Format:
Online-Ressource (21 S.)
Series Statement:
Simon School of Business working paper series 14-12
Content:
We consider a sellers ability to deter potential entrants by offering exclusive contracts to its downstream buyers. Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) showed that this can be a profitable strategy if there is a coordination failure on the part of the buyers. Segal and Whinston (2000) showed that the seller need not rely on a coordination failure if it can make discriminatory divide-and-conquer offers. These papers and the literature that followed has assumed that all offers are public. We show that if buyers cannot observe each other's offers and have passive or wary out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the divide-and-conquer exclusion strategy fails. Equilibria in which the incumbent obtains exclusion for free due to a coordination failure on the part of the buyers, on the other hand, exist for all out-of-equilibrium beliefs
Note:
Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.
Language:
English
Keywords:
Arbeitspapier
;
Graue Literatur
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2433242
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