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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Education Attainment in Public Administration Around the World : Evidence from a New Dataset (2012)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_845823132
    Format: Online-Ressource (41 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1475510667 , 9781475510669
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 12/231
    Content: The paper provides a detailed description of a novel dataset on education attainment in public administrations covering the period 1981-2011 for 178 countries. The dataset uses information extracted from CVs for over 130,000 mid to senior level officials from mainly central banks and ministries of economy and finance. Our main finding is that there is little heterogeneity across regions when considering a non quality-adjusted measure of education attainment in public administrations. Adjusting our measure for quality, using a country wide academic ranking, reveals important cross-regional heterogeneity differing from that of standard measures of education attainment for the general population. The dataset also allows us to uncover important patterns in public administrations' education attainment along gender and seniority across regions. We further use the dataset to explore a few applications which provide some evidence of (i) the importance of salary incentives in attracting highly educated staff and (ii) a positive association between education attainment in public administrations and government effectiveness (e.g. higher tax revenue mobilization, limiting corruption, better public finance management and private market support)
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Arezki, Rabah Education Attainment in Public Administration Around the World: Evidence from a New Dataset Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2012 ISBN 9781475510669
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781475510669.001
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability-Exploring the Determinants (2008)
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_845881418
    Format: Online-Ressource (34 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451870051 , 9781451870053
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 08/147
    Content: We analyze recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance. We first calculate levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries. The econometric analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood of establishing adequate governance arrangements are higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Masciandaro, Donato Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability-Exploring the Determinants Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008 ISBN 9781451870053
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.5089/9781451870053.001
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The fear of freedom : politicians and the independence and accountability of financial sector supervisors (2007)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edoccha_9958123896902883
    Format: 1 online resource (52 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-2859-8 , 1-283-51799-X , 9786613830449 , 1-4519-1042-8
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ;
    Content: Compared with the case of central bank independence, independence for financial sector supervisors remains more controversial. This paper analyzes changes in independence and accountability arrangements in a set of 32 countries that overhauled their legal and/or institutional frameworks for supervision in recent years. Despite improvements, there is strong evidence that the endorsement of independence remains half-hearted, which shows itself through either overcompensation on the accountability side, or resort to political control mechanisms. The latter could potentially undermine the agency's credibility. The results indicate that policymakers still need to be persuaded of the long-term benefits of independence for financial sector soundness, and of the potential for a virtuous interaction between independence and accountability, if the arrangements are well-designed.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Table of Contents; I. Introduction and Overview; II. Governance, Independence, and Accountability; A. The Governance Nexus; B. Four Pillars of Regulatory Governance; III. Independence and Accountability in Practice; A. The Four Dimensions of Independence; B. The Dimensions of Accountability; IV. What Are the Emerging Trends?; A. Methodology; Tables; 1. Mapping Accountability Arrangements; B. General Overview; 2. Independence and Accountability Overview; C. Unfamiliarity; 3. Overview of Changes in the Ratings; D. Fear of Freedom: What Worries Governments the Most?; Figures , 1. Ratings Results for Selected Countries4. Changes in Meeting Specific Independence and Accountability Criteria; E. A Closer Look at Individual Countries; F. Additional Perspectives; 5. Accountability and Independence: Regional Trends; 6. Accountability and Independence: Trends by Country Income Levels; 7. Accountability and Independence: Trends by Location of Institution; 8. Accountability and Independence: Trends by Type of Change; V. Conclusions; 9. Accountability and Independence: Trends by Immediate Cause of Reform; Appendixes; I. Countries Selected for the Survey , II. Criteria for the Index on Independence and Accountability for Financial Sector SupervisorsIII. Scatter Plot of Ratings Before and After; IV. Total Rating-Before and After; V. Independence- Before and After; VI. Accountability-- Before and After; References , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4527-9250-X
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6589-9
    Language: English
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Reserve requirements, the maturity structure of debt, and bank runs / (2008)
    [Washington, District of Columbia] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edoccha_9958124767502883
    Format: 1 online resource (28 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4623-4268-X , 1-4527-9751-X , 9786612840623 , 1-282-84062-2 , 1-4518-6968-1
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ;
    Content: The paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Contents; I. Introduction; II. Motivation and Literature; III. The Model; A. The Domestic Economy; B. Date-Specific and Maturity-Specific Reserve Requirements; C. The Lenders' Problem; D. Defining the Equilibrium; Figures; 1. Structure of the Model; IV. The Emergence of Bank Runs; A. The Emergence of Bank Runs in the Setup Without Reserve Requirements; Defining the Illiquidity Condition; 2. Decision Tree at t=1 Summarizes How a Bank Run Would Occur.; B. Can Reserve Requirements Prevent the Occurrence of a Bank Run?; Illiquidity Conditions with Reserve Requirements , Reserve Requirements and Market FailureC. International Lending After the Bank Runs: Are International Lenders "Throwing Good Money After Bad Money"?; International Re-Optimization Problem; V. Discussion; Sunspot and Bank Run Probability; Incentive to Form a Bank; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4519-1422-9
    Language: English
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Building supervisory structures in Sub-Saharan Africa : an analytical framework (2007)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958061615802883
    Format: 1 online resource (34 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-3868-2 , 1-4527-2692-2 , 1-282-55815-3 , 1-4519-1035-5 , 9786613822307
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/07/18
    Content: Current trends in financial sector development in sub-Saharan Africa are prompting policymakers to focus on the design of appropriate supervisory structures. Against the backdrop of worldwide efforts to remodel supervisory structures, this paper develops an analytical framework for designing a regulatory strategy that could assist in prioritizing the needs for regulation and supervision over time. Such a strategy should facilitate the design of a supervisory structure suitable for an individual country's current and future needs. The paper emphasizes that in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, any such strategy is constrained by the reality of capacity limitations and should take into account the need to keep the central bank involved in the process. Building on the framework, the paper identifies a number of supervisory structures that could meet sub-Saharan Africa's needs.
    Note: "January 2007." , Contents; I. Introduction; II. Revisiting Supervisory Structures-What Are the Arguments?; A. The "Changing Structure of the Financial System" Argument; B. The "Economies of Scale" Argument; C. The "Institutional Strengthening" Argument; III. Financial Sectors and Their Supervision in SSA; A. Key Facts and Trends in Financial Sector Development; Tables; 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Relative Importance of Segments in the Financial Systems of Selected Countries; B. Overview of Financial Sector Supervision; 2. Sub-Saharan Countries: Financial Sector Supervisory Structures in Selected Countries , C. How Does the Emerging SSA Debate Fit into the Broader Debate?3. Supervisory Models in SSA-Overview; IV. An Analytical Framework for Shaping SSA's Supervisory Structures; A. Capacity Constraints; B. The Role of the Central Bank; C. Regulatory Strategy: Scope and Intensity; Regulatory scope; Regulatory intensity; The cost of regulation; V. A Typology of Possible Models; Model 1-The Singapore model; 4. Overview of Advantages and Disadvantages of Selected Supervisory Structures; Model 2-The Irish model; Model 3-Bi-polar with banking supervision in the central bank , Model 4-Bi-polar with supervision of all deposit-taking institutions in the central bankModel 5-The U.K.-FSA model; Synthesis; VI. Conclusions; References , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6582-1
    Language: English
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The effectiveness of macroeconomic commitment in weak(er) institutional environments / (2010)
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958063777002883
    Format: 1 online resource (91 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-6885-9 , 1-4552-2131-7 , 1-282-84739-2 , 9786612847394 , 1-4552-0523-0
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/10/193
    Content: This paper analyzes the institutional conditions affecting the establishment and effectiveness of independent central banks and of budgetary institutions. It draws on the recent theory developed by North, Wallis and Weingast on the transition from a closed and fragile state to an open economic and political environment. The paper presents a composite indicator allowing for the identification of a country’s position along this transition path. The findings suggest that (i) while the establishment of autonomous central banks seems to be relatively independent from the broader institutional framework, sound budgetary institutions tend to be established in countries with higher levels of rule of law for the elites, and (ii) while central bank independence is effective in reducing inflation irrespective of a country’s position along the transition path, budget institutions seem to be most effective as a disciplining device in weak institutional environments.
    Note: "August 2010." , At head of title: IMF Institute. , Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; Appendix Tables; Boxes; Tables; Figures; A. Central Bank Independence; B. Budget Institutions; C. The Institutional Framework in Developing Countries; 1: NWW's Limited-and Open-Access Orders and the Transition; A. Doorsteps and the Establishment of MCI; B. Doorsteps and the Effectiveness of MCI; A. First Doorstep: The Rule of Law for Elites; 1: Components of the First Doorstep; B. Second Doorstep: Perpetual Forms of Organizations; 2: Components of the Second Doorstep; C. Third Doorstep: Political Control of the Military , 3: Components of the Third DoorstepD. Aggregation of the Index; 1: Country Rankings and Doorsteps: D1; 2: Country Rankings Under Doorsteps: D2; 3: Country Rankings Under Doorsteps: D3; 2: The Performance of Mauritius, Tanzania, and Chad under the Doorsteps; A. Descriptive Statistics; 4: Spearman Rank Correlations among Sub-Indices; 5: Average Index Values per Income Group; 4: Overall Doorsteps and CBI; 5: D1 and CBI; 6: D2 and CBI; 7: D3 and CBI; 8: Overall Doorsteps and BI; 9: D1 and BI; 10: D2 and BI; 11: D3 and BI; B. Econometric Analysis; Doorsteps and the Quality of MCI , 6: Doorsteps and CBI7: Doorsteps and the Budget Index; Doorsteps and the Impact of MCI; 8: Doorsteps and the impact of CBI; 9: Split Samples-The Impact of CBI on Inflation with low D1; 10: Split Samples-The Impact of CBI on Inflation with High D1; 12: The Effectiveness of CBI for Low D1 (a through e); 13: Split Samples-The Impact of BI on PED with Low D; 13.a: Marginal Effect of BI on PED (varying D1); 13.b: Marginal Effect of BI on PED (varying D1D2); 13.c: Marginal Effect of BI on PED (varying D1D2D3); 14: Split Samples-The Impact of BI on PED with High D1 , 14: The Effectiveness of BI for Low D1 (a through e)Caveats and Robustness Checks; 11: Doorstep and the Impact of BI; 12: Interactions between Doorsteps and Budget Index; I: Databases Used for the Construction of the Doorsteps Index; II: Arnone (2007) CBI Index Scores Updated for 2009; III: Dabla Norris et al. (2010) BI Index Scores; IV: Description of Variables; Reference; VI. Conclusion; V. Empirical Analysis; IV. A Composite Indicator of Doorstep Conditions; III. New Contribution and Theory; II. Literature; I. Introduction; Footnotes
    Language: English
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Structural reforms, IMF programs and capacity building : an empirical investigation (2012)
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958093821202883
    Format: 1 online resource (30 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4755-1155-8 , 1-4755-1154-X
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ;
    Content: This paper investigates the role that International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs and capacity building play in fostering structural reforms. To do so, we exploit two novel datasets on IMF capacity building and structural reforms available for over one hundred IMF member countries over the period 1980 - 2010. The main results are threefold. First, there is a general association between IMF programs and structural reforms but this relationship is not very robust. Second, IMF training leads to an increase in structural reforms but only through IMF programs and only when a significant share of public servants is trained. Third, IMF technical assistance does not significantly lead to more structural reforms but raises the likelihood of completion of ongoing IMF programs. Our results are robust to a large number of checks, estimators and correcting for endogeneity.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Data; A. Structural reforms; B. IMF Capacity Building Activities and IMF Programs; C. Controls; D. Who receives IMF Capacity Building and Programs?; III. Empirical Strategy; A. Conceptual discussion; IMF training and reforms; IMF technical assistance and reforms; B. Model specification; Structural Reforms and Capacity Building; Program implementation and capacity building; C. Results; D. Robustness; IV. Endogeneity Issues; V. Conclusions; References; Appendixes; Appendix 1. Typology of IMF Programs , Appendix 2. Table A1. Exploratory Regressions: What country features are associatedFigures; Figure 1. Evolution of Training Activities by Region; Figure 2. Total Number of Trained Officials during 1981-2011; Figure 3. Evolution of Technical Assistance by Region; Figure 4. Total Number of Technical Assistance during 1990-2012; Figure 5. Evolution of IMF Programs by Region; Figure 6. Actual Technical Assistance vs. Predicted Allocation; Tables; Table 1. Exploratory regression relating IMF program to structural reforms; Table 2. Results for training and TA interacted with programs , Table 3. Results for Training and TA interacted with programsTable 4. Capacity building and program failure; Table 5. Impact of training on structural reforms controlling for country motivation; Table 6. Impact of technical assistance on structural reforms using instrument based on; Table 7. Capacity building and program success using an instrument based on donor , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4755-1156-6
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4755-1070-5
    Language: English
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The accountability of financial sector supervisors : principles and practice (2005)
    [Washington, D.C.] :International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Systems Dept.,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958086315702883
    Format: 1 online resource (52 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-9019-6 , 1-4527-6833-1 , 1-282-04443-5 , 1-4519-0606-4 , 9786613797575
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/05/51
    Content: Policymakers' uneasiness about granting independence to financial sector regulators stems to a large extent from the lack of familiarity with, and elusiveness of, the concept of accountability. This paper gives operational content to accountability and argues that it is possible to do so in a way that encourages and supports agency independence. The paper first elaborates on the role and purposes of accountability. Second, it shows that the unique features of financial sector supervision point to a more complex system of accountability arrangements than, for instance, the conduct of monetary policy. Finally, the paper discusses specific arrangements that can best secure the objectives of accountability and, thus, independence. Our findings have a wider application than financial sector supervision.
    Note: "March 2005." , ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY""; ""A. Provide Public Oversight""; ""B. Maintain and Enhance Legitimacy""; ""C. Enhance Agency Governance""; ""D. Improve Agency Performance""; ""III. CONTRASTING ACCOUNTABILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR CENTRAL BANKS AND FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISORS""; ""A. Agency Objectives""; ""B. Confidentiality and Transparency""; ""C. Enforcement and Sanctioning Powers""; ""D. A Multiple Principals Environnent""; ""IV. ESTABLISHING MECHANISMS TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY""; ""A. Typology of Arrangements"" , ""B. Relationship to the Legislature (Parliamentary Accountability) Objectives""""C. Relationship to the Executive Branch (Ministerial Accountability) Objectives""; ""D. Judicial Accountability Objectives""; ""E. Accountability Toward Stakeholders (Industry, Consumers) and the Public ( Market- Based Accountability) Objectives""; ""F. Audit (Financial Accountability) Objective""; ""G. Monitoring Outside National Jurisdictions Objective""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES"" , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6070-6
    Language: English
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Will they sing the same tune? : Measuring convergence in the new European system of financial supervisors (2009)
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958078129602883
    Format: 1 online resource (45 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4623-0834-1 , 1-4527-2080-0 , 1-282-84356-7 , 9786612843563 , 1-4518-7289-5
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/09/142
    Content: In June 2009 a new financial supervisory framework for the European Union (EU) was endorsed, consisting of a macro- and a micro-prudential pillar. The latter is composed of a Steering Committee, a supranational layer and a network of national supervisory authorities at the bottom, de facto establishing a complex multiple principals-multiple agents network. This paper focuses on the network of national agencies. Starting from an analysis of supervisory architectures and governance arrangements, we assess to what extent lack of convergence could undermine efficient and effective supervision. The main conclusion is that harmonization of governance arrangements towards best practice would better align supervisors' incentive structures and, hence, be beneficial for the quality of supervision.
    Note: "July 2009". , Contents; I. Introduction; II. A European Supervisory Structure is Born; III. Review of Supervisory Architectures; A. Closer analysis of the EU supervisory landscape; B. Potential policy implications of polarization; IV. Convergence in Supervisory Governance; A. Measuring Independence; B. Measuring Accountability; C. Is There Governance Convergence Within the EU?; V. Conclusions and Policy Considerations; References; Figures; 1 Financial Supervisory Regimes: number of reforms per year (1998-2008); 2 FSU Index distribution; 3 CBFA Index distribution; 4 Financial Supervision Regimes , 5 Institutional Independence: Cross-country convergence6 Regulatory & Supervisory Independence: Cross-country convergence; 7 Budgetary independence: Cross-country convergence; 8 Political accountability: Cross-country convergence; 9 Judiciary accountability: Cross-country convergence; 10 Transparency: Cross-country convergence; 11 Total independence: Cross-country convergence; 12 Overall accountability Cross-country convergence; 13 Independence and Accountability: scatter-plot; 14 Independence and Accountability inside and outside the Central Bank , 14A: Independence Indices inside and outside the Central Bank14B: Accountability Indices inside and outside the Central Bank; Tables; 1. The Institutional Indicators; 2. Independence Criteria; 3. Accountability Criteria; Annexes; Annex - The European Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4519-1718-X
    Language: English
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Trade effects of currency unions : do economic dissimilarities matter? (2008)
    [Washington, District of Columbia] :International Monetary Fund,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958098553202883
    Format: 1 online resource (29 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-4623-0533-4 , 1-4527-4705-9 , 9786612842009 , 1-282-84200-5 , 1-4518-7107-4
    Series Statement: IMF working paper ;
    Content: This paper provides a general equilibrium analysis of the trade effects of the formation of a currency union, and of its subsequent enlargement to include an economically dissimilar country. Furthermore, it investigates how economic dissimilarities among countries affect the magnitude of the trade effects fostered by a common currency. We show that sharing a common currency enhances the volume of bilateral trade among countries. However, the more economically dissimilar is an accession country, compared to the original members of a currency union, the smaller are the gains in trade that would follow the enlargement of a currency union.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Basic Model; III. The Initial Equilibrium; IV. The Formation of a Currency Union; A. The General Equilibrium Effect on the Relative Wage; B. The Effect on the Bilateral Patterns of Trade; V. The Enlargement of the Currency Union; A. The General Equilibrium Effect on the Relative Wage; B. The Effect on the Bilateral Patterns of Trade; VI. Do Economic dissimilarities Matter?; VII. Conclusions; Tables; 1. Simulations of the Gain in Bilateral Trade; Mathematical Appendix; A. Proof of Proposition 1; B. Proof of Proposition 2; C. Proof of Proposition 3 , D. Proof of Proposition 4E. Proof of Proposition 5; F. Proof of Proposition 6; References , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4519-1560-8
    Language: English
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