a symptom of underdevelopment. Despite being cursed by their institutions, weak states are blessed by their resources: greater oil means more development, both historically and across countries today.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 Aug 2016). , Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Three puzzles and some building blocks; 3. Intellectual heritage of the institutions curse view; 4. The institutions curse; 5. Not manna from heaven after all: the endogeneity of oil; 6. The resource blessing; 7. Whither the Arab Spring?; 8. Conclusions.

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-107-13860-4

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-316-50336-4

Language: English

URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316481530

UID:

Format: xiii, 401 Seiten : , Diagramme.

ISBN: 978-1-107-13860-5 , 978-1-316-50336-2

Series Statement: Business and public policy

Content: "The "resource curse" is the view that countries with extensive natural resources tend to suffer from a host of undesirable outcomes, including the weakening of state capacity, authoritarianism, fewer public goods, war, and economic stagnation. This book debunks this view, arguing that there is an "institutions curse" rather than a resource curse. Legacies endemic to the developing world have impelled many countries to develop natural resources as a default sector in lieu of cultivating modern and diversified economies, and bad institutions have also condemned nations to suffer from ills unduly attributed to minerals and oil. Victor Menaldo also argues that natural resources can actually play an integral role in stimulating state capacity, capitalism, industrialization, and democracy, even if resources are themselves often a symptom of underdevelopment. Despite being cursed by their institutions, weak states are blessed by their resources: greater oil means more development, both historically and across countries today"...

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe ISBN 978-1-316-48153-0

Language: English

Subjects: Political Science

Keywords: Erdölpolitik ; Institution ; Begrenzte Staatlichkeit

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

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Format: 1 online resource (xi, 312 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

ISBN: 1-108-19642-X , 1-108-18800-1 , 1-108-18595-9

Content: This book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Jan 2018). , Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Table of contents -- List of figures -- List of tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- Major Existing Explanations -- Democracy: Of, By, and For the People -- Democracy Is Of and By the People, but Sometimes Not For the People -- A Deeper Critique of Democracy -- Our Book's Contributions -- A New Theoretical Framework for Understanding Democracy -- Roadmap for the Book -- 2 Elites and the Causes and Consequences of Democracy -- Basic Assumptions -- Key Actors in the Theory -- Authoritarian Political Elites -- Incumbent Economic Elites -- Outsider Economic Elites -- The Masses -- Outcomes -- Consolidated Dictatorship -- Volatile Dictatorship -- Elite-Biased Democracy -- Why Elite-Biased Democracy Is a Sustainable Regime Type -- Popular Democracy -- Common Paths to Outcomes -- Elite-Biased Democracy -- Popular Democracy -- Summarizing Our Key Theoretical Predictions for Regime Outcomes -- How Our Theory Relates to Long-Standing Theories of Democratization -- Public Policy and Institutional Consequences of Different Types of Democracies -- Governance Outcomes -- Fiscal and Material Outcomes -- Outcomes for Former Political Elites -- Summary of the Argument and Key Predictions -- Conclusion -- 3 Constitutions as Elite Deal Making -- Constitutions as a Vehicle of Elite Deal Making -- Crafting the Deal -- Enforcing Elite-Biased Constitutions under Democracy -- Measuring Political Regimes and Constitutional Origins -- Global Trends in Political Regimes and Autocratic Constitutions -- Constitutional Engineering Case by Case -- Federalism -- Bicameralism -- Favorable Electoral Systems -- Banning of Left-Wing Parties -- Prohibiting Retroactive Criminal Punishment -- Popular Initiation of Legislation -- Protections for Property Rights -- Additional Elite Bias Features -- Conclusion. , 4 Evidence on the Causes and Consequences of Democracy -- Getting to Democracy -- Hypotheses about Democratization -- Case Evidence -- Measurement -- Measuring Democratic Transition -- Measuring Elite Coordination Potential -- Incumbent Political and Economic Elites -- Outsider Economic Elites and the Masses -- Controls -- Statistical Strategy for Estimating Democratic Transitions -- Statistical Results -- Outcomes under Elite-Biased Democracy -- Measurement Strategy for Explaining Outcomes under Democracy -- Measuring Regime Type -- Controls -- Statistical Strategy for Explaining Outcomes under Regimes -- Empirical Results for Governance and Material Outcomes -- Fiscal and Monetary Outcomes in the Post-World War II Era -- The Fate of Former Dictators -- Measurement Strategy for Explaining Former Dictators' Fates -- Statistical Strategy for Explaining Dictator Fates -- Empirical Results for Dictator Fates -- Conclusion -- 5 Unraveling the Deal -- The Politics and Process of Reforming Elite-Biased Constitutions -- Constitutional Annulments and Amendments -- Annulments of Elite-Biased Constitutions -- Popular Amendments to Elite-Biased Constitutions -- Further Elite Entrenchment under Elite-Biased Constitutions -- The Causes of Constitutional Annulment and Amendments -- Empirical Predictions -- Measurement Strategy for Explaining Constitutional Change -- Measuring Constitutional Change -- Measuring Coordination Potential between Outsider Economic Elites and the Masses -- Controls -- Empirical Strategy for Explaining Constitutional Change -- Empirical Results -- Outcomes following Amendments to Elite-Biased Democracy -- Measurement Strategy for Explaining Outcomes under Democracy -- Measuring Regime Type -- Empirical Strategy for Explaining Outcomes under Regimes -- Empirical Results for Governance and Material Outcomes. , Fiscal and Monetary Outcomes in the Post-World War II Era -- Conclusion -- 6 Sweden -- Incumbent Economic Elites under Dictatorship -- Incumbent Economic Elites Use Parliament to Protect Their Interests -- The Rise of Outsider Economic Elites -- Reaction to Liberalization by Incumbent Economic Elites -- Late Nineteenth-and Early Twentieth-Century Constitutional Engineering -- Bicameralism -- Restrictions on the Franchise over the Nineteenth Century -- Proportional Representation -- Decentralization -- Sweden's Twentieth-Century Elite-Biased Democracy and First Steps toward Popular Democracy -- The Initial Decade of Elite-Biased Institutions -- Initial Reforms to Elite-Biased Democracy -- Growing Social Democratic Hegemony -- The Dawn of Sweden's Golden Age of Progressive Policy -- Long Shadow of Elite Biases -- The Advent of Popular Democracy -- Proximate Reasons behind the 1970s Reforms -- Effects of Popular Democracy -- Challenges to the Welfare State and the Resilience of Popular Democracy -- The Swedish Welfare State Today -- Conclusion -- 7 Chile -- Chile during the Nineteenth Century: A "Republican" Oligarchy -- Chile's Experiment with Popular Democracy -- The Great Depression Cements a New Coalition -- How Popular Was Chile's Democracy before the 1960s? -- The March to Salvador Allende -- Salvador Allende: The Apogee of Popular Rule -- Making Sense of Chile's Era of Popular Democracy -- Chile under the Iron Fist of Pinochet -- Gaming Democracy: Chile's 1980 Constitution -- Fine-Tuning the Constitution on the Eve of Democratization -- Chile's Elite-Biased Democracy -- Overrepresentation of Conservative Parties -- Fate of Pinochet Regime Officials -- Conservative Monetary and Fiscal Policies -- Finance Continues to Blossom -- Large, Export-Oriented Agricultural Interests Continue Their Ascendance -- Inequality -- Reforming Elite-Biased Democracy. , Conclusion -- 8 Colonial and Occupier Legacies in New Democracies -- Classifying Colonial and Occupier Legacies -- The Conventional Wisdom on Colonial Legacies -- Democracy following Colonial Rule: The Cases of Canada and the Philippines -- Canada -- Canadian Independence: A British Orchestration -- British Colonial Legacies -- The Long (but Faded) Shadow of the British Colonial Past -- The Philippines -- Filipino Independence on an American Timetable -- Political Legacies of the American Occupation -- The Maintenance and Modification of the American Colonial Legacy -- A Democratic Successor State to an Authoritarian Predecessor: The Case of Ukraine -- The Founding of Ukraine: A Bridge to the Soviet Past -- Soviet Legacies in Independent Ukraine -- Wiggling in the Straightjacket: Attempts to Overhaul Ukraine's Institutions -- Conclusion -- 9 Conclusion -- Democratic Breakdown -- Shifts from Popular Democracy to Elite-Biased Democracy -- Policy Implications: The Democracy Cure? -- References -- Index.

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-107-19982-4

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-316-64903-2

Language: English

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

UID:

Format: graph. Darst., Tab., Lit. S. 722

ISSN: 1468-2508

In: The journal of politics, Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, 1939, 74(2012), 3, Seite 707-722, 1468-2508

Language: English

UID:

Format: graph. Darst., Tab., Lit. S. 722

ISSN: 0022-3816

In: The journal of politics, Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, 1939, 74(2012), 3, Seite 707-722, 0022-3816

In: volume:74

In: year:2012

In: number:3

In: pages:707-722

Language: English