Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

UID:

Format: 1 online resource : , illustrations (black and white, and colour)

Edition: First edition.

ISBN: 0-19-254220-6 , 0-19-185067-5 , 0-19-254219-2

Series Statement: Oxford scholarship online ebooks.

Content: How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences.

Note: This edition previously issued in print: 2018. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-19-881288-4

Language: English

URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)

URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)

URL: Oxford scholarship online

URL: Oxford scholarship online

URL: Oxford scholarship online

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource (304 p.)

ISBN: 9780198812883

Content: "Our thoughts are meaningful. We think about things in the outside world; how can that be so? This is one of the deepest questions in contemporary philosophy. Ever since the 'cognitive revolution', states with meaning-mental representations-have been the key explanatory construct of the cognitive sciences. But there is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. Powerful new methods in cognitive neuroscience can now reveal information processing in the brain in unprecedented detail. They show how the brain performs complex calculations on neural representations. Drawing on this cutting-edge research, Nicholas Shea uses a series of case studies from the cognitive sciences to develop a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation. His approach is distinctive in focusing firmly on the 'subpersonal' representations that pervade so much of cognitive science. The diversity and depth of the case studies, illustrated by numerous figures, make this book unlike any previous treatment. It is important reading for philosophers of psychology and philosophers of mind, and of considerable interest to researchers throughout the cognitive sciences."

Note: English

Language: English

URL: kostenfrei

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Format: xi, 292 Seiten , Illustrationen , 24 cm

Edition: First edition

ISBN: 9780198812883

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe

Language: English

Keywords: Bewusstsein ; Kognition ; Kognitionswissenschaft ; Wahrnehmung ; Repräsentation

URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)

UID:

Format: 1 online resource : , illustrations (black and white, and colour)

Edition: First edition.

ISBN: 0-19-254220-6 , 0-19-185067-5 , 0-19-254219-2

Series Statement: Oxford scholarship online ebooks.

Content: How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences.

Note: This edition previously issued in print: 2018. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-19-881288-4

Language: English

UID:

Format: 1 online resource : , illustrations (black and white, and colour)

Edition: First edition.

ISBN: 0-19-254220-6 , 0-19-185067-5 , 0-19-254219-2

Series Statement: Oxford scholarship online ebooks.

Content: How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences.

Note: This edition previously issued in print: 2018. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-19-881288-4

Language: English

UID:

Format: 1 online resource : , illustrations (black and white, and colour)

Edition: First edition.

ISBN: 0-19-254220-6 , 0-19-185067-5 , 0-19-254219-2

Series Statement: Oxford scholarship online ebooks.

Content: How can we think about things in the outside world? There is still no widely accepted theory of how mental representations get their meaning. In light of pioneering research, Nicholas Shea develops a naturalistic account of the nature of mental representation with a firm focus on the subpersonal representations that pervade the cognitive sciences.

Note: This edition previously issued in print: 2018. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-19-881288-4

Language: English

UID:

Format: 99 S. ; , 22 cm.

ISBN: 0-534-60994-5 , 978-0-534-60994-8

Series Statement: Wadsworth philosophers series

Note: Includes bibliographical references (p. [97]-99)

Language: English

Subjects: Philosophy

UID:

Format: 1 online resource : , illustrations.

ISBN: 9780191997167

Series Statement: Oxford scholarship online

Content: Concepts are how we classify things in the world and organise our knowledge about them. But concepts also lead us astray, driving lazy overgeneralizations and housing unpleasant prejudices. This book draws on the latest scientific research to construct a philosophical theory of how concepts do the job of structuring the way we see the world.

Additional Edition: Print version : ISBN 9780198893660

Language: English

DOI: 10.1093/9780191997167.001.0001

URL: Oxford Academic

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (270 pages)

Edition: First edition.

ISBN: 0-19-199716-1 , 0-19-889367-1

Content: Concepts are how we classify things in the world and organize our knowledge about them. But concepts also lead us astray, driving lazy overgeneralizations and housing unpleasant prejudices. This book draws on the latest scientific research to construct a philosophical theory of how concepts do the job of structuring the way we see the world.

Note: Cover -- Concepts at the Interface -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- 1: Thinking with Concepts -- 1.1 Concepts in the Playground of Thought -- 1.2 Deliberation -- 1.3 Non-Local Inference -- 1.4 Concepts as an Interface -- 1.5 Metacognition -- 1.6 Re-casting the Distinctions -- 1.7 What's New? -- Chapter Summary -- 1.1 Concepts in the Playground of Thought -- 1.2 Deliberation -- 1.3 Non-Local Inference -- 1.4 Concepts as an Interface -- 1.5 Metacognition -- 1.6 Re-casting the Distinctions -- 1.7 What's New? -- 2: Representational Structure -- 2.1 What is Semantically-Significant Representational Structure? -- 2.2 Varieties of Semantically-Significant Representational Structure -- 2.3 Structural Representation -- 2.4 General-Purpose Compositional Structure -- 2.5 Terminology -- Chapter Summary -- 2.1 What is Semantically-Significant Representational Structure? -- 2.2 Varieties of Semantically-Significant Representational Structure -- 2.3 Structural Representation -- 2.4 General-Purpose Compositional Structure -- 3: Computational Processes -- 3.1 Transitions Faithful to Content -- 3.2 Content-Specific and Content-General Transitions -- 3.3 Types of Transition Go with Types of Representational Structure -- 3.4 Content-Specific Transitions Involving Concepts -- Chapter Summary -- 3.1 Transitions Faithful to Content -- 3.2 Content-Specific and Content-General Transitions -- 3.3 Types of Transition Go with Types of Representational Structure -- 3.4 Content-Specific Transitions Involving Concepts -- 4: Informational Models -- 4.1 Ways of Storing Information -- 4.2 Information in Domain-Specific Transitions -- 4.3 'Model-Based' Tasks -- 4.4 Structural Representations -- 4.5 Relational Inference Tasks -- 4.6 Using One Relation to Stand for Another -- 4.7 Models Built out of Concepts -- 4.8 Conclusion -- Chapter Summary. , 4.1 Ways of Storing Information -- 4.2 Information in Domain-Specific Transitions -- 4.3 'Model-Based' Tasks -- 4.4 Structural Representations -- 4.5 Relational Inference Tasks -- 4.6 Using One Relation to Stand for Another -- 4.7 Models Built out of Concepts -- 4.8 Conclusion -- 5: Concepts as an Interface -- 5.1 Reaching Conclusions via Simulations -- 5.2 Simulations Use Special-Purpose Informational Models -- 5.3 Concepts as Plug-and-Play Devices -- 5.4 Mediating between Type 1 and Type 2 Processes -- 5.5 Shifting Information between Systems -- 5.6 Models of Working Memory Labels -- 5.7 Concept Individuation -- 5.8 The Simulation Combination Puzzle -- 5.9 Bringing It All Together -- Chapter Summary -- 5.1 Reaching Conclusions via Simulations -- 5.2 Simulations Use Special-Purpose Informational Models -- 5.3 Concepts as Plug-and-Play Devices -- 5.4 Mediating between Type 1 and Type 2 Processes -- 5.5 Shifting Information between Systems -- 5.6 Models of Working Memory Labels -- 5.7 Concept Individuation -- 5.8 The Simulation Combination Puzzle -- 5.9 Bringing It All Together -- 6: The Frame Problem and the If-Then Problem -- 6.1 The Frame Problem -- 6.2 Avoiding the Frame Problem Leads to the If-Then Problem -- 6.3 A Compound Architecture Still Faces the Frame Problem -- 6.4 A (Partial) Solution -- 6.5 How Cognition Partly Avoids and Partially Solves the Frame Problem -- Chapter Summary -- 6.1 The Frame Problem -- 6.2 Avoiding the Frame Problem Leads to the If-Then Problem -- 6.3 A Compound Architecture Still Faces the Frame Problem -- 6.4 A (Partial) Solution -- 6.5 How Cognition Partly Avoids and Partially Solves the Frame Problem -- 7: Drawing on Meaning -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Phenomenon: Drawing on Meaning -- 7.3 Semantic Inference and Syntactic Inference -- 7.4 Content-Specific Transitions Draw on More Contents. , 7.5 Are Content-Specific Transitions Really So Different? -- 7.6 Conclusion -- Chapter Summary -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Phenomenon: Drawing on Meaning -- 7.3 Semantic Inference and Syntactic Inference -- 7.4 Content-Specific Transitions Draw on More Contents -- 7.5 Are Content-Specific Transitions Really So Different? -- 7.6 Conclusion -- 8: Metacognition -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Metacognition -- 8.3 Appraisal of Concepts -- 8.4 Reliability of Inference -- 8.5 Coherence in the Cognitive Playground -- 8.6 Conclusion -- Chapter Summary -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Metacognition -- 8.3 Appraisal of Concepts -- 8.4 Reliability of Inference -- 8.5 Coherence in the Cognitive Playground -- 8.6 Conclusion -- 9: Concluding Thoughts -- 9.1 Deliberating with Concepts: The Picture -- 9.2 Concepts Look Both Ways -- 9.3 Tokening a Concept -- 9.4 Doing in Thought -- 9.5 The Unreasonable Power of Human Cognition -- Chapter Summary -- 9.1 Deliberating with Concepts: The Picture -- 9.2 Concepts Look Both Ways -- 9.3 Tokening a Concept -- 9.4 Doing in Thought -- 9.5 The Unreasonable Power of Human Cognition -- Acknowledgements -- Figure Credits -- References -- Index.

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-19-889366-3

Language: English