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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge [u.a.] :Cambridge Univ. Press,
    UID:
    almafu_BV042034431
    Format: XIV, 354 S. : , Ill.
    Edition: 1. publ.
    ISBN: 978-1-107-04896-6 , 978-1-107-62677-5
    Content: "Order Within Anarchy focuses on how the laws of war create strategic expectations about how states and their soldiers will act during war, which can help produce restraint. International law as a political institution helps to create such expectations by specifying how violence should be limited and clarifying which actors should comply with those limits. The success of the laws of war depends on three related factors: compliance between warring states and between soldiers on the battlefield, and control of soldiers by their militaries. A statistical study of compliance of the laws of war during the twentieth century shows that joint ratification strengthens both compliance and reciprocity, compliance varies across issues with the scope for individual violations, and violations occur early in war. Close study of the treatment of prisoners of war during World Wars I and II demonstrates the difficulties posed by states' varied willingness to limit violence, a lack of clarity about what restraint means, and the practical problems of restraint on the battlefield"..
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe ISBN 978-1-107-27362-7
    Language: English
    Subjects: Law
    RVK:
    Keywords: Kriegsrecht ; Kriegsgefangener ; Kriegsverbrechen ; Rechtsfortbildung
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9947414422802882
    Format: 1 online resource (xiv, 354 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 9781107273627 (ebook)
    Content: Order within Anarchy focuses on how the laws of war create strategic expectations about how states and their soldiers will act during war, which can help produce restraint. The success of the laws of war depends on three related factors: compliance between warring states and between soldiers on the battlefield, and control of soldiers by their militaries. A statistical study of compliance of the laws of war during the twentieth century shows that joint ratification strengthens both compliance and reciprocity, compliance varies across issues with the scope for individual violations, and violations occur early in war. Close study of the treatment of prisoners of war during World Wars I and II demonstrates the difficulties posed by states' varied willingness to limit violence, a lack of clarity about what restraint means, and the practical problems of restraint on the battlefield.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Common conjectures, norms, and identities; 3. The laws of war in their strategic context; 4. Modeling minutia; 5. Patterns of compliance with the laws of war during the twentieth century; 6. Statistical gore; 7. Spoilt darlings? Treatment of prisoners of war during the World Wars; 8. Assessing variation across issues: aerial bombing, chemical weapons, treatment of civilians, and conduct on the high seas; 9. Dynamics of common conjectures: the rational evolution of norms; 10. Conclusion: current issues and policy insights.
    Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9781107048966
    Language: English
    Subjects: Political Science
    RVK:
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 3
    UID:
    kobvindex_DGP1634432606
    ISSN: 0043-8871
    In: World politics, Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1949, 41(1988), 1, Seite 75-97, 0043-8871
    Language: English
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  • 4
    UID:
    kobvindex_DGP1634598318
    Format: 2 graph. Darst., Lit. S. 438
    ISSN: 0020-8833
    In: International studies quarterly, Cary, NC : Oxford University Press, 1967, 31(1987), 4, Seite 423-438, 0020-8833
    Language: English
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  • 5
    UID:
    kobvindex_DGP596711751
    ISSN: 0022-3433
    In: Journal of peace research, London [u.a.] : SAGE Publ., 1964, Bd. 36 (1999), S. 481-489, 0022-3433
    Language: English
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  • 6
    UID:
    kobvindex_DGP1641787422
    Format: graph. Darst., Tab., Lit.Hinw.
    ISSN: 0043-8871
    Content: The authors tested five novel hypotheses derived from the selectorate theory of war with data for up to about 140 states and spanning the years 1816 - 1993. The hypotheses point to subtle differences in selection effects across regime types that should operate during crises that fall short of war and also during wars. Leaders who rely on a large coalition (such as democrats) to remain in office are shown to be more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to fight wars when the odds of victory are not overwhelming. They are also more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to take part in disputes that fall short of war when the odds are not exceptionally favorable. However, they are less selective about this form of participation than they are about war. Small-coalition leaders show no such selectivity in their preparedness to engage in disputes short of war or in war as a function of their odds of victory. These results hold whether the odds of victory are assessed continuously or whether they are based on a specific threshold. The authors also find, in keeping with the selectorate theory, that if a war fails to resolve quickly, democrats try harder than autocrats to win. And when the war is over, democrats demobilize much more slowly than autocrats. (World Politics / SWP)
    In: World politics, Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1949, 56(2004), 3, Seite 363-388, 0043-8871
    Language: English
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  • 7
    UID:
    kobvindex_DGP1660238293
    Format: 48 (Summer 1994) 3, S. 387-423 , graph. Darst., Tab.
    ISSN: 0020-8183
    In: International organization, Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947, (1994), 48 (Summer 1994) 3, Seite 387-423, 0020-8183
    Language: English
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  • 8
    UID:
    gbv_1641787422
    Format: graph. Darst., Tab., Lit.Hinw.
    ISSN: 0043-8871
    Content: The authors tested five novel hypotheses derived from the selectorate theory of war with data for up to about 140 states and spanning the years 1816 - 1993. The hypotheses point to subtle differences in selection effects across regime types that should operate during crises that fall short of war and also during wars. Leaders who rely on a large coalition (such as democrats) to remain in office are shown to be more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to fight wars when the odds of victory are not overwhelming. They are also more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to take part in disputes that fall short of war when the odds are not exceptionally favorable. However, they are less selective about this form of participation than they are about war. Small-coalition leaders show no such selectivity in their preparedness to engage in disputes short of war or in war as a function of their odds of victory. These results hold whether the odds of victory are assessed continuously or whether they are based on a specific threshold. The authors also find, in keeping with the selectorate theory, that if a war fails to resolve quickly, democrats try harder than autocrats to win. And when the war is over, democrats demobilize much more slowly than autocrats. (World Politics / SWP)
    In: World politics, Baltimore, MD : John Hopkins University Press, 1949, 56(2004), 3, Seite 363-388, 0043-8871
    In: volume:56
    In: year:2004
    In: number:3
    In: pages:363-388
    Language: English
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  • 9
    UID:
    gbv_1660238293
    Format: 48 (Summer 1994) 3, S. 387-423 , graph. Darst., Tab.
    ISSN: 0020-8183
    In: International organization, Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947, (1994), 48 (Summer 1994) 3, Seite 387-423, 0020-8183
    In: year:1994
    In: number:48 (Summer 1994) 3
    In: pages:387-423
    Language: English
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  • 10
    UID:
    gbv_1634432606
    ISSN: 0043-8871
    In: World politics, Baltimore, MD : John Hopkins University Press, 1949, 41(1988), 1, Seite 75-97, 0043-8871
    In: volume:41
    In: year:1988
    In: number:1
    In: pages:75-97
    Language: English
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