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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Paying Primary Health Care Centers for Performance in Rwanda (2010)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048264632
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (29 p)
    Content: Paying for performance (P4P) provides financial incentives for providers to increase the use and quality of care. P4P can affect health care by providing incentives for providers to put more effort into specific activities, and by increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery of services. This paper evaluates the impact of P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, institutional delivery, and child preventive care using data produced from a prospective quasi-experimental evaluation nested into the national rollout of P4P in Rwanda. Treatment facilities were enrolled in the P4P scheme in 2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled two years later. The incentive effect is isolated from the resource effect by increasing comparison facilities' input-based budgets by the average P4P payments to the treatment facilities. The data were collected from 166 facilities and a random sample of 2158 households. P4P had a large and significant positive impact on institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young children, and improved quality of prenatal care. The authors find no effect on the number of prenatal care visits or on immunization rates. P4P had the greatest effect on those services that had the highest payment rates and needed the lowest provider effort. P4P financial performance incentives can improve both the use of and the quality of health services. Because the analysis isolates the incentive effect from the resource effect in P4P, the results indicate that an equal amount of financial resources without the incentives would not have achieved the same gain in outcomes
    Additional Edition: Gertler, Paul J Paying Primary Health Care Centers for Performance in Rwanda
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-5190
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda (2013)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048265800
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
    Content: Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by specific utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a paying for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. This study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing and counseling and using data from a prospective quasi-experimental design. The study finds a positive impact of paying for performance with an increase of 6.1 percentage points in the probability of individuals having ever been tested. This positive impact is stronger for married individuals: 10.2 percentage points. The results also indicate larger impacts of paying for performance on the likelihood that the respondent reports both partners have ever been tested, especially among discordant couples (14.7 percentage point increase) in which only one of the partners is HIV positive
    Additional Edition: De Walque, Damien Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6364
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda (2013)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797589511
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper 6364
    Content: Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by specific utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a paying for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. This study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing and counseling and using data from a prospective quasi-experimental design. The study finds a positive impact of paying for performance with an increase of 6.1 percentage points in the probability of individuals having ever been tested. This positive impact is stronger for married individuals: 10.2 percentage points. The results also indicate larger impacts of paying for performance on the likelihood that the respondent reports both partners have ever been tested, especially among discordant couples (14.7 percentage point increase) in which only one of the partners is HIV positive.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    Stabi Berlin
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Impact of Implementing Performance-Based Financing on Childhood Malnutrition in Rwanda
    BioMed Central
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1780667159
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Content: Malnutrition remains a serious concern in Rwanda, particularly among children under-5 years. Performance-based financing (PBF), an innovative health systems financing strategy, has been implemented at the national level since 2008. This study aimed to assess the impact of PBF and other factors associated with the prevalence of three classifications of malnutrition (stunting, wasting and underweight) in children under-5 years in Rwanda. The study is a cross-sectional study comprising of 713 children under five years old from 557 households, whose anthropometric measurements (height, weight and age) had been obtained as part of the 2008 Rwanda General Health and HIV household survey. Z-scores for height-for-age, weight-for-age, weight-for-height, and body mass index-for-age were analyzed according to the World Health Organization 2006 Child Growth Standards. Random intercept logistic regression models were used to regress each anthropometric measure (WAZ, HAZ and WHZ) against child, maternal and household characteristics
    Note: Africa , Rwanda , en_US
    Language: Undetermined
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Stabi Berlin
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda (2014)
    Elsevier
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1017865779
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Content: Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a pay for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. Using a prospective quasi-experimental design, this study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing. We find a positive impact of pay for performance on HIV testing among married individuals (10.2 percentage points increase). Paying for performance also increased testing by both partners by 14.7 percentage point among discordant couples in which only one of the partners is an AIDS patient.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    Stabi Berlin
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Paying Primary Health Care Centers for Performance in Rwanda (2010)
    World Bank, Washington, DC
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1759665266
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper No. 5190
    Content: Paying for performance (P4P) provides financial incentives for providers to increase the use and quality of care. P4P can affect health care by providing incentives for providers to put more effort into specific activities, and by increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery of services. This paper evaluates the impact of P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, institutional delivery, and child preventive care using data produced from a prospective quasi-experimental evaluation nested into the national rollout of P4P in Rwanda. Treatment facilities were enrolled in the P4P scheme in 2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled two years later. The incentive effect is isolated from the resource effect by increasing comparison facilities' input-based budgets by the average P4P payments to the treatment facilities. The data were collected from 166 facilities and a random sample of 2158 households. P4P had a large and significant positive impact on institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young children, and improved quality of prenatal care. The authors find no effect on the number of prenatal care visits or on immunization rates. P4P had the greatest effect on those services that had the highest payment rates and needed the lowest provider effort. P4P financial performance incentives can improve both the use of and the quality of health services. Because the analysis isolates the incentive effect from the resource effect in P4P, the results indicate that an equal amount of financial resources without the incentives would not have achieved the same gain in outcomes
    Note: Africa , Rwanda , English , en_US
    Language: Undetermined
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Stabi Berlin
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