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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Enforceability of Labor Law : Evidence From A Labor Court in Mexico (2008)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958109650402883
    Format: 1 online resource (36 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-4483
    URL: Volltext
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    FU Berlin
    HWR Berlin
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    TH Brandenburg
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Litigation and Settlement : New Evidence From Labor Courts in Mexico (2007)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958099247402883
    Format: 1 online resource (40 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-4434
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    FU Berlin
    HWR Berlin
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    TH Brandenburg
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Enforceability of Labor Law : Evidence From A Labor Court In Mexico (2008)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049074139
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial
    Additional Edition: Kaplan, David S Enforceability of Labor Law
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Enforceability of Labor Law : Evidence From A Labor Court in Mexico (2008)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958109650402883
    Format: 1 online resource (36 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-4483
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    FU Berlin
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Enforceability of Labor Law : Evidence From A Labor Court in Mexico (2008)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    edoccha_9958109650402883
    Format: 1 online resource (36 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-4483
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    Charité
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Litigation and Settlement : New Evidence From Labor Courts in Mexico (2007)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958099247402883
    Format: 1 online resource (40 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-4434
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    FU Berlin
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Litigation and Settlement : New Evidence From Labor Courts in Mexico (2007)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    edoccha_9958099247402883
    Format: 1 online resource (40 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-4434
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    Charité
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Enforceability of Labor Law : Evidence from a Labor Court in Mexico (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797531009
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper 4483
    Content: The authors analyze lawsuits involving publicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico to study how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, even after a judge has awarded something to a worker alleging unjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent of the time. Workers who are dismissed after working more than seven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollected because their legally-mandated severance payments are larger. A simple theoretical model is used to generate predictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on the information available to the worker and on the worker's cost of collecting an award after trial, both of which are determined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differences in outcomes across lawyers are consistent with the hypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who are poorly informed and of workers who find it more costly to collect an award after winning at trial.
    Note: English
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    Stabi Berlin
  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Litigation and Settlement : New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797537155
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper 4434
    Content: Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.
    Note: English
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    Stabi Berlin
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