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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Dordrecht :Springer Netherlands :
    UID:
    almahu_9949198407802882
    Format: X, 242 p. , online resource.
    Edition: 1st ed. 1992.
    ISBN: 9789401580229
    Series Statement: Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization, 9
    Content: Many social or economic conflict situations can be modeled by specifying the alternatives on which the involved parties may agree, and a special alternative which summarizes what happens in the event that no agreement is reached. Such a model is called a bargaining game, and a prescription assigning an alternative to each bargaining game is called a bargaining solution. In the cooperative game-theoretical approach, bargaining solutions are mathematically characterized by desirable properties, usually called axioms. In the noncooperative approach, solutions are derived as equilibria of strategic models describing an underlying bargaining procedure. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides the reader with an up-to-date survey of cooperative, axiomatic models of bargaining, starting with Nash's seminal paper, The Bargaining Problem. It presents an overview of the main results in this area during the past four decades. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic approach. The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for coalitional bargaining games are included, as well as an auxiliary chapter on the relevant demands from utility theory.
    Note: Preliminaries -- Nash bargaining solutions -- Independence of irrelevant alternatives and revealed preferences -- Monotonicity properties -- Additivity properties -- Risk properties -- Bargaining with a variable number of players -- Alternative models and solution concepts -- Noncooperative models for bargaining solutions -- Solutions for coalitional bargaining games -- Elements from utility theory.
    In: Springer Nature eBook
    Additional Edition: Printed edition: ISBN 9789048141784
    Additional Edition: Printed edition: ISBN 9780792318736
    Additional Edition: Printed edition: ISBN 9789401580236
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics , Mathematics
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Aufsatzsammlung
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 2
    UID:
    almahu_9949285059602882
    Format: XVIII, 316 p. , online resource.
    Edition: 1st ed. 2002.
    ISBN: 9780306475269
    Series Statement: Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization, 31
    Content: Chapters in Game Theory has been written on the occasion of the 65th birthday of Stef Tijs, who can be regarded as the godfather of game theory in the Netherlands. The contributors all are indebted to Stef Tijs, as former Ph.D. students or otherwise. The book contains fourteen chapters on a wide range of subjects. Some of these can be considered surveys while other chapters present new results: most contributions can be positioned somewhere in between these categories. The topics covered include: cooperative stochastic games; noncooperative stochastic games; sequencing games; games arising form linear (semi-) infinite programming problems; network formation, costs and potential games; potentials and consistency in transferable utility games; the nucleolus and equilibrium prices; population uncertainty and equilibrium selection; cost sharing; centrality in social networks; extreme points of the core; equilibrium sets of bimatrix games; game theory and the market; and transfer procedures for nontransferable utility games. Both editors did their Ph.D with Stef Tijs, while he was affiliated with the mathematics department of the University of Nijmegen.
    Note: Stochastic Cooperative Games: Theory and Applications -- Sequencing Games: a Survey -- Game Theory and the Market -- On the Number of Extreme Points of the Core of a Transferable Utility Game -- Consistency and Potentials in Cooperative TU-Games: Sobolev's Reduced Game Revived -- On the Set of Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game: a Survey -- Concave and Convex Serial Cost Sharing -- Centrality Orderings in Social Networks -- The Shapley Transfer Procedure for NTU-Games -- The Nucleolus as Equilibrium Price -- Network Formation, Costs, and Potential Games -- Contributions to the Theory of Stochastic Games -- Linear (Semi-) Infinite Programs and Cooperative Games -- Population Uncertainty and Equilibrium Selection: a Maximum Likelihood Approach.
    In: Springer Nature eBook
    Additional Edition: Printed edition: ISBN 9781441952837
    Additional Edition: Printed edition: ISBN 9781402070631
    Additional Edition: Printed edition: ISBN 9781475776355
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics , Mathematics
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Festschrift ; Aufsatzsammlung
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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