UID:
almahu_9949697762002882
Format:
1 online resource (236 pages).
ISBN:
0-12-813813-0
Series Statement:
Perspectives in Behavioral Economics and the Economics of Behavior
Note:
Front Cover -- Belief and Rule Compliance: An Experimental Comparison of Muslim and Non-Muslim Economic Behavior -- Copyright -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Background -- 1.2 Objectives and Outline -- Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks -- 2.1 Neoclassical Economics: Concepts and Limitations -- 2.1.1 Rational Choice Model & Decision Theory -- 2.1.2 Transaction Costs and Efficiency -- 2.1.3 Property Rights and Their Dimensions -- 2.2 Four Levels of Institutional Analysis Framework -- 2.2.1 Social Theory - Embeddedness (Informal Rules of the Game) -- 2.2.2 Institutional Environment (Formal Rules of the Game) -- 2.2.3 Governance of Contractual Relations (Play of the Game) -- 2.2.3.1 Rule Setting -- Mutual Agreement -- Ensuring Justice ( Qist) -- Distribution and Redistribution -- 2.2.3.2 Enforcement of Rules -- 2.2.3.3 The Implications of the Rules -- 2.2.3.4 The Role of Collective Action -- 2.2.4 Resource Allocation and Employment (Motivation for the Game) -- 2.2.4.1 Incentive Systems for All -- 2.3 Rules of Behaviour According to Qur'ān and Sunnah -- 2.3.1 Rule-Compliance and Discouraging Noncompliance (Capstone Rule) -- 2.3.2 Cooperation -- 2.3.3 Consultation -- 2.3.4 Contract -- 2.3.5 Free-Flow of Information -- 2.3.6 Property Rights -- 2.3.7 Reciprocity -- 2.3.8 Right Not to Be Harmed, and the Obligation Not to Harm (Golden Rule) -- 2.3.9 Trust -- 2.4 Positivism Versus Ethicism -- Chapter 3: Game Theory and Human Behaviour -- 3.1 Uncertainty and Decision-Making in Uncertainty -- 3.2 Principles of Human Decision Making -- 3.2.1 Individualistic Dimension -- 3.2.1.1 Biases in Assessments of Information -- 3.2.1.2 Subjective Assessments of Value -- 3.2.1.3 Choice Construction -- 3.2.1.4 Willpower, Procrastination and Temptation -- 3.2.2 Social Dimension -- 3.2.2.1 Social Preferences.
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3.2.2.2 The Influence of Social Networks -- 3.2.2.3 The Role of Social Norms -- 3.2.3 Mental Frames Dimension -- 3.2.3.1 The Impact on Thoughts and Actions -- 3.2.3.2 The Effects of Identity Saliency -- 3.2.3.3 Shaping Beliefs, Ideologies and Biases -- 3.2.4 Divine Dimension -- 3.2.4.1 Revelation in the Scriptures -- 3.2.4.2 Morality and Practical Decision-Making -- 3.2.4.3 Moral Dilemmas: The Case of the Abandoned Ship -- Chapter 4: Markets and Investment Behaviour -- 4.1 Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion -- 4.2 Behavioural Biases in Investing -- 4.2.1 Emotions -- 4.2.1.1 Affects and Animal Spirits -- 4.2.1.2 Hubris and Irrationality -- 4.2.1.3 Mood and Investment Decisions -- 4.2.1.4 Neuroeconomics and Neurofinance -- The 2008 Financial Crisis - A Psycho-Analytic Perspective -- The 2008 Financial Crisis - An Islamic Finance Perspective -- 4.2.2 Framing -- 4.2.2.1 Shaping the Markets -- 4.2.3 Heuristics -- 4.2.3.1 Heterogeneous Beliefs -- 4.2.3.2 Confirmation and Hindsight Bias -- 4.2.4 Market Forces -- 4.2.4.1 Peer Effects and Herd Mentality -- 4.2.4.2 The Influence of Institutional Investors -- 4.3 Risk Preferences -- 4.3.1 Gender and Investment Decisions -- 4.3.2 Culture, Religion and Economic Choice -- 4.3.3 Fear, Trauma and Countercyclical Risk Aversion -- 4.3.4 Recency and Uncertainty -- Chapter 5: Game Theory and Testing for Rule Compliance -- 5.1 The Rules of the Game -- 5.1.1 Motivation for Our Games -- 5.1.2 Games We Play(ed) -- 5.2 Games Design -- 5.2.1 Game 1: Rowing Game (Test for Capstone Rule) -- 5.2.2 Game 2: Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Test for Rule of Cooperation) -- 5.2.3 Game 3: Ultimatum Game (Test for Rule of Contract) -- 5.2.4 Game 4: Cake-Cutting Game (Test for Rule of Property Rights) -- 5.2.5 Game 5: Volunteer's Dilemma (Test for Golden Rule).
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5.2.6 Game 6: Trust Game (Test for the Rules of Trust & Reciprocity) -- 5.2.7 Priming Instrument -- 5.3 Sample -- 5.4 Game Matrix and Group Selection -- 5.5 Background of Cities Where Games are Played -- Chapter 6: Rule-compliance and Institutional Quality -- 6.1 Main Experimental Results -- 6.1.1 Details of Test Subjects -- 6.1.2 Results of Game 1: Rowing Game (Test for Capstone Rule) -- 6.1.3 Results of Game 2: Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Test for Rule of Cooperation) -- 6.1.4 Results of Game 3: Ultimatum Game (Test for Rule of Contract) -- 6.1.5 Results of Game 4: Cake-Cutting Game (Test for Rule of Property Rights) -- 6.1.6 Results of Game 5: Volunteer's Dilemma (Test for Golden Rule) -- 6.1.7 Results of Game 6: Trust Game (Test for Rule of Trust & Reciprocity) -- 6.2 Statistical Analyses of All Experimental Games -- 6.3 Overall Performance in the Tests for All the Rules -- 6.4 Overall Analysis Based on the Performance of the Tests in Both Cities -- Chapter 7: Economic and Institutional Applications -- 7.1 Key Aspects and Recommendations for Institutional Development and Reform -- 7.1.1 Aspect 1: Broad Principles and Core Values -- 7.1.1.1 Implement Prescribed & Proscribed Behaviours -- 7.1.2 Aspect 2: Strict Enforcement of Regulations -- 7.1.2.1 Enforce Mechanisms of Trust, Honesty and Cooperation -- 7.1.3 Aspect 3: Install Institutional Nudges -- 7.1.3.1 Encourage People to Do the Right Things -- 7.1.3.2 Overcome Cognitive Obstacles That Inhibit Action -- The Power of Defaults -- Desirable Action -- 7.1.4 Aspect 4: Manage Perceptions and Reputation -- 7.1.4.1 Enhance Transparency and Openness of Practices -- 7.1.4.2 Reinforce Self-Regulating Behaviours -- 7.2 Rule-Based Versus Principle-Based Systems -- 7.3 Behavioural Approach Applications and Findings -- 7.3.1 Application I. Corruption -- 7.3.2 Application II. Poverty.
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7.3.3 Application III. Environmental/Resource Preservation -- 7.3.4 Application IV. Financial Contracts and Risk-Sharing -- 7.3.5 Application V. Financial Products, Disclosure and Innovation -- 7.3.6 Application VI. Management and Corporate Responsibility -- 7.4 Some Points to Consider -- Chapter 8: Conclusion -- 8.1 Summary of Findings and Contribution -- 8.2 Limitations of Study -- 8.3 Directions for Future Research -- 8.4 Concluding Remarks -- Annex -- Annex 1a : Sample Size and Ratios of Background Spread -- Annex 1b : Sample Size and Ratios of Muslim Versus Non-Muslim and Primed Versus Unprimed Groupings -- Annex 2 : Critical Behaviour Thresholds on Sample Splits Based on WEF's Global Competitiveness Index 2015-16 -- Annex 3 : Priming Instrument -- Islam-Specific Priming Instrument (for Priming Muslims) -- God-Related Priming Sentences (for Priming Non-Muslims) -- Annex 4 : Game Scripts -- Annex 5 : Postexperiment Questionnaire -- Annex 6 : Other Possible Adherents to Prescribe Behaviours (Singapore) -- Annex 7 : Other Possible Adherents to Prescribe Behaviours (Malaysia) -- Annex 8 : Other Statistical Data -- References -- Index -- Back Cover.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-12-813809-2
Language:
English
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