Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: xiii, 299 Seiten : , Illustrationen, Diagramme.

ISBN: 978-1-108-73940-5 , 978-1-108-49700-8

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe ISBN 978-1-108-68370-8

Language: English

Subjects: Political Science

Keywords: Partei ; Wahlverhalten

URL: http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030738480&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

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Format: XV, 292 S. : , graph. Darst.

Edition: 1. publ.

ISBN: 978-0-521-88431-0 , 978-0-521-71122-7

Series Statement: Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Note: Includes bibliographical references and index

Language: English

Subjects: Economics , Political Science

Keywords: Telekommunikation ; Elektrizität ; Reformpolitik ; Wahlkampf

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

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Format: 1 online resource (xvii, 250 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 1-107-12017-9 , 0-511-05013-5 , 0-511-17374-1 , 0-511-15295-7 , 0-511-61265-6 , 1-280-43256-X , 0-511-30217-7 , 0-521-78555-3

Series Statement: Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Content: Why do labor unions resist economic restructuring and adjustment policies in some countries and in some economic sectors while they submit in other cases? And why do some labor leaders fashion more creative and effective roles for labor unions? This book addresses these critical questions in an in-depth elegant comparative study of Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela in the 1990s. In each case, the book studies both the role of national confederations as well as individual unions in specific economic sectors in each country. It demonstrates the importance of the presence and nature of alliances between political parties and labor unions as well as the significance of competition between labor unions for the representation of the same set of workers. This work opens new horizons for appreciating the intellectual and practical importance of the variation in the interactions between workers, unions, political parties, and economic policies.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 Oct 2015). , Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Abstract; Acknowledgments; List of Acronyms; 1 Unions' Dilemma: How to Survive Neoliberalism; 2 A Theory of Union-Government Interactions; 3 The Populist Past and Its Institutional Legacies; 4 A Tug of War: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Venezuela; 5 Divided We Rule: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Mexico; 6 From Pickets to Prices: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Argentina; 7 Multilevel Comparison; 8 Labor Competition and Partisan Coalitions; Bibliography; Interviews; Index , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-521-78072-1

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-511-01260-8

Language: English

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612657

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Format: 1 online resource (68 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 1-108-77397-4 , 1-108-77437-7 , 1-108-77221-8

Series Statement: Cambridge elements. Elements in politics and society in Latin America 2515-5253

Content: This Element introduces the concept of institutional weakness, arguing that weakness or strength is a function of the extent to which an institution actually matters to social, economic or political outcomes. It then presents a typology of three forms of institutional weakness: insignificance, in which rules are complied with but do not affect the way actors behave; non-compliance, in which state elites either choose not to enforce the rules or fail to gain societal cooperation with them; and instability, in which the rules are changed at an unusually high rate. The Element then examines the sources of institutional weakness.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Jul 2019). , Cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Understanding Institutional Weakness: Power and Design in Latin American Institutions -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Why Institutional Strength Matters for Comparative Politics -- 1.2 Why Latin America? -- 2 Defining Institutions -- 3 Institutional Weakness -- 3.1 The Core Concept -- 3.1.1 Social Norms and Institutional Strength -- 3.1.2 Insignificance -- 3.2 Types of Institutional Weakness -- 3.2.1 Noncompliance -- 3.2.1.1 State Nonenforcement -- 3.2.1.2 State (In)capacity and Societal Resistance -- 3.2.2 Instability -- 3.3 Judicial Interpretation as a Source of Noncompliance and Instability -- 4 Accounting for Institutional Weakness -- 4.1 Sources of (Non)compliance -- 4.1.1 Strategic Adoption of Weak Institutions -- 4.1.1.1 Implementation and Enforcement Gaps -- 4.1.2 State Capacity and Societal Resistance -- 4.1.3 Societal Sources of Compliance -- 4.2 Sources of Insignificance: Audience Costs and Preemptive Design -- 4.3 Sources of Instability -- 4.3.1 Economic Instability -- 4.3.2 Unstable Coalitions -- 4.3.3 Instability Traps -- 4.3.4 Compliance and Stability -- 5 The Persistence of Institutional Weakness in Latin America -- 5.1 A Problem of Institutional Borrowing? -- 5.2 Mechanisms that Reproduce Institutional Weakness in Latin America -- 5.3 Democracy and Institutional Ambition -- 6 Conclusion -- References.

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-108-73888-5

Language: English

Subjects: Political Science

URL: lizenzpflichtig

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108772211

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Format: XVII, 250 S. , graph. Darst. , 24 cm

ISBN: 0521785553 , 0521780721

Series Statement: Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Note: Includes bibliographical references (p. 205-235) and index

Language: English

Subjects: Economics

URL: Sample text

URL: Publisher description

URL: Table of contents

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

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Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xvii, 339 Seiten) : , Diagramme, Karten.

ISBN: 978-1-108-77660-8

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover ISBN 978-1-108-48933-1

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback ISBN 978-1-108-70233-1

Language: English

Subjects: Political Science

Keywords: Verwaltung ; Politische Kultur ; Politische Verantwortung ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Aufsatzsammlung

DOI: 10.1017/9781108776608

URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)

URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)

URL: lizenzpflichtig

Author information: Brinks, Daniel M. 1961-

Author information: Levitsky, Steven 1968-

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xiii, 299 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 1-108-75095-8 , 1-108-75458-9 , 1-108-68370-3

Content: Calvo and Murillo consider the non-policy benefits that voters consider when deciding their vote. While parties advertise policies, they also deliver non-policy benefits in the form of competent economic management, constituency service, and patronage jobs. Different from much of the existing research, which focuses on the implementation of policy or on the delivery of clientelistic benefits, this book provides a unified view of how politicians deliver broad portfolios of policy and non-policy benefits to their constituency. The authors' theory shows how these non-policy resources also shape parties' ideological positions and which type of electoral offers they target to poorer or richer voters. With exhaustive empirical work, both qualitative and quantitative, the research documents how linkages between parties and voters shape the delivery of non-policy benefits in Argentina and Chile.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 29 Jan 2019). , Non-policy politics -- A demand-side model of non-policy politics -- Tracing political preferences and party organization in Argentina and Chile -- Mapping voter preference in Argentina and Chile -- Party organization: how activists reach voters -- Votersʹ preferences and partiesʹ electoral offers -- Party activists and their conditional effect on the vote -- Targeting patronage in Argentina and Chile -- Back to policy offers -- Non-policy politics and electoral responsiveness.

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-108-49700-4

Language: English

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

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Format: 1 online resource (xvii, 339 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

ISBN: 1-108-80828-X , 1-108-80317-2 , 1-108-77660-4

Content: Analysts and policymakers often decry the failure of institutions to accomplish their stated purpose. Bringing together leading scholars of Latin American politics, this volume helps us understand why. The volume offers a conceptual and theoretical framework for studying weak institutions. It introduces different dimensions of institutional weakness and explores the origins and consequences of that weakness. Drawing on recent research on constitutional and electoral reform, executive-legislative relations, property rights, environmental and labor regulation, indigenous rights, squatters and street vendors, and anti-domestic violence laws in Latin America, the volume's chapters show us that politicians often design institutions that they cannot or do not want to enforce or comply with. Challenging existing theories of institutional design, the volume helps us understand the logic that drives the creation of weak institutions, as well as the conditions under which they may be transformed into institutions that matter.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 May 2020). , Cover -- Half-title page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Maps -- List of Tables -- List of Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- 1 The Political Origins of Institutional Weakness -- Why Institutional Weakness Matters for Comparative Politics -- Defining Institutions -- The Concept of Institutional Weakness -- Social Norms and Institutional Strength -- Insignificance -- Types of Institutional Weakness -- Noncompliance -- State Nonenforcement -- State (In)capacity and Societal Resistance -- Instability -- Judicial Interpretation as a Source of Noncompliance and Instability -- Explaining Institutional Weakness -- Sources of (Non)compliance -- Weakness by Design: The Role of Audience Value -- Implementation Gaps: Disjunctures between Rule Writers and Power Holders -- State Capacity and Societal Resistance -- Societal Sources of Compliance -- Sources of Insignificance -- Sources of Instability: The Cost of Change -- Economic Instability -- Unstable Coalitions -- Instability Traps -- Compliance and Stability -- Conclusion -- 2 When (Electoral) Opportunity Knocks: Weak Institutions, Political Shocks, and Electoral Reforms in Latin America -- Why do Politicians Reform the Rules of the Electoral Game? -- Electoral Rule Change in Latin America -- Modeling the Survival of Electoral Rules -- The Dependent Variable: Time to Electoral Reform -- The Independent Variables: Electoral Shocks and Institutional Constraints -- Results -- Conclusion -- 3 The Stickiness of "Bad" Institutions: Constitutional Continuity and Change under Democracy -- The Objective of this Chapter -- Framework -- Crafting the Deal -- Unraveling the Deal: Constitutional Annulments and Amendments -- Looking under the Hood: Constitutional Annulments and Amendments -- The Causes of Constitutional Annulments and Amendments. , Measurement Strategy for Explaining Constitutional Change -- Measuring Constitutional Change -- Measuring Coordination Potential between Outsider Elites and the Masses -- Controls -- Empirical Strategy for Explaining Constitutional Change -- Empirical Results -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 4 Presidential Crises in Latin America -- Introduction -- Ousters and Observability -- The Political Logic of Presidential Exits -- Patterns of Presidential Crises -- Instability Traps and Institutional Spillover -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 5 Coercion Gaps -- The Coercion Gap -- Setting the Law -- Peru -- Colombia -- Enforcing the Law -- Local Forbearance -- Selecting and Sanctioning Bureaucrats -- Implications for Institutional Weakness -- 6 Aspirational Laws as Weak Institutions: Legislation to Combat Violence against Women in Mexico -- A Life Free from Violence as an "Aspirational Right" -- Aspirational Rights as Weak Institutions -- Law and Policy to Combat VAW in Mexico -- Survey Data on Compliance with VAW Laws -- Physical Domestic Abuse in Mexico -- Attitudes toward Physical Intimate Partner Abuse -- Reporting Physical Intimate Partner Abuse -- Conclusions -- 7 The Social Determinants of Enforcement: Integrating Politics with Limited State Capacity -- The Politics of Enforcement -- Nonenforcement by Forbearance: Gold Mining Cooperatives in Bolivia -- Nonenforcement by Standoff: Brickmakers in Argentina -- Blocked Enforcement: Illegal and Informal Mining in Peru -- Selective Enforcement: Environmental Regulation in Santa Fe, Argentina -- Coproduced Enforcement: Business and the State Against Construction Racketeering in Peru -- Conclusion -- 8 A Multilevel Approach to Enforcement: Forest Protection in the Argentine Chaco -- Enforcement in Multilevel Systems. , The National Forest Protection Regime: National Design and Subnational Implementation in the Core Chaco Provinces -- Designing the NFPR -- Subnational Implementation of the NFPR -- Consistency of Provincial Rules with the NFPR -- Enforcement of the NFPR -- Explaining Governors' Implementation Choices -- Large Producers -- Conservationist Coalitions -- Governors' Choices: Implementation as Conflict Avoidance -- Multilevel Dynamics in Salta -- Salta's Organized Interests and the Design of the NFPR -- Designing Salta's OTBN -- Enforcing the NFPR in Salta -- Conclusion -- 9 What/Whose Property Rights?: The Selective Enforcement of Land Rights under Mexican Liberalism -- The Politics of Enacting and Enforcing Liberal Land Laws -- The Reform Period (1855-1875) -- Disentailment of Corporate Lands -- The Enclosure of Public Lands -- The Porfiriato (1876-1910) -- Disentailment of Corporate Lands -- Enclosures of Public Lands -- Judicial Cases and the Motivations for Selective Enforcement -- General Trends in Judicial Cases on Land Conflicts -- Type of Petitioners and Rate of Success -- Collective Petitioners -- Individual Petitioners -- Different Types and Levels of Enforcement -- Challenged Authorities -- Amparo Judicial Enforcers -- Conclusion -- 10 Imported Institutions: Boon or Bane in the Developing World? -- Intellectual Context -- Case Selection -- A Demanding Test -- An Exogenous Shock -- A Staged Innovation -- Longitudinal Data Analysis -- Discussion -- The Externalization of Monitoring -- The Deepening of Democracy -- The Size of the Agency -- The Skill and Solidarity of the State Agents -- Conclusion -- 11 Social Origins of Institutional Strength: Prior Consultation over Extraction of Hydrocarbons in Bolivia -- Introduction -- Alternative Arguments -- Institutional Strength as Societal Compliance and State Enforcement. , Political Incorporation of Mobilized Social Actors -- Methodology and Case Selection -- Process Tracing of Prior Consultation in Bolivia -- The Contentious Adoption of Prior Consultation in Bolivia -- Indigenous Political Incorporation and Institutional Strengthening of Prior Consultation in Bolivia -- Conclusion -- 12 Conclusion -- Measuring Institutional Weakness -- Measuring Noncompliance -- Direct Observation of Violations -- Observation of Sanctions -- Measuring Enforcement Effort -- Coproduction as an Indirect Measure of Compliance -- Measuring Insignificance -- Measuring Instability -- The Counterfactual Benchmark -- The Persistence of Institutional Weakness in Latin America -- Conclusion: From Institutional Weakness to Institutional Weakening -- Bibliography -- Index.

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-108-48933-8

Language: English

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108776608

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Format: 1 online resource (xv, 292 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

ISBN: 9780511813092 (ebook)

Series Statement: Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Content: This book studies policymaking in the Latin American electricity and telecommunication sectors. Murillo's analysis of the Latin American electricity and telecommunications sectors shows that different degrees of electoral competition and the partisan composition of the government were crucial in resolving policymakers' tension between the interests of voters and the economic incentives generated by international financial markets and private corporations in the context of capital scarcity. Electoral competition by credible challengers dissuaded politicians from adopting policies deemed necessary to attract capital inflows. When electoral competition was low, financial pressures prevailed, but the partisan orientation of reformers shaped the regulatory design of market-friendly reforms. In the post-reform period, moreover, electoral competition and policymakers' partisanship shaped regulatory redistribution between residential consumers, large users, and privatized providers.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Voice and light : the politics of telecommunications and electricity reform -- Political competition and policy adoption -- Casting a partisan light on regulatory choices -- Postreform regulatory redistribution in Chile -- Postreform regulatory redistribution in Argentina and Mexico -- A multilevel analysis of market reforms in Latin American public utilities -- Conclusion.

Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9780521884310

Language: English

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813092

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

UID:

Format: X, 318 S. , graph. Darst.

Edition: 1. Aufl.

ISBN: 8432311936

Series Statement: Nueva ciencia política de América Latina

Uniform Title: Labour unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America 〈span.〉

Note: Literaturverz

Language: Spanish

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

URL: Verlagsangaben