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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [München] : Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute
    UID:
    b3kat_BV043649465
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten) , Diagramme
    Series Statement: CESifo working paper no. 5160
    Content: We consider a simple tournament model in which individuals auto-select into the contest on the basis of their commonly known strength levels, and privately observed strength-shocks (reflecting temporary deviations from observed levels). The model predicts that the participation rate should increase with the player’s observed strength, and the total awarded prize amount. Furthermore, under certain conditions self-selection implies that participants with high observed strength levels have smaller expected strength-shocks than those with low levels. Consequently, the latter should play better than predicted and the former worse (given their observed strength). These predictions are confronted with data from a large chess tournament held in the USA. This tournament is divided into different sections, with players being able to play in the section to which their current chess rating (observed strength) belongs. As predicted, we find that within each section the participation probability increases with chess rating and prize amounts, and players with a relatively low (resp. high) rating are indeed the ones who have a better (resp. worse) relative performance.
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023592434
    Format: 47 S. , graph. Darst. , 22 cm
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 12507
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Author information: Mocan, Naci
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research
    UID:
    almafu_9958103603702883
    Format: 1 online resource: , illustrations (black and white);
    Series Statement: NBER working paper series no. w17059
    Content: We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger.
    Note: May 2011.
    Language: English
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