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  • 1
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617340
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (36 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Content: When the La Niña drought hit Chile in 1998–99, the country's recently reformed electricity sector suffered a price collapse. Power outages followed—but were they inevitable? No. The electricity shortage can be blamed on the rigid price system and deficient regulatory governance. In the early 1980s Chile reformed its electricity sector, introducing a regulatory framework that became influential worldwide. But in 1998 and 1999 La Niña brought one of the worst droughts on record, causing a price system collapse, random power outages, and three-hour rotating electricity cuts. Fischer and Galetovic study the interaction between regulatory incentives and governance during the 1998–99 electricity shortage, showing that the supply restriction could have been managed without outages. The shortage can be blamed on a rigid price system, which was unable to respond to large supply shocks, and on deficient regulatory governance, which led to a weak regulator unable to make the system work. The authors also show that the regulator's weakness stemmed not from lack of formal powers but from vulnerability to lobbyists and a lack of independence. Moreover, the regulator seems not to have fully understood the incentives in the price system during supply restrictions. The authors conclude that the Chilean shortage shows the limitations of a rigid price system requiring heavy regulatory intervention. This suggests that countries whose governance structures are ill suited to dealing with loopholes left by the law should rely as much as possible on market rules that clearly allocate property rights ex ante and leave the terms of contracts to be freely negotiated by private parties.
    Content: [Fortsetzung 1. Abstract] This paper -a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, World Bank Institute- is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase the understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at rfischer@dii.uchile.cl or agaleto@dii.uchile.cl
    Note: Weitere Ausgabe: Fischer, Ronald : Regulatory Governance and Chile's 1998–99 Electricity Shortage
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Fischer, Ronald Regulatory Governance and Chile's 1998–99 Electricity Shortage 2001
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049080271
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten)
    Content: Public-private partnerships are used to procure public infrastructure. Despite involving private investors and concessionaires, they impact the public budget like traditional provision and create fiscal risks. This paper develops a conceptual framework to assess whether and how public-private partnerships shift risks to concessionaires and financiers. It uses this framework to describe and assess the Chilean public-private partnerships program. The paper identifies renegotiations as the major source of fiscal risk, which involved additional investments, increasing the cost by about one-third over the original project cost estimates. The 2010 law reform on public-private partnerships introduced changes to the renegotiations regime and began the routine use of variable term contracts. Using contractual data, the analysis finds evidence suggesting that renegotiations fell dramatically. The paper also calculates the realized internal rates of return for 50 highway and airport public-private partnerships, using cash flow data for the entire public-private partnerships program, which started in 1991. The average internal rate of return is 6.8 percent, with averages of 9.1 and 3.1 percent for fixed and variable term public-private partnerships, respectively. The returns show a large dispersion, which suggests that infrastructure projects are intrinsically risky and private participation entails significant risk shifting from the budget to concessionaires and financiers
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Engel, Eduardo Managing the Fiscal Risks Wrought by Ppps: A Simple Framework and Some Lessons from Chile Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2022
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 3
    UID:
    b3kat_BV026948217
    Format: 46, [2] S. , graph. Darst.
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 6828
    Language: Undetermined
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 4
    UID:
    b3kat_BV026948149
    Format: 43 S.
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 6689
    Language: Undetermined
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Highway ; Franchising ; Computer network resources
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 5
    UID:
    b3kat_BV026945306
    Format: 17 S. , graph. Darst.
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 8869
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 6
    UID:
    b3kat_BV026944448
    Format: 27 S. , graph. Darst
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 8146
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 7
    UID:
    gbv_72997345X
    Format: 30 p. , 21 x 29.7cm
    Series Statement: OECD Economics Department Working Papers no.455
    Content: Chile’s regulatory framework is working reasonably well. The country’s structural reforms since the 1980s, with the privatisation of utilities and deregulation of product and labour markets, have improved resource allocation and increased the population’s access to basic services, while calling for a comprehensive upgrading of regulatory institutions. At the same time, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are contributing to closing Chile’s infrastructure deficit, particularly in transport. The recurrent cuts in shipments of natural gas from Argentina since 2004 have put additional strain on regulation in the electricity sector to encourage investment in generation and ensure the security of supply. This paper reviews regulatory reform in three network industries (electricity, gas and telecoms), where further liberalisation, particularly in electricity retailing, and improvements in the regulation of telecoms would do much to further improve the business climate. The governance of public-private partnerships can be improved by increasing transparency and accountability in the concession process. In doing so, the government’s exposure to contingent liabilities can be contained. This Working Paper relates to the 2005 OECD Economic Survey of Chile (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/chile).
    Language: English
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  • 8
    UID:
    b3kat_BV047937111
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (29 Seiten) , 21 x 29.7cm
    Series Statement: OECD Economics Department Working Papers
    Content: Chile's regulatory framework is working reasonably well. The country's structural reforms since the 1980s, with the privatisation of utilities and deregulation of product and labour markets, have improved resource allocation and increased the population's access to basic services, while calling for a comprehensive upgrading of regulatory institutions. At the same time, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are contributing to closing Chile's infrastructure deficit, particularly in transport. The recurrent cuts in shipments of natural gas from Argentina since 2004 have put additional strain on regulation in the electricity sector to encourage investment in generation and ensure the security of supply. This paper reviews regulatory reform in three network industries (electricity, gas and telecoms), where further liberalisation, particularly in electricity retailing, and improvements in the regulation of telecoms would do much to further improve the business climate. The governance of public-private partnerships can be improved by increasing transparency and accountability in the concession process. In doing so, the government's exposure to contingent liabilities can be contained. This Working Paper relates to the 2005 OECD Economic Survey of Chile (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/chile)
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 9
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049075890
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: When the La Niña drought hit Chile in 1998-99, the country's recently reformed electricity sector suffered a price collapse. Power outages followed-but were they inevitable? No. The electricity shortage can be blamed on the rigid price system and deficient regulatory governance. In the early 1980s Chile reformed its electricity sector, introducing a regulatory framework that became influential worldwide. But in 1998 and 1999 La Niña brought one of the worst droughts on record, causing a price system collapse, random power outages, and three-hour rotating electricity cuts. Fischer and Galetovic study the interaction between regulatory incentives and governance during the 1998-99 electricity shortage, showing that the supply restriction could have been managed without outages. The shortage can be blamed on a rigid price system, which was unable to respond to large supply shocks, and on deficient regulatory governance, which led to a weak regulator unable to make the system work. The authors also show that the regulator's weakness stemmed not from lack of formal powers but from vulnerability to lobbyists and a lack of independence. Moreover, the regulator seems not to have fully understood the incentives in the price system during supply restrictions. The authors conclude that the Chilean shortage shows the limitations of a rigid price system requiring heavy regulatory intervention. This suggests that countries whose governance structures are ill suited to dealing with loopholes left by the law should rely as much as possible on market rules that clearly allocate property rights ex ante and leave the terms of contracts to be freely negotiated by private parties. This paper-a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase the understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at rfischer@dii.uchile.cl or agaleto@dii.uchile.cl
    Additional Edition: Fischer, Ronald Regulatory Governance and Chile's 1998-99 Electricity Shortage
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 10
    UID:
    b3kat_BV026945192
    Format: 27 S. , graph. Darst.
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 8803
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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