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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048264026
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (p)
    ISBN: 9780821395554 , 9780821395585
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Labor markets analysis of human resources for healthNeeds-based estimates for the health workforce -- A labor market approach -- Productivity of health workers : Tanzania -- Health worker performance -- Fiscal issues in scaling up the health workforce -- Politics and governance in human resources for health -- How many health workers -- Rural/urban imbalance of health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa -- Migration and attrition -- Public and private practice of health workers -- The equity perspective -- Incentives for provider performance -- Intrinsic motivation -- Facility-level human resource management -- Health worker education and training -- Becoming a health worker student -- Paying for higher education reform in health
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC :International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank,
    UID:
    almahu_9949191389102882
    Format: pages ; , cm.
    ISBN: 9780821395554 , 9780821395585
    Series Statement: World Bank e-Library.
    Note: Labor markets analysis of human resources for health -- Needs-based estimates for the health workforce -- A labor market approach -- Productivity of health workers : Tanzania -- Health worker performance -- Fiscal issues in scaling up the health workforce -- Politics and governance in human resources for health -- How many health workers -- Rural/urban imbalance of health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa -- Migration and attrition -- Public and private practice of health workers -- The equity perspective -- Incentives for provider performance -- Intrinsic motivation -- Facility-level human resource management -- Health worker education and training -- Becoming a health worker student -- Paying for higher education reform in health.
    Additional Edition: Print Version: ISBN 9780821395554
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 3
    UID:
    edoccha_9958246234102883
    Format: 1 online resource (29 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: Paying for performance (P4P) provides financial incentives for providers to increase the use and quality of care. P4P can affect health care by providing incentives for providers to put more effort into specific activities, and by increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery of services. This paper evaluates the impact of P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, institutional delivery, and child preventive care using data produced from a prospective quasi-experimental evaluation nested into the national rollout of P4P in Rwanda. Treatment facilities were enrolled in the P4P scheme in 2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled two years later. The incentive effect is isolated from the resource effect by increasing comparison facilities' input-based budgets by the average P4P payments to the treatment facilities. The data were collected from 166 facilities and a random sample of 2158 households. P4P had a large and significant positive impact on institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young children, and improved quality of prenatal care. The authors find no effect on the number of prenatal care visits or on immunization rates. P4P had the greatest effect on those services that had the highest payment rates and needed the lowest provider effort. P4P financial performance incentives can improve both the use of and the quality of health services. Because the analysis isolates the incentive effect from the resource effect in P4P, the results indicate that an equal amount of financial resources without the incentives would not have achieved the same gain in outcomes.
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 4
    UID:
    edocfu_9958246234102883
    Format: 1 online resource (29 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: Paying for performance (P4P) provides financial incentives for providers to increase the use and quality of care. P4P can affect health care by providing incentives for providers to put more effort into specific activities, and by increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery of services. This paper evaluates the impact of P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, institutional delivery, and child preventive care using data produced from a prospective quasi-experimental evaluation nested into the national rollout of P4P in Rwanda. Treatment facilities were enrolled in the P4P scheme in 2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled two years later. The incentive effect is isolated from the resource effect by increasing comparison facilities' input-based budgets by the average P4P payments to the treatment facilities. The data were collected from 166 facilities and a random sample of 2158 households. P4P had a large and significant positive impact on institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young children, and improved quality of prenatal care. The authors find no effect on the number of prenatal care visits or on immunization rates. P4P had the greatest effect on those services that had the highest payment rates and needed the lowest provider effort. P4P financial performance incentives can improve both the use of and the quality of health services. Because the analysis isolates the incentive effect from the resource effect in P4P, the results indicate that an equal amount of financial resources without the incentives would not have achieved the same gain in outcomes.
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC :International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank,
    UID:
    edocfu_990046239210402883
    Format: S.
    ISBN: 9780821395554 , 9780821395585
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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