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  • 1
    AV-Medium
    AV-Medium
    München Universum Film
    UID:
    (DE-605)(DE-157)512824
    Format: 1 DVD (90 Min.) farb.
    Language: German
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    (DE-627)74079678X
    ISBN: 9783518460184
    In: Braintertainment, [Berlin] : Suhrkamp, 2012, (2012), Seite 248-254, 9783518460184
    In: year:2012
    In: pages:248-254
    Language: Undetermined
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 3
    Book
    Book
    New York [usw.] : McGraw-Hill
    UID:
    (DE-627)429931875
    Format: XII, 206 S. 8"
    Series Statement: (McGraw-Hill paperback series in psychopathology)
    Note: Literaturverz. S. 180-188
    Language: Undetermined
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  • 4
    Book
    Book
    New York [u.a.] : McGraw-Hill
    UID:
    (DE-603)179392573
    Format: XVI, 525 S.
    Series Statement: McGraw-Hill series in psychology
    Language: English
    Subjects: Psychology , Sociology
    RVK:
    RVK:
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  • 5
    Book
    Book
    Annapois, Md : Naval Institute Press
    UID:
    (DE-627)186792042
    Format: xv, 246 p , ill , 24 cm
    ISBN: 1557505721
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    Language: English
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  • 6
    UID:
    (DE-627)1805682911
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (36 p)
    Content: Notwithstanding the fact that ERISA was enacted to protect employee benefits, courts have narrowly construed the relief available when benefits are denied, out of concern that a stronger remedy would be too costly for the system to bear. Judges, I argue, are ill-equipped to make this policy judgment. Instead, a regulated, subsidized, paternalistic market should be created to permit the benefit players themselves to choose and price the strength of the remedy they desire. This is a superior means to reach the right level of remedial strength for the most players. To protect against undesirably weak remedial options being selected, I propose the market should have a highly protective default remedial option, clear disclosure rules, subsidies, and a regulatory floor
    Note: In: Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 2009, pp. 657-692 , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 14, 2008 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 7
    UID:
    (DE-627)180568292X
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (66 p)
    Content: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) rewrote the law of private health insurance. How the ACA rewrote the law of civil remedies, however, is — to date — a question largely unexamined by scholars. Courts everywhere, including the United States Supreme Court, will soon confront this important issue.This Article offers a foundational treatment of the ACA on remedy. It predicts a series of flashpoints over which litigation reform battles will be fought. It identifies several themes that will animate those conflicts and trigger others. It explains how judicial construction of the statute’s functional predecessor, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), converted a protective statute into a uniquely effective piece of federal litigation reform. And, ultimately, it considers whether the ACA — which incorporates, modifies, and rejects ERISA in several notable ways — will experience a similar fate
    Note: In: American University Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3, pp. 649-714, 2014 , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 1, 2013 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1805682946
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (66 p)
    Content: Benefit regulation has been called “the most consequential subject to which no one pays enough attention.” It exhausts judges, intimidates legislators, and scares off theorists. That need not be so. Reality is less complicated than advertised.Governments often consider intervention if markets fail to make some socially desirable Good X — such as education, health care, home mortgages, or pensions, for example — sufficiently available. One obvious fix is for the government to provide the good itself. A less obvious intervention is for the government to regulate employment-based (EB) arrangements that provide Good X as a benefit to employees and their families. In the United States, such employment-based interventions are massive: they affect trillions of dollars, billions in tax breaks, and millions of people. They have been written into federal law for decades and generate constant litigation before the United States Supreme Court. Yet, while other regulatory interventions are well-theorized, employment-based interventions are not. There is no coherent account of employment-based interventions as a concept independent from the peculiarities of Good X or the relevant implementing statutes. This is a significant failure, and one that has obscured clear thinking — by legislators, courts, scholars, and the public — on the subject for decades. This Article offers a simple theory of employment-based interventions that (1) explains the common conceit of all such interventions and (2) provides a non-technical framework for evaluating any particular intervention, regardless of Good X. In so doing, it makes the relative appeal (or insufficiency) of employment-based interventions vastly easier to understand
    Note: In: Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 4, pp. 1257-1322, 2016 , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 19, 2015 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1806719606
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (56 p)
    Series Statement: Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2020, pp.1043-1097
    Content: Health care reform is once again in the air. Virtually all Democrats favor some meaningful expansion of public insurance, whether through single payer or the creation of a “public option” that would allow consumers dissatisfied with the private market to buy into a public program. Republicans, not surprisingly, have pushed back, not only against single payer, but also against the public option, saying it will drive private payors to extinction. All the political jousting implicates a larger and serious policy question; namely, what should be the role of private payors in the nation’s health care system?Arguments to date on that subject have largely overlooked two crucial realities. First, payors (public and private) perform multiple functions regarding health care delivery. That the government is better at one function does not mean, or even imply, that the government is better at all of them. By disaggregating the services payors render in connection with health care financing, debates about the ideal roles for public and private payors — as well as whether one of them will or should compete the other into extinction — can be had on understandable terms.Second, although frequent references to the competitive virtues of a public option have been made, insufficient thought has been given to the conceptual specifics of why and how private payors faced with a public option might evolve. In terms of improving care delivery, observers have underexamined how private payors might serve as welfare-enhancing big data digesters, care evaluators, choice intermediaries, and incentive innovators — all proficiencies that not only rate to improve the cost and quality of care, but are entirely harmonious with modern experience about where private actors often create value: by collecting, analyzing, packaging, presenting, and deploying information.Once these two significant theoretical refinements are brought to bear, a richer analysis of the public-private question emerges — and one that supplies good reason to doubt that private payors should or will (at least in the short term) be put to the sword by either Congress or public-option-armed consumers
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 15, 2019 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 10
    Book
    Book
    Harmondsworth [u.a.] : Penguin Books
    UID:
    (DE-605)HT005103174
    Format: 442 S. : graph. Darst.
    Series Statement: Penguin modern psychology readings
    Language: English
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