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  • Undetermined  (4)
Type of Publication
Consortium
Language
  • Undetermined  (4)
  • 1
    UID:
    (DE-627)1840855215
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    ISBN: 9781799833642
    Language: Undetermined
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781182728
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (25 p)
    Content: This paper describes the background, the process, and the market reaction of Chinese crucial privatization program, namely the Non-tradable Share Issue Reform. We document the following findings: (1) The privatization program causes economically moderate and statistically significant cumulative abnormal return (-60, 60) of 4.34% (median: 4.86%). (2) The privatization program brings tradable shareholders enormous buy-and-hold returns. The short run BHR amounts to 54.29% (median: 51.26%), and the medium run BHR reaches to as high as 78.22% (median: 76.01%), both significantly different from zero. The NBHR (BHR net of buy and hold the market index) is also economically large and statistically significant. (3) The privatization program activates the market, increases both the volatility and the liquidity. (4) Although the comovement of individual stocks with the market does not change significantly, the price efficiency increases both in the short run and the medium run
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 1, 2007 erstellt
    Language: Undetermined
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  • 3
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781182795
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (45 p)
    Content: We use a natural experiment occurred on Hong Kong stock market to examine the effects of removing short sales constraints on several trading characteristics of underlying stocks. We find that the trading of underlying stocks become less active after the lift of short sales constraints; meanwhile the liquidity of underlying stocks is tightened and the information asymmetry among the investors aggravates. But we fail to find any evidence indicating that the lift of short sales constraints seriously destabilizes the market. We further provide a story of noise traders to explain these empirical findings
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 1, 2006 erstellt
    Language: Undetermined
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781386102
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (46 p)
    Content: Within a cost-benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. We conclude that independent long-term institutions actively monitor and benefit from their efforts. This benefit has both private and shared components. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the subset of monitoring institutions
    Note: In: Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming
    Language: Undetermined
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