Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

Berlin Brandenburg

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  • 1
    In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010, Vol.33(4), pp.353-365
    Description: Abstract The commentators offer helpful suggestions at three levels: (1) explanations for the particular effects discussed in the target article; (2) implications of those effects for our understanding of the role of moral judgment in human cognition; and (3) more theoretical questions about the overall relationship between ordinary cognition and systematic science. The present response takes up these three issues in turn.
    Keywords: Morality -- Analysis ; Cognition -- Analysis ; Science -- Analysis ; Judgment (Psychology) -- Analysis;
    ISSN: 0140-525X
    E-ISSN: 1469-1825
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  • 2
    Language: English
    In: Cognition, January 2013, Vol.126(1), pp.72-86
    Description: ► Three studies show that moral judgments can affect judgments about whether a trait is innate. ► A large-scale study compared trained researchers ( = 1506) to other participants ( = 5043). ► In conditions that encourage case-based thinking, even researchers show an impact of morality. ► In conditions that encourage principled thinking, the effect is reduced in all participants. The concept of innateness appears in systematic research within cognitive science, but it also appears in less systematic modes of thought that long predate the scientific study of the mind. The present studies therefore explore the relationship between the properly scientific uses of this concept and its role in ordinary folk understanding. Studies 1–4 examined the judgments of people with no specific training in cognitive science. Results showed (a) that judgments about whether a trait was innate were not affected by whether or not the trait was learned, but (b) such judgments were impacted by considerations. Study 5 looked at the judgments of both non-scientists and scientists, in conditions that encouraged either thinking about individual cases or thinking about certain general principles. In the case-based condition, both non-scientists and scientists showed an impact of moral considerations but little impact of learning. In the principled condition, both non-scientists and scientists showed an impact of learning but little impact of moral considerations. These results suggest that both non-scientists and scientists are drawn to a conception of innateness that differs from the one at work in contemporary scientific research but that they are also both capable of ‘filtering out’ their initial intuitions and using a more scientific approach.
    Keywords: Moral Cognition ; Innateness ; Scientific Cognition ; Psychology
    ISSN: 0010-0277
    E-ISSN: 18737838
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  • 3
    In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010, Vol.33(4), pp.315-329
    Description: Abstract It has often been suggested that people's ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-held view, suggesting that people's moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to say that the relevant competencies are entirely non-moral but that some additional factor (conversational pragmatics, performance error, etc.) then interferes and allows people's moral judgments to affect their intuitions. Another approach would be to say that moral considerations truly do figure in workings of the competencies themselves. I argue that the data available now favor the second of these approaches over the first.
    Keywords: Causal Cognition; Moral Cognition; Theory Of Mind
    ISSN: 0140-525X
    E-ISSN: 1469-1825
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  • 4
    Language: English
    In: Cognition, 2015, Vol.135, p.36(3)
    Description: To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.011 Byline: Joshua Knobe Abstract: * Two samples of philosophy papers were compared, one from 1960 to 1999, the other from 2009 to 2013. * Within the 1960-1999 sample, the majority of papers (62%) used purely a priori methods. * Within the 2009-2013 sample, only a small minority (12%) used purely a priori methods.
    ISSN: 0010-0277
    Source: Cengage Learning, Inc.
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  • 5
    Language: English
    In: Cognition, February 2015, Vol.135, pp.36-38
    Description: The philosophical study of mind in the twentieth century was dominated by a research program that used a priori methods to address foundational questions. Since that time, however, the philosophical study of mind has undergone a dramatic shift. To provide a more accurate picture of contemporary philosophical work, I compared a sample of highly cited philosophy papers from the past five years with a sample of highly cited philosophy papers from the twentieth century. In the twentieth century sample, the majority of papers used purely a priori methods, while only a minority cited results from empirical studies. In the sample from the past five years, the methodology is radically different. The majority of papers cite results from empirical studies, a sizable proportion report original experimental results, and only a small minority are purely a priori. Overall, the results of the review suggest that the philosophical study of mind has become considerably more integrated into the broader interdisciplinary field of cognitive science.
    Keywords: Philosophy of Mind ; Philosophy of Cognitive Science ; Bibliometrics ; Psychology
    ISSN: 0010-0277
    E-ISSN: 18737838
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  • 6
    Language: English
    In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2011, Vol.101(6), pp.1207-1220
    Description: According to models of objectification, viewing someone as a body induces de-mentalization, stripping away their psychological traits. Here evidence is presented for an alternative account, where a body focus does not diminish the attribution of all mental capacities but, instead, leads perceivers to infer a different kind of mind. Drawing on the distinction in mind perception between agency and experience, it is found that focusing on someone's body reduces perceptions of agency (self-control and action) but increases perceptions of experience (emotion and sensation). These effects were found when comparing targets represented by both revealing versus nonrevealing pictures (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) or by simply directing attention toward physical characteristics (Experiment 2). The effect of a body focus on mind perception also influenced moral intuitions, with those represented as a body seen to be less morally responsible (i.e., lesser moral agents) but more sensitive to harm (i.e., greater moral patients; Experiments 5 and 6). These effects suggest that a body focus does not cause objectification per se but, instead, leads to a redistribution of perceived mind.
    Keywords: Morality ; Dehumanization ; Pornography ; Dualism ; Sexism
    ISSN: 0022-3514
    E-ISSN: 1939-1315
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  • 7
    Language: English
    In: The Behavioral and brain sciences, February 2013, Vol.36(1), pp.100-1
    Description: The target article convincingly argues that mutualistic cooperation is supported by partner choice. However, we will suggest that mutualistic cooperation is not the basis of fairness; instead, fairness is based on impartiality. In support of this view, we show that adults are willing to destroy others’ resources to avoid inequality, a result predicted by impartiality but not by mutualistic cooperation.
    Keywords: Choice Behavior ; Marriage ; Morals ; Sexual Partners
    ISSN: 0140525X
    E-ISSN: 1469-1825
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  • 8
    Language: English
    In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2014, Vol.106(4), pp.501-513
    Description: Belief in free will is a pervasive phenomenon that has important consequences for prosocial actions and punitive judgments, but little research has investigated why free will beliefs are so widespread. Across 5 studies using experimental, survey, and archival data and multiple measures of free will belief, we tested the hypothesis that a key factor promoting belief in free will is a fundamental desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors. In Study 1, participants reported greater belief in free will after considering an immoral action than a morally neutral one. Study 2 provided evidence that this effect was due to heightened punitive motivations. In a field experiment (Study 3), an ostensibly real classroom cheating incident led to increased free will beliefs, again due to heightened punitive motivations. In Study 4, reading about others’ immoral behaviors reduced the perceived merit of anti-free-will research, thus demonstrating the effect with an indirect measure of free will belief. Finally, Study 5 examined this relationship outside the laboratory and found that the real-world prevalence of immoral behavior (as measured by crime and homicide rates) predicted free will belief on a country level. Taken together, these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society.
    Keywords: Free Will ; Moral Reasoning ; Moral Responsibility ; Motivation ; Punishment
    ISSN: 0022-3514
    E-ISSN: 1939-1315
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  • 9
    Language: English
    In: Cognition, October 2017, Vol.167, pp.25-37
    Description: People’s beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people’s representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people’s notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people’s representations of what is normal were found to be influenced both by what they believed to be descriptively average and by what they believed to be prescriptively ideal. This is shown across three domains: people’s use of the word “normal” (Study 1), their use of gradable adjectives (Study 2), and their judgments of concept prototypicality (Study 3). A final study investigated the learning of normality for a novel category, showing that people actively combine statistical and prescriptive information they have learned into an undifferentiated notion of what is normal (Study 4). Taken together, these findings may help to explain how moral norms impact the acquisition of normality and, conversely, how normality impacts the acquisition of moral norms.
    Keywords: Normality ; Morality ; Learning ; Concepts ; Psychology
    ISSN: 0010-0277
    E-ISSN: 18737838
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  • 10
    Language: English
    In: Cognition, December 2015, Vol.145, pp.30-42
    Description: Past work has demonstrated that people’s moral judgments can influence their judgments in a number of domains that might seem to involve straightforward matters of fact, including judgments about freedom, causation, the doing/allowing distinction, and intentional action. The present studies explore whether the effect of morality in these four domains can be explained by changes in the relevance of alternative possibilities. More precisely, we propose that moral judgment influences the degree to which people regard certain alternative possibilities as relevant, which in turn impacts intuitions about freedom, causation, doing/allowing, and intentional action. Employing the stimuli used in previous research, Studies 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a show that the relevance of alternatives is influenced by moral judgments and mediates the impact of morality on non-moral judgments. Studies 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b then provide direct empirical evidence for the link between the relevance of alternatives and judgments in these four domains by manipulating (rather than measuring) the relevance of alternative possibilities. Lastly, Study 5 demonstrates that the critical mechanism is not whether alternative possibilities are considered, but whether they are regarded as . These studies support a unified framework for understanding the impact of morality across these very different kinds of judgments.
    Keywords: Morality ; Alternative Possibilities ; Modality ; Psychology
    ISSN: 0010-0277
    E-ISSN: 18737838
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