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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845818066
    Format: Online-Ressource (20 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1484354729 , 9781484354728
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 13/126
    Content: Traditional bank competition policy seeks to balance efficiency with incentives to take risk. The main tools are rules guiding entry/exit and consolidation of banks. This paper seeks to refine this view in light of recent changes to financial services provision. Modern banking is largely market-based and contestable. Consequently, banks in advanced economies today have structurally low charter values and high incentives to take risk. In such an environment, traditional policies that seek to affect the degree of competition by focusing on market structure (i.e. concentration) may have limited effect. We argue that bank competition policy should be reoriented to deal with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem. It should also focus on the permissible scope of activities rather than on market structure of banks. And following a crisis, competition policy should facilitate resolution by temporarily allowing higher concentration and government control of banks
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_84587165X
    Format: Online-Ressource (28 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451867913 , 9781451867916
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 07/227
    Content: While public financial institutions (such as public development banks) are commonly associated with developing countries, in fact they are prevalent in the developed world as well. We study a sample of public financial institutions in industrialized countries and identify dominant trends in their organization and oversight. While practices in developed countries may be a useful reference point, a more nuanced approach, accounting for the disparity of institutional environment, regulatory capacity, and government accountability and effectiveness, may be required in developing countries. Further investment in the accumulation of evidence and formulation of best practices in the organization and oversight of public financial institutions seems warranted and necessary. This paper was prepared while Mr. Ratnovski was working in the Financial Supervision and Regulation Division during January-April 2006. The authors are grateful to Jonathan Fiechter, David Marston, and participants of an MCM seminar in April 2006 for their helpful comments
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845859641
    Format: Online-Ressource (28 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1455201812 , 9781455201815
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 10/170
    Content: Banks increasingly use short-term wholesale funds to supplement traditional retail deposits. Existing literature mainly points to the ""bright side"" of wholesale funding: sophisticated financiers can monitor banks, disciplining bad but refinancing good ones. This paper models a ""dark side"" of wholesale funding. In an environment with a costless but noisy public signal on bank project quality, short-term wholesale financiers have lower incentives to conduct costly monitoring, and instead may withdraw based on negative public signals, triggering inefficient liquidations. Comparative statics suggest that such distortions of incentives are smaller when public signals are less relevant and project liquidation costs are higher, e.g., when banks hold mostly relationship-based small business loans
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845963759
    Format: Online-Ressource (43 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1513517589 , 9781513517582
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers: Working Paper No. 15 / 249
    Content: Traditional theory suggests that more profitable banks should have lower risk-taking incentives. Then why did many profitable banks choose to invest in untested financial instruments before the crisis, realizing significant losses? We attempt to reconcile theory and evidence. In our setup, banks are endowed with a fixed core business. They take risk by levering up to engage in risky ‘side activities’(such as market-based investments) alongside the core business. A more profitable core business allows a bank to borrow more and take side risks on a larger scale, offsetting lower incentives to take risk of given size. Consequently, more profitable banks may have higher risk-taking incentives. The framework is consistent with cross-sectional patterns of bank risk-taking in the run up to the recent financial crisis
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
    Author information: Vlahu, Razvan 1977-
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845835467
    Format: Online-Ressource (25 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 147550263X , 9781475502633
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 12/89
    Content: U.S. monetary policy can remain extraordinarily accommodative only if longer-term inflation expectations stay well-anchored, including in response to commodity price shocks. We find that oil price shocks have a statistically significant, but economically small impact on longer-term inflation compensation embedded in U.S. Treasury bonds. The estimated effect is larger for the post-crisis period, and robust to controlling for measures of liquidity risk premia. Oil price shocks are also correlated with the variance of longer-term inflation expectations in the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers in the post-crisis period. These results are not attributable to looser monetary policy - oil price increases were associated with expectations of a faster monetary tightening after the crisis. Overall, the findings are consistent with some impact of commodity prices on long-term inflation expectations and/or on inflation rate risk
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845820583
    Format: Online-Ressource (41 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 9781475536157 , 1616356774 , 9781616356774
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 13/16
    Content: Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks' transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC : Internat. Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_718597923
    Format: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 23 S.)
    ISBN: 9781475504095
    Series Statement: IMF staff discussion note 2012/5
    Content: This note overviews macroprudential policy options that have been proposed to address the systemic risks experienced during the recent financial crisis. It contributes to the policy debate by providing a taxonomy of macroprudential policies in terms of the specific negative externalities in the financial system that these policies are meant to address, and discusses their interrelations and some key implementation issues
    Note: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845807382
    Format: Online-Ressource (9 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1475597347 , 9781475597349
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 14/25
    Content: There is much confusion about what shadow banking is. Some equate it with securitization, others with non-traditional bank activities, and yet others with non-bank lending. Regardless, most think of shadow banking as activities that can create systemic risk. This paper proposes to describe shadow banking as “all financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a private or public backstop to operate”. Backstops can come in the form of franchise value of a bank or insurance company, or in the form of a government guarantee. The need for a backstop is in our view a crucial feature of shadow banking, which distinguishes it from the “usual” intermediated capital market activities, such as custodians, hedge funds, leasing companies, etc
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845810227
    Format: Online-Ressource (28 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1475514743 , 9781475514742
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 13/233
    Content: We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard—increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank’s success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government’s commitment to shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently and so reduce bank risk taking. This systemic insurance effect will be relatively more important when bailout rents are low and the risk of contagion (upon a bank failure) is high. The optimal policy may then be not to try to avoid bailouts, but to make them “effective”: associated with lower rents
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC : Internat. Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_737503653
    Format: Online-Ressource (36 S.) , graph. Darst.
    ISBN: 9781475583588
    Series Statement: IMF staff discussion note 2012/12
    Content: This note outlines the basic economics of the shadow banking system, highlights (systemic) risks related to it, and suggests implications for measurement and regulatory approaches
    Note: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
    Author information: Claessens, Stijn 1959-
    Author information: Kumar, Manmohan S.
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