Format:
1 Online-Ressource (335 pages)
ISBN:
9783030485276
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Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
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Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 Corporate Governance -- Introduction -- Corporate Governance (CG) -- Defining Corporate Governance -- Narrow View of CG -- Broader View of CG -- The Importance of CG -- Enron -- Parmalat -- Palmer & -- Harvey -- HIH Insurance -- China Aviation Oil -- Satyam Computers -- Mehran Bank -- The Rationale for This Study -- References -- Chapter 2 Theories, Models and Mechanisms -- Theories of CG -- Agency Theory -- Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT) -- Stakeholder Theory -- Stewardship Theory -- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Approach -- Class and Managerial Hegemony -- Social Contract Theory (SCT) -- Legitimacy Theory -- CG Models -- Anglo-American Model -- The German Model -- The Japanese Model -- Corporate Governance in Pakistan -- Convergence of Corporate Governance Models -- CG Mechanisms -- Internal Mechanisms -- External Mechanisms -- Relationship Between Internal and External Mechanisms -- Landmark CG Developments -- The Cadbury Report -- The OECD Principles -- ASX Corporate Governance Council -- The King Reports (South Africa) -- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 (US) -- Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 3 Predictions of Corporate Governance Models -- Introduction -- Agency Perspective -- Resource Dependence Perspective (RDP) -- Stakeholder Perspective -- Multi Theory Approach -- Multi-theory Framework Adopted for This Research -- Selected Key Studies -- Hillman and Dalziel (2003) -- Nicholson and Kiel (2004) -- Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) -- Approach of This Research -- Predictions of Our Proposed Models -- Board Roles and Performance -- Monitoring Role and Firm Performance (Board Meetings) -- Resource-Dependence Role and Firm Performance (Board Size)
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Board Structure and Performance -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality (Board Leadership) -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Ownership Concentration -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 4 Research Design and Statistical Method -- Introduction -- Sample, Study Period, and Data Source -- Sample Firms -- Study Period -- Data Source -- Analytical Approach -- Reasons for Panel Data -- Types of Panel Data Analytic Models -- Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) -- Fixed Effects Model (Least Squares Dummy Variable Model) -- Random Effects Models -- Panel Data Specification Tests -- Serial Correlation -- Heteroscedasticity -- Multicollinearity -- Endogeneity -- Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Dependent Variables-Performance Variables -- Tobin's Q (TQ) -- Return on Assets (ROA) -- Return on Equity (ROE) -- Control Variables -- Firm Size (FSIZE) -- Leverage (LEVRG) -- Firm Age (AGE) -- Sales Growth (GRO) -- Industry Dummies (INDUM) -- Moderating Variables -- The Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (CODE) -- Ownership Concentration (OWCENT) -- Mediating Variables -- Empirical Model -- Summary -- References -- Chapter 5 Empirical Results and Discussion -- Introduction -- Descriptive Statistics -- Distribution of Sample Firms by Characteristics -- Firm Performance Measures -- Independent Variables -- Board Independence -- CEO Duality -- Board Diversity -- Board Committees -- Audit Committee Independence -- Board Size (BSIZE) -- Frequency of Board Meetings (BMETS) -- Board Structural Characteristics: Statistical Test of Pre- and Post-2012 Period Means -- Control Variables -- Firm Size -- Leverage Ratio -- Correlation Analysis
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Board Independence (BINDP) -- CEO Duality (CEODUL) -- Board Diversity (DIVERSE) -- Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) -- Board Committees (BCOMTS) -- Board Size and Board Meetings -- Ownership Concentration -- Control Variables -- Panel Data Specifications and Diagnostic Tests -- Pooled OLS vs. Random and Fixed Effects -- Random and Fixed Effects -- Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test of Multicollinearity -- Breusch-Pagan/Cool-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity -- Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test -- Regression Analyses-Testing the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of Tobin's Q -- Effect of the Control Variables on Tobin's Q (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Mediation Effects of Board Size-Resource-Dependence Role (Model M3-Model M7) -- Direct Effects of the Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of TQ -- Effect of the Control Variables on TQ (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Independent Variables on TQ (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4)
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Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Meetings on the Relationship Between Board Structure and TQ (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROA (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Revised Code on the Mediator Board Size (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Size (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Board Size on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROA -- Effect of Control Variables on ROA (Model M0) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP's Code Revision on ROA (Model M2) -- Moderating Effect of Ownership Concentration on ROA (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Moderating Effect of SECP Revision on the Mediator Board Meetings (Model M4) -- Moderating Effect of TOP1-TOP5 Ownership Concentration on Board Meetings Mediator (Model M4) -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROA (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Table Regression Results for the Conceptual Framework -- Board Size (Resource-Dependence Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Effect of Control Variables on ROE (Model M0)
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Direct Effect of Board Structure Variables on ROE (Model M1) -- Moderating Effect of the SECP Code and Ownership Concentration on TQ (Model M2) -- Direct Effects of Board Structure and Moderator Variables on the Mediator Board Size (Model M3) -- Implications of Table Results for the Conceptual Model -- Board Meetings (Monitoring Role) as the Mediator of ROE -- Mediating Effect of Monitoring of the Board on the Relationship Between Board Structure and ROE (Model M5 and Model M6) -- Implications of Regression Results in Table for the Conceptual Framework -- Discussion -- Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Direct Effects) -- Board Size and Firm Performance -- Board Independence and Firm Performance -- CEO Duality and Firm Performance -- Board Diversity and Firm Performance -- Board Committees and Firm Performance -- Audit Committee Independence and Firm Performance -- Mediation Effects of Board Roles on Firm Performance -- Moderating Effects of the SECP's Code on Firm Performance -- References -- Chapter 6 Summary and Implications of the Study -- Prelude -- Implications -- Contribution -- Application and Implications for Fellow Emerging Economies -- Results Within the Framework of PESTLE Analysis of Emerging Economies -- Limitations -- Avenues for Future Research -- References -- Appendices -- References -- Index
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Tabassum, Naeem Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2020 ISBN 9783030485269
Language:
English
Subjects:
Economics
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