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  • 1
    UID:
    b3kat_BV047917389
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    ISBN: 9783030926120
    Series Statement: Human perspectives in health sciences and technology volume 5
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover ISBN 978-3-030-92611-3
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback ISBN 978-3-030-92614-4
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books. ; Electronic books.
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Author information: Bremer, Anne
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV045501452
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (XXV, 591 Seiten) , Illustrationen, Diagramme, Karten
    ISBN: 9783319967769
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-3-319-96775-2
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-3-319-96777-6
    Language: English
    Subjects: General works
    RVK:
    Keywords: Meereskunde ; Muscheln ; Umweltwissenschaften ; Umweltbezogenes Management ; Ökologie ; Aquatisches Ökosystem ; Aufsatzsammlung
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Cover
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  • 3
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023514775
    Format: 171 S. , zahlr. Ill.
    ISBN: 0893814423 , 089381444X
    Language: English
    Subjects: General works , Art History
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Strand, Paul 1890-1976 ; Fotografie ; Ausstellungskatalog ; Ausstellungskatalog ; Bildband
    Author information: Greenough, Sarah 1951-
    Author information: Strand, Paul 1890-1976
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  • 4
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048264605
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (28 p)
    Content: This paper discusses short-run and long-run effects of "green stimulus" efforts, and compares these effects with "non-green" fiscal stimuli. Green stimulus is defined here as short-run fiscal stimuli that also serve a "green" or environmental purpose in a situation of "crisis" characterized by temporary under-employment. A number of recently enacted national stimulus packages contain sizeable "green" components. The authors categorize effects according to their a) short-run employment effects, b) long-run growth effects, c) effects on carbon emissions, and d) "co-benefit" effects (on the environment, natural resources, and for other externalities). The most beneficial "green" programs in times of crisis are those that can stimulate employment in the short run, and lead to large "learning curve" effects via lower production costs in the longer term. The overall assessment is that most "green stimulus" programs that have large short-run employment and environmental effects are likely to have less significant positive effects for long-run growth, and vice versa, implying a trade-off in many cases between short-run and long-run impacts. There are also trade-offs for employment generation in that programs that yield larger (smaller) employment effects tend to lead to more employment gains for largely lower-skilled (higher-skilled) workers, so that the long-term growth effects are relatively small (large). Ultimately, the results reinforce the point that different instruments are needed for addressing different problems
    Additional Edition: Strand, Jon Green Stimulus, Economic Recovery, and Long-Term Sustainable Development
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048264613
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (47 p)
    Content: This paper develops a global model of climate policy, focusing on the choice between tax and cap-and-trade solutions. The analysis assumes that the world can be split into two regions, with two fuels that both lead to carbon emissions. Region A consumes all fuels, and is responsible for defining and implementing climate policy. Region B produces all of fuel 1 (oil), while fuel 2 (interpreted as coal, natural gas, or renewables) is both produced and consumed in region A. The paper studies three model variants. All involve full policy coordination in each country block, but no coordination across blocks; and all involve an optimal producer tax on fuel 1 by region B. In model 1, region A sets two fuel consumption taxes, one for each fuel. The optimal region A tax on fuel 1 then exceeds the Pigou level as defined by the region; the tax set on fuel 2 is Pigouvian. The presence of a second fuel in region A reduces region B's optimal tax on fuel 1. In model 2, region A sets a common carbon tax, which is lower (higher) for fuel 1 (2) than in model 1. In model 3, region A sets a carbon emissions cap. This enhances region B's strategic position via the trade-off between fuels 1 and 2 in region A, following from the cap. In realistic cases, this leaves region A strategically weaker under a cap policy than under a tax policy, more so the less carbon-intensive the local fuel (2) is. In conclusion, a fuel-consuming and importing region that determines a climate policy will typically prefer to set a carbon tax, instead of setting a carbon emissions cap. The main reason is that a tax is more efficient than a cap at extracting rent from fuel (oil) exporters
    Additional Edition: Strand, Jon Taxes and Caps As Climate Policy Instruments With Domestic and Imported Fuels
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048265162
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
    Content: This paper provides counterexamples to the idea that mitigation of greenhouse gases causing climate change, and adaptation to climate change, are always and everywhere substitutes. The author considers optimal policy for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions when climate damages follow a geometric Brownian motion process with positive drift, and the trajectory for damages can be down-shifted by adaptive activities, focusing on two main cases: 1) damages are reduced proportionately by adaptation for any given climate impact ("reactive adaptation"); and 2) the growth path for climate damages is down-shifted ("anticipatory adaptation"). In this model mitigation is a lumpy one-off decision. Policy to reduce damages for given emissions is continuous in case 1, but may be lumpy in case 2, and reduces both expectation and variance of damages. Lower expected damages promote mitigation, and reduced variance discourages it (as the option value of waiting is reduced). In case 1, the last effect may dominate. Mitigation then increases when damages are dampened: mitigation and adaptation are complements. In case 2, mitigation and adaptation are always substitutes
    Additional Edition: Strand, Jon Implications of a Lowered Damage Trajectory for Mitigation in a Continuous-Time Stochastic Model
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048265392
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
    Content: This paper provides an analytical discussion of several interconnected resource allocation problems from under-pricing of electricity used by farmers for groundwater extraction. In these situations, groundwater extraction is inefficiently high even without electricity under-pricing. Moreover, part of the electric power supply intended for farmers is often diverted to other unauthorized uses (notably illicit consumption). The paper demonstrates that unless non-price electricity rationing imposes severe constraints on demand, the range of resource allocation problems includes insufficient incentives to provide high-level service by the power utility, insufficient incentives for farmers to install and operate efficient equipment, and losses due to political "rent seeking" activities to influence water allocations. It also shows that diversion of electricity to illicit uses can increase overall economic efficiency when this leads to less electricity use by farmers, thus somewhat ameliorating the problem of excessive groundwater extraction as well as the inefficiencies related to under-pricing of electricity. Systemic reforms for overcoming these problems may face severe political obstacles
    Additional Edition: Strand, Jon Allocative Inefficiencies Resulting from Subsidies to Agricultural Electricity Use
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048264738
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
    Content: Interests in obtaining carbon offsets in host countries for Clean Development Mechanism projects may serve as an obstacle to implementing more stringent general environmental policies in the same countries. A relatively lax environmental policy, whereby carbon emissions remain high, can be advantageous for such countries as it leaves them with a higher than otherwise scope for future emissions reductions through Clean Development Mechanism and other offset projects. In this note, the potential to affect the availability of future Clean Development Mechanism projects is shown to distort environmental and energy policies of Clean Development Mechanism host countries in two ways. Measures to reduce use of fossil energy are weakened. Because this weakens private sector incentives to switch to lower-carbon technology through Clean Development Mechanism projects, host governments then also find it attractive to subsidize this switch, in order to maximize the country's advantage from the Clean Development Mechanism
    Additional Edition: Strand, Jon Carbon Offsets With Endogenous Environmental Policy
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 9
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048265113
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
    Content: This paper provides a first analysis of optimal offset policies by a "policy bloc" of fossil fuel importers implementing a climate policy, facing a (non-policy) fringe of other importers, and a bloc of fuel exporters. The policy bloc uses either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade scheme, jointly with a fully efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe. The policy bloc is then shown to prefer a tax over a cap-and-trade scheme, since 1) a tax extracts more rent as fuel exporters reduce the export price, and more so when the policy bloc is larger relative to the fringe; and 2) offsets are more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme. The optimal offset price under a carbon tax is half the tax rate; under a cap-and-trade scheme the quota and offset price are equal. The domestic carbon and offset price are both higher under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme when the policy bloc is small; when it is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap-and-trade scheme. Fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc, and more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower, and since the price obtained when selling offsets is often higher (always so for a large fringe)
    Additional Edition: Strand, Jon Strategic Climate Policy with Offsets and Incomplete Abatement
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048265161
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (33 p)
    Content: Heterogeneity of public utility services is common in developing countries. In a "high-level" equilibrium, the quality of utility services is high, consumer willingness to pay for services is high, the utility is well funded and staff well paid in order to induce high quality of performance. In a "low-level" equilibrium the opposite is the case. Which alternative occurs depends on both the quality of utility management, and public perceptions about service quality. If a utility administration has the potential to offer high-quality service, and the public is aware of this, high-quality equilibrium also requires the public's service payments to be high enough to fund the needed pay incentives for the utility staff. When the public lack knowledge about the utility administration's quality, the public's initial beliefs about the utility administration's quality also will influence their willingness to make adequate service payments for a high-quality equilibrium. This paper shows that, with low confidence, only a low-level equilibrium may exist; while with higher initial confidence, a high-level equilibrium become possible. "Intermediate" (in between the low- and high-level) outcomes also can occur in early periods, with "high-level" outcomes later on
    Additional Edition: Strand, Jon Low-Level versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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