UID:
edoccha_9959936861602883
Format:
1 online resource (131 pages)
Content:
The weaponisation of social-media by Russia should be the subject of continuous in-depth analysis and monitoring by NATO's command structures and its allies. This would require employing specialists with excellent Russian-language skills and the cultural awareness to be able to pick up on particular keywords, messages, historic links and interpretations. Similarly, it is important to measure the resonance and effectiveness of Russia's propaganda activities in social media by using network analysis and testing the influence of different content on target audiences. It is important to ensure the pluralism of information, opinions and voices speaking on behalf of NATO, the 'West' and also on behalf of the Kremlin and Russia. Varied information about the same events results in the mutual reduction of the influence of different senders. The Allied governments and NATO have to empower non-government voices such as journalists, experts, social activists and reputable NGOs by providing them with timely information on issues of importance, ensuring active feedback loops and identifying new information-sharing platforms. Young audiences in the Allied countries and also in Russia may be internet-savvy but at the same time lack awareness of propaganda and other influencing techniques. Notwithstanding, all society members are susceptible to Russian propaganda as it resonates with their fears, needs and motivations. School education programmes on (digital) media literacy and social-awareness campaigns on the impact of propaganda on society should be introduced to mitigate the effects of hostile information campaigns, particularly online ones. Particular attention should be paid to the potential of manipulation with imagery as it is one of the most effective and widely used online propaganda methods. It appears that the online-journalist community (both professional and non-professional) also lacks awareness of propaganda and other influencing techniques at times, or does not devote enough effort to checking and analysing sources. Since the media still remains an authority in the eyes of most people, it can unintentionally amplify rumours and propaganda messages as content is shared. Closer cooperation with journalists as regards information is needed, by supplying them with materials and content based on facts, and organizing workshops on the significance of what they publish during particular information-war campaigns. A major component of combating internet trolls should be unmasking them and exposing their activities. Because, in this type of conflict, the volume of posts matters (even the most intelligent argumentation disappears in an abundance of less sophisticated, but more numerous messages on the part of the opponent), different institutions should activate internet users so that organized masses of troll posts could be opposed by organized groups of citizens aware of trolling. Combatting trolls should utilise two tactics: at the comment level, and exposing falsities. The first requires short, coherent, logical and, above all, numerous comments. It is important to block the propaganda effects of pluralistic ignorance, the spiral of silence and the bandwagon effect (see Section 3.3), which are inherent in the internet. The second level requires cooperation between internet users and researchers who are able to expose and compromise trolls. Trolls extensively employ personal attacks rather than argument, hence their comments often contain 'hate speech' (text that threatens, insults or attacks a person or group on the basis of national origin, ethnicity, race or religion). Whilst respecting freedom of speech, administrators of websites and social media portals should be more active in monitoring content for hate speech, and blocking and reporting it, as required by law.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 9934-8582-7-4
Language:
English
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