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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. :The World Bank,
    UID:
    almafu_9958246218202883
    Format: 1 online resource (49 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: Who are the civil servants that serve poor people in the developing world? This paper uses direct surveys of civil servants-the professional body of administrators who manage government policy-and their organizations from Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Philippines, to highlight key aspects of their characteristics and experience of civil service life. Civil servants in the developing world face myriad challenges to serving the world's poor, from limited facilities to significant political interference in their work. There are a number of commonalities across service environments, and the paper summarizes these in a series of 'stylized facts' of the civil service in the developing world. At the same time, the particular challenges faced by a public official vary substantially across and within countries and regions. For example, measured management practices differ widely across local governments of a single state in Nigeria. Surveys of civil servants allow us to document these differences, build better models of the public sector, and make more informed policy choices.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    almafu_9958955378002883
    Format: 1 online resource (47 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: This paper investigates the consequences of granting politicians power over bureaucrats in the implementation of small-scale public infrastructure projects. While potentially bolstering the incentive for the executive to perform, increased legislative oversight may lead to distortions in the technocratic process for political gain. By assembling a nationally representative data set from Nigeria that tracks public projects from inception to audit, the paper finds evidence of a clear trade-off between political oversight and bureaucratic autonomy. Using an instrumental variables strategy in which early career choices of politicians are key determinants of legislative committee membership, the analysis finds that legislative influence increases the likelihood that a project is launched by 18 percent, but at the cost of reducing project quality by 15 percent and increasing the reported misuse of funds. The results highlight the fundamental tension between bureaucratic inaction and political corruption.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. :The World Bank,
    UID:
    almafu_9958990375302883
    Format: 1 online resource (80 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: What determines the distribution of information acquired within the hierarchy of a public organization? Without market processes, the generation and absorption of information in bureaucracy relies on individual actors undertaking costly action to acquire it. This paper reports on comparisons between individual-level claims by public officials in the Government of Ethiopia regarding the characteristics of local constituents they serve and objective benchmark data. Public officials make large errors about their constituents' characteristics. The errors of 49 percent of public officials are at least 50 percent of the underlying benchmark data. Given public officials' stated reliance on this information to make public policy decisions, such mistakes imply a substantial misallocation of public resources. The results are consistent with classic theoretical predictions related to the incentives that determine information acquisition in hierarchies, such as de facto control over decision making and an organizational culture of valuing operational information. A field experiment implies that these incentives mediate the effectiveness of interventions aimed at improving the information of public-sector agents.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 4
    UID:
    almafu_9958975988302883
    Format: 1 online resource (60 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: A burgeoning area of social science research examines how state capabilities and bureaucratic effectiveness shape economic development. This paper studies how the management practices of civil service bureaucrats correlate to the delivery of public projects, using novel data from the Ghanaian Civil Service. This paper combines hand-coded progress reports on 3,600 projects with a management survey in the government ministries and departments responsible for these projects. The analysis finds that management matters: practices related to autonomy are positively associated with project completion, yet practices related to incentives/monitoring of bureaucrats are negatively associated with project completion. The negative impact of incentives/monitoring practices is partly explained by bureaucrats having to multi-task, interactions with their intrinsic motivation, their engagement in influence activities, and project characteristics such as the clarity of targets and deliverable outputs. The paper discusses the interplay between management practices and corruption, alternative methods by which to measure management practices in organizations, and the external validity of the results. The findings suggest that the focus of many civil service reform programs on introducing stronger incentives and monitoring may backfire in some organizations, and that even countries with low levels of state capability may benefit by providing public servants with greater autonomy in some spheres.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 5
    UID:
    gbv_1877053570
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (pages cm)
    ISBN: 9781464819575
    Content: The Government Analytics Handbook presents frontier evidence and practitioner insights on how to leverage data to strengthen public administration. Covering a range of microdata sources-such as administrative data and public servant surveys-as well as tools and resources for undertaking the analytics, it transforms the ability of governments to take a data-informed approach to diagnose and improve how public organizations work--
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9781464819810
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9781464819575
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 6
    Book
    Book
    Sarnen :Verl. d. Histor.-Antiquar. Vereins Obwalden,
    UID:
    almahu_BV002654707
    Format: 296 S. : Kt.
    Series Statement: Obwaldner Geschichtsblätter 18.
    Note: Zugl.: Zürich, Univ., Diss. - Einzelaufnahme eines Zs.-Bandes
    Language: German
    Subjects: History
    RVK:
    Keywords: Landwirtschaft ; Agrarsoziologie ; Landwirtschaft ; Hochschulschrift ; Hochschulschrift
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, Development Economics, Development Research Group
    UID:
    gbv_1040815057
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8595
    Content: A burgeoning area of social science research examines how state capabilities and bureaucratic effectiveness shape economic development. This paper studies how the management practices of civil service bureaucrats correlate to the delivery of public projects, using novel data from the Ghanaian Civil Service. This paper combines hand-coded progress reports on 3,600 projects with a management survey in the government ministries and departments responsible for these projects. The analysis finds that management matters: practices related to autonomy are positively associated with project completion, yet practices related to incentives/monitoring of bureaucrats are negatively associated with project completion. The negative impact of incentives/monitoring practices is partly explained by bureaucrats having to multi-task, interactions with their intrinsic motivation, their engagement in influence activities, and project characteristics such as the clarity of targets and deliverable outputs. The paper discusses the interplay between management practices and corruption, alternative methods by which to measure management practices in organizations, and the external validity of the results. The findings suggest that the focus of many civil service reform programs on introducing stronger incentives and monitoring may backfire in some organizations, and that even countries with low levels of state capability may benefit by providing public servants with greater autonomy in some spheres
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Rasul, Imran Management and Bureaucratic Effectiveness: Evidence from the Ghanaian Civil Service Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2018
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Author information: Rasul, Imran
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, Development Economics, Development Research Group
    UID:
    gbv_1031671471
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8554
    Content: This paper investigates the consequences of granting politicians power over bureaucrats in the implementation of small-scale public infrastructure projects. While potentially bolstering the incentive for the executive to perform, increased legislative oversight may lead to distortions in the technocratic process for political gain. By assembling a nationally representative data set from Nigeria that tracks public projects from inception to audit, the paper finds evidence of a clear trade-off between political oversight and bureaucratic autonomy. Using an instrumental variables strategy in which early career choices of politicians are key determinants of legislative committee membership, the analysis finds that legislative influence increases the likelihood that a project is launched by 18 percent, but at the cost of reducing project quality by 15 percent and increasing the reported misuse of funds. The results highlight the fundamental tension between bureaucratic inaction and political corruption
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Rogger, Daniel The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making; Evidence from Nigeria Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2018
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC, USA : World Bank Group, Development Economics, Development Research Group
    UID:
    gbv_1665275006
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 80 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8644
    Content: What determines the distribution of information acquired within the hierarchy of a public organization? Without market processes, the generation and absorption of information in bureaucracy relies on individual actors undertaking costly action to acquire it. This paper reports on comparisons between individual-level claims by public officials in the Government of Ethiopia regarding the characteristics of local constituents they serve and objective benchmark data. Public officials make large errors about their constituents' characteristics. The errors of 49 percent of public officials are at least 50 percent of the underlying benchmark data. Given public officials' stated reliance on this information to make public policy decisions, such mistakes imply a substantial misallocation of public resources. The results are consistent with classic theoretical predictions related to the incentives that determine information acquisition in hierarchies, such as de facto control over decision making and an organizational culture of valuing operational information. A field experiment implies that these incentives mediate the effectiveness of interventions aimed at improving the information of public-sector agents
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Rogger, Daniel Hierarchy And Information Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2018
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 10
    UID:
    edocfu_9958955378002883
    Format: 1 online resource (47 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: This paper investigates the consequences of granting politicians power over bureaucrats in the implementation of small-scale public infrastructure projects. While potentially bolstering the incentive for the executive to perform, increased legislative oversight may lead to distortions in the technocratic process for political gain. By assembling a nationally representative data set from Nigeria that tracks public projects from inception to audit, the paper finds evidence of a clear trade-off between political oversight and bureaucratic autonomy. Using an instrumental variables strategy in which early career choices of politicians are key determinants of legislative committee membership, the analysis finds that legislative influence increases the likelihood that a project is launched by 18 percent, but at the cost of reducing project quality by 15 percent and increasing the reported misuse of funds. The results highlight the fundamental tension between bureaucratic inaction and political corruption.
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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