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  • 1
    UID:
    gbv_845888412
    Format: Online-Ressource (41 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451862202 , 9781451862201
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 05/201
    Content: We test the implications of Flannery''s (1986) and Diamond''s (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low-risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high-risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond''s model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Espinosa-Vega, Marco Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005 ISBN 9781451862201
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    almafu_9958068254102883
    Format: 1 online resource: , illustrations (black and white);
    Series Statement: NBER working paper series no. w8752
    Content: Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large organizations in activities that require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea in the context of bank lending to small firms, an activity that is typically thought of as relying heavily on soft information. We find that large banks are less willing than small banks to lend to informationally 'difficult' credits, such as firms that do not keep formal financial records. Moreover, controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, large banks lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate credit constraints as effectively. All of this is consistent with small banks being better able to collect and act on soft information than large banks.
    Note: January 2002.
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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