UID:
almahu_9949577237602882
Format:
1 online resource (395 p.)
Edition:
New ed.
ISBN:
1-282-45127-8
,
9786612451270
,
0-8330-4814-7
Content:
A work of enduring value and lasting relevance, this book is both a classic account of the application of powerful ideas to the problem of managing the Department of Defense (DoD) and a cautionary history of the controversies inspired by that successful effort. Robert S. McNamara took office in 1961 convinced that the Secretary of Defense, rather than the services, should control the evaluation of military needs and should choose among alternatives for meeting those needs. His device was a new system for allocating defense resources, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), whic
Note:
"MG-407."
,
Unfinished business, 1961 -- New concepts and new tools to shape the defense program -- Why independent analysts? -- NATO strategy and forces -- Nuclear strategy and forces -- Yardsticks of sufficiency -- Three controversial program decisions -- Some problems in wartime defense management -- Unfinished business, 1969.
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-8330-3826-5
Language:
English
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