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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    New York : Oxford University Press
    UID:
    gbv_279676506
    Format: X, 189 S.
    ISBN: 0195105060
    Series Statement: Philosophy of mind series
    Note: Literaturverz. S. 179 - 185
    Language: English
    Subjects: Philosophy
    RVK:
    Keywords: Person ; Identität ; Philosophie ; Person ; Identität ; Philosophie ; Philosophy of Mind
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Abingdon, Oxon ; : Routledge,
    UID:
    almahu_9949568569402882
    Format: 1 online resource.
    ISBN: 9781000845563 , 1000845567 , 9781003032908 , 1003032907 , 9781000845594 , 1000845591
    Series Statement: Little debates about big questions
    Content: Are we made entirely of matter, like sticks and stones? Or do we have a soul--a nonphysical entity--where our mental lives take place? The authors Eric T. Olson and Aaron Segal begin this accessible and wide-ranging debate by looking at the often-overlooked question of whether we appear in ordinary experience to be material things. Olson then argues that the dependence of our mental lives on the condition of our brains--the fact that general anesthesia causes complete unconsciousness, for instance--is best explained by saying that our mental lives are physical activities in our brains rather than nonphysical activities in the soul. Segal objects that this view is incompatible with two obvious and important facts about ourselves: that there is only one of you rather than trillions of almost identical beings now thinking your thoughts, and that we exist and remain conscious for more than an instant. These facts, he claims, are presupposed in our practical and moral judgments--but they require us to be immaterial things. Olson is forced to concede that there is no easy and uncontroversial answer to these objections but doubts whether taking us to be immaterial would be any help. The debate takes in large philosophical questions extending well beyond dualism and materialism. The book features clear statements of each argument, responses to counter-arguments, in-text definitions, a glossary of key terms, and section summaries. Scholars and students alike will find it easy to follow the debate and learn the key concepts from metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and other areas necessary to understand each position. Key Features Is the only introductory book devoted to the debate between substance dualism and materialism Discusses both traditional and novel arguments for each position Debates important but infrequently discussed questions, including: do we appear, in ordinary experience, to be material? should materialism be the default view? is there a good probabilistic argument for materialism? Written in a lively and accessible style Uses only a limited number of technical terms and defines all of them in the glossary
    Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9781000845594
    Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 0367333643
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780367333645
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780367470265
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0367470268
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books.
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    New York ; : Oxford University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9947362356602882
    Format: 1 online resource (x, 189 p.).
    ISBN: 9780199833528 (ebook) :
    Series Statement: Philosophy of mind
    Content: Olson presents a defence of a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. Continuity of mental contents or capacities is neither necessary nor sufficient for us to persist through time. Our identity consists in biological processes.
    Additional Edition: Print version ISBN 9780195134230
    Language: English
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  • 4
    Book
    Book
    New York ; London :Routledge,
    UID:
    almahu_BV049097930
    Format: xxiv, 240 Seiten.
    ISBN: 978-0-367-47026-5 , 978-0-367-33364-5
    Series Statement: Little debates about big questions
    Additional Edition: Äquivalent
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe ISBN 978-1-003-03290-8
    Language: English
    Subjects: Philosophy
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Seele ; Philosophie
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Oxford :Oxford University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9947362227402882
    Format: 1 online resource (ix, 250 p.) : , ill.
    ISBN: 9780199872008 (ebook) : , 0199872007 (ebook) :
    Series Statement: Philosophy of mind
    Content: Many discussions of personal identity frequently ignore the basic metaphysical nature of human people. 'What Are We?' explains the question's meaning, considers in detail the main possible answers to it, and suggests how the problem might be solved.
    Additional Edition: Print version ISBN 9780195176421
    Language: English
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  • 6
    Book
    Book
    Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press
    UID:
    gbv_523523424
    Format: IX, 250 S. , graph. Darst. , 24 cm
    ISBN: 0195176421 , 9780195176421
    Series Statement: Philosophy of mind
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index. - Formerly CIP
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe Olson, Eric T., 1963 - What are we? Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2007 ISBN 9780199872008
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0199872007
    Language: English
    Subjects: Philosophy
    RVK:
    Keywords: Philosophische Anthropologie ; Person ; Ontologie ; Selbst
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