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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9947414250102882
    Format: 1 online resource (xii, 156 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 9780511510373 (ebook)
    Series Statement: Political economy of institutions and decisions
    Content: In a world where capital moves freely across national borders, developing countries have increasingly been subjected to devastating financial crises caused by the sudden withdrawal of foreign capital. How do such crises come about? This book focuses on a novel causal path: that of miscommunication. By examining the determinants of Asia's financial crisis of 1997–98, it demonstrates why developing democracies are exceptionally vulnerable to breakdowns in communication between financial officials and the chief executive and outlines the disastrous consequences of such breakdowns. The book offers a framework for predicting where chief executives are most likely to be ill informed about critical economic variables. It also considers those situations in which politicians are dependent on financial officials whom they cannot completely trust or in which multiple veto players damage the flow of information.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). , Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Bank Regulation in the Debate Over Capital Flow Liberalization --Chapter 3: The Signaling Argument -- Chapter 4: Incredible Signaling in Democracies: The Cases of Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippine -- Chapter 5: Unorthodox Solutions to the Signaling Problem: The Cases of Malaysia and Indonesia -- Chapter 6: Orthodox Solutions to the Signaling Problem: The Cases of Singapore and Hong Kong -- Chapter 7: Some Concluding Remarks.
    Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9780521854924
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 2
    UID:
    gbv_477450172
    Format: XII, 156 S. , Ill., graph. Darst.
    Edition: 1. publ.
    ISBN: 9780521107433 , 052185492X , 9780521854924
    Series Statement: Political economy of institutions and decisions
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Asien ; Bank ; Kreditmarkt ; Finanzkrise ; Internationale Kapitalbewegung
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  • 3
    UID:
    kobvindex_DGP1641614889
    Format: Tab., Lit. S. 261-262
    ISSN: 0020-8183
    In: International organization, Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947, 60(2006), 1, Seite 245-262, 0020-8183
    Language: English
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  • 4
    UID:
    gbv_1641614889
    Format: Tab., Lit. S. 261-262
    ISSN: 0020-8183
    In: International organization, Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947, 60(2006), 1, Seite 245-262, 0020-8183
    In: volume:60
    In: year:2006
    In: number:1
    In: pages:245-262
    Language: English
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  • 5
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023593875
    Format: 41, [2] S. , 22 cm
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13992
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Author information: Easterly, William 1957-
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  • 6
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023295064
    Format: 21 S. , graph. Darst.
    Series Statement: NBER working paper series 13968
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,
    UID:
    edoccha_9958126557502883
    Format: 1 online resource (52 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-4360-0 , 1-4527-3389-9 , 1-283-51279-3 , 1-4519-1966-2 , 9786613825247
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers
    Content: We examine the deep determinants of long-run macroeconomic stability in a cross-country framework. We find that conflict, openness, and democratic political institutions have a strong and statistically significant causal impact on macroeconomic stability. Surprisingly the most robust relationship of the three is for democratic institutions. A one standard deviation increase in democracy can reduce nominal instability nearly fourfold. This impact is robust to alternative measures of democracy, samples, covariates, and definitions of conflict. It is particularly noteworthy that a variety of nominal pathologies discussed in the recent macroeconomic literature, such as procyclical policy, original sin, and debt intolerance, have common origins in weak democratic institutions. We also find evidence that democratic institutions both strongly influence monetary policy and have a strong, independent positive effect on stability after controlling for various policy variables.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE DEEP DETERMINANTS OF STABILITY""; ""III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY""; ""IV. MEASUREMENT AND ESTIMATION ISSUES""; ""V. RESULTS""; ""VI. ROBUSTNESS ""; ""VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""References"" , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-7507-X
    Language: English
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,
    UID:
    edocfu_9958126557502883
    Format: 1 online resource (52 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4623-4360-0 , 1-4527-3389-9 , 1-283-51279-3 , 1-4519-1966-2 , 9786613825247
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers
    Content: We examine the deep determinants of long-run macroeconomic stability in a cross-country framework. We find that conflict, openness, and democratic political institutions have a strong and statistically significant causal impact on macroeconomic stability. Surprisingly the most robust relationship of the three is for democratic institutions. A one standard deviation increase in democracy can reduce nominal instability nearly fourfold. This impact is robust to alternative measures of democracy, samples, covariates, and definitions of conflict. It is particularly noteworthy that a variety of nominal pathologies discussed in the recent macroeconomic literature, such as procyclical policy, original sin, and debt intolerance, have common origins in weak democratic institutions. We also find evidence that democratic institutions both strongly influence monetary policy and have a strong, independent positive effect on stability after controlling for various policy variables.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE DEEP DETERMINANTS OF STABILITY""; ""III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY""; ""IV. MEASUREMENT AND ESTIMATION ISSUES""; ""V. RESULTS""; ""VI. ROBUSTNESS ""; ""VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""References"" , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-7507-X
    Language: English
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  • 9
    UID:
    gbv_845906909
    Format: Online-Ressource (52 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 145187507X , 9781451875072
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 04/215
    Content: We examine the deep determinants of long-run macroeconomic stability in a cross-country framework. We find that conflict, openness, and democratic political institutions have a strong and statistically significant causal impact on macroeconomic stability. Surprisingly the most robust relationship of the three is for democratic institutions. A one standard deviation increase in democracy can reduce nominal instability nearly fourfold. This impact is robust to alternative measures of democracy, samples, covariates, and definitions of conflict. It is particularly noteworthy that a variety of nominal pathologies discussed in the recent macroeconomic literature, such as procyclical policy, original sin, and debt intolerance, have common origins in weak democratic institutions. We also find evidence that democratic institutions both strongly influence monetary policy and have a strong, independent positive effect on stability after controlling for various policy variables
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Subramanian, Arvind What Determines Long-Run Macroeconomic Stability? Democratic Institutions Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004 ISBN 9781451875072
    Language: English
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