In:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Wiley, Vol. 99, No. 2 ( 2019-09), p. 409-430
Abstract:
In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons . I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0031-8205
,
1933-1592
Language:
English
Publisher:
Wiley
Publication Date:
2019
detail.hit.zdb_id:
208823-X
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2008885-1
SSG:
5,1
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