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  • 1
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040616919
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (32 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Content: January 2000 - People in Sofia are willing to pay 4.2 percent of their income or more for a program to improve air quality. Through a survey, Wang and Whittington study willingness to pay for improvements in air quality in Sofia, Bulgaria. Using a stochastic payment card approach - asking respondents the likelihood that they would agree to pay a series of prices - they estimate the distribution of willingness to pay various prices. They find that people in Sofia are willing to pay up to about 4.2 percent of their income for a program to improve air quality. The income elasticity of willingness to pay for air quality improvements is about 27 percent. For comparison, they also used the referendum contingent valuation approach. Results from that approach yielded a higher estimate of willingness to pay. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the economics of pollution control in developing countries. Copies of the paper are available from Hua Wang may be contacted at hwang1@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Wang, Hua Willingness to Pay for Air Quality Improvements in Sofia, Bulgaria 1999
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040616975
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (32 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Content: May 2000 - How well air and water pollution regulation is implemented depends very much on both the level of economic development and actual environmental quality. Pollution pricing is closer to the dictates of environmental economics than China's formal regulatory statutes would suggest - and there is considerable scope for using economic instruments to reduce China's industrial pollution problems. Wang and Wheeler investigate two aspects of China's pollution levy system, which was first implemented about 20 years ago. First, they analyze what determines differences in enforcement of the pollution levy in various urban areas. They find that collection of the otherwise uniform pollution levy is sensitive to differences in economic development and environmental quality. Air and water pollution levies are higher in areas that are heavily polluted. Second, they analyze the impact of pollution charges on industry's environmental performance, in terms of the pollution intensity of process production and the degree of end-of-pipe abatement for both water pollution and air pollution. Econometric analysis shows that plants respond strongly to the levy by either abating air pollution in the production process or providing end-of-pipe treatment for water pollution. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The authors may be contacted at hwang1@worldbank.org or dwheeler1@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Wang, Hua Endogenous Enforcement and Effectiveness of China's Pollution Levy System 1999
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040616976
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (32 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Content: May 2000 - Community pressure may be as strong an incentive for industrial firms to control pollution in China as pollution levies are. Wang evaluates the strength of the effect that community pressure and pollution charges have on industrial pollution control in China and estimates the marginal cost of pollution abatement. He examines a well-documented set of plant-level data, combined with community-level data, to assess the impact of pollution charges and community pressure on industrial behavior in China. He constructs and estimates an industrial organic water pollution discharge model for plants that violate standards for pollution discharge, pay pollution charges, and are constantly under community pressure to further abate pollution. He creates a model and estimates implicit prices for pollution discharges from community pressure, which are determined jointly by the explicit price, the pollution levy. He finds that the implicit discharge price is at least as high as the explicit price. In other words, community pressure not only exists but may be as strong an incentive as the pollution charge is for industrial firms to control pollution in China. Wang's modeling approach also provides a way to estimate the marginal cost of pollution abatement. The empirical results show that the current marginal cost of abatement is about twice the effective charge rate in China. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The author may be contacted at hwang1@worldbank.org
    Note: Weitere Ausgabe: Wang, Hua : Pollution Charges, Community Pressure, and Abatement Cost of Industrial Pollution in China
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Wang, Hua Pollution Charges, Community Pressure, and Abatement Cost of Industrial Pollution in China 1999
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076307
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: Inspections have a statistically significant impact on firms' environmental performance in the Chinese city of Zhenjiang, and citizens' complaints have a significant impact on inspections. So stronger information and education campaigns may improve social welfare in the city. - Little empirical research has been done on monitoring and enforcement issues in environmental economics, especially to analyze the impact of monitoring and enforcement on polluters' environmental performance. No studies have been done in developing economies. Dasgupta, Laplante, Mamingi, and Wang explore the impact of inspections, and the potential impact of pollution charges and citizens' complaints, on the environmental performance of polluters in China. Their analysis of plant-level data from the city of Zhenjiang shows that: · Inspections have a statistically significant impact on firms' environmental performance. · Pollution charges do not have a statistically significant effect on firms' performance - although the lack of variation in pollution charges in Zhenjiang precludes effectively capturing their impact. · Complaints have a significant impact on inspections and therefore on pollution control. Currently available data do not allow analysis of whether the cost of additional inspections is justified, but it is reasonable to speculate that additional inspections would improve social welfare in Zhenjiang and that information and education campaigns are probably a good way to encourage citizen complaints. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Pollution Control in China: The Role and Impact of Inspection and Complaints (RPO 682-44). The authors may be contacted at sdasgupta@worldbank.org, blaplante@worldbank.org, or hwang1@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Dasgupta, Susmita Industrial Environmental Performance in China
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group, World Bank
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617570
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Edition: Also available in print.
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2936
    Note: "December 18, 2002. - Includes bibliographical references. - Title from title screen as viewed on February 5, 2003 , Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2002]
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Jin, Yanhong Industrial ownership and environmental performance 2002
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617571
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Edition: Also available in print.
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2937
    Note: "December 18, 2002. - Includes bibliographical references. - Title from title screen as viewed on February 5, 2003 , Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2002]
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Di, Wenhua The determinants of government environmental performance 2002
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC : World Bank, Policy Research Dept., Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040616305
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (ii, 30 p) , ill , 28 cm
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 1644
    Note: "September 1996"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 16-17) , Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1996]
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Wang, Hua Pricing industrial pollution in China 1996
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040616838
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (28 p) , ill , 28 cm
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Edition: Also available in print.
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2198
    Content: China's unique combination of emissions charges and pollution abatement subsidies has given China's most heavily polluting industrial firms incentive to invest in pollution abatement
    Note: "October 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 22-23) , Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1999]
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Wang, Hua How the Chinese system of charges and subsidies affects pollution control efforts by China's top industrial polluters 1999
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 9
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040616506
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (52 p) , ill , 28 cm
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 1856
    Note: "November 1997"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 40-41) , Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1997] , Weitere Ausgabe: Dasgupta, Susmita: Surviving success
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Dasgupta, Susmita Surviving success 1997
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 10
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076355
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (28 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: The marginal productivity of water used for industry varies among sectors in China, but there is great potential for the Chinese government to save water by raising water prices to industry, to encourage water conservation. - Using plant-level data on more than 1,000 Chinese industrial plants, Wang and Lall estimate a production function treating capital, labor, water, and raw material as inputs to industrial production. They then estimate the marginal productivity of water based on the estimated production function. Using the marginal productivity approach to valuing water for industrial use, they also derive a model and estimates for the price elasticity of water use by Chinese industries. Previous studies used water demand functions and total cost functions to estimate firms' willingness to pay for water use. They find that the marginal productivity of water varies among sectors in China, with an industry average of 2.5 yuan per cubic meter of water. The average price elasticity of industrial water demand is about -1.0, suggesting a great potential for the Chinese government to use pricing policies to encourage water conservation in the industrial sector. Increasing water prices would reduce water use substantially. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the economics of industrial pollution control in developing countries
    Additional Edition: Lall, Somik Valuing Water for Chinese Industries
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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