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1
Online Resource
Online Resource
Handbook of industrial organization : volume 1 (1989)
Amsterdam : North-Holland
Details
UID:
gbv_789726122
Format: Online Ressource (xvi, 947 pages) , illustrations.
Edition: Online-Ausg.
ISBN: 0444704345 , 9780444704344
Series Statement: Handbooks in economics 10
Content: v. 1. pt. 1. Determinants of firm and market organization. Technological determinants of firm and industry structure / John C. Panzar -- The theory of the firm / Bengt R. Holmstrom and Jean Tirole -- Transaction cost economics / Oliver E. Williamson -- Vertical integration : determinants and effects / Martin K. Perry -- pt. 2. Analysis of market behavior. Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization : an introduction and overview / Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole -- Theories of oligopoly behavior / Carl Shapiro -- Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger / Alexia Jacquemin and Margaret E. Slade -- Mobility barriers and the value of incumbency / Richard J. Gilbert -- Predation, monopolization, and antitrust / Janusz A. Ordover and Garth Saloner -- Price discrimination Hal R. Varian -- Vertical contractual relations / Michael L. Katz -- Product differentiation / B. Curtis Eaton and Richard G. Lipsey -- Imperfect information in the product market / Joseph E. Stiglitz -- The timing of innovation : research, development, and diffusion / Jennifer F. Reinganum -- The theory and the facts of how markets clear : is industrial organization valuable for understanding macroeconomics? / Dennis W. Carlton
Note: Includes bibliographical references , v. 1. pt. 1. Determinants of firm and market organization. Technological determinants of firm and industry structure , Transaction cost economics , Vertical integration : determinants and effects , pt. 2. Analysis of market behavior. Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization : an introduction and overview , Theories of oligopoly behavior , Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger , Mobility barriers and the value of incumbency , Predation, monopolization, and antitrust , Price discrimination Hal R. Varian ; Vertical contractual relations , Product differentiation , Imperfect information in the product market , The timing of innovation : research, development, and diffusion , The theory and the facts of how markets clear : is industrial organization valuable for understanding macroeconomics?
Language: English
Subjects: Economics
RVK:
QR 500
RVK:
QC 131
RVK:
QR 200
RVK:
QR 000
RVK:
QP 340
Keywords: Industrieökonomie ; Electronic books
URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
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    Chapter 1 Technological determinants of firm and industry structure (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642891
    ISBN: 0444704345
    Content: This chapter discusses the cost concepts required for analyzing the role of technology in the determination of firm and industry structure. It focuses on the general multiproduct case, although important single product aspects of the problem are also discussed. An analysis of the role these cost concepts play in determining efficient industry structure is presented in the chapter. The most basic concept with which to characterize the productive technology available to the firm is the technology set, a list of the combinations of inputs and outputs that are available to the firm. In a private enterprise economy, any industry structure that persists in the long run must yield the firms in the industry at least zero economic profits. This places certain restrictions on the relative locations of the cost and demand curves. In an empirical application that attempts to estimate the cost function of an individual firm, the data available may be better suited for estimating a short-run cost function: a specification that assumes that only some of the inputs available to the firm are set at their cost-minimizing levels.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 3-59, 0444704345
    In: 9780444704344
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:3-59
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01004-6
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  • 3
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    Chapter 10 Price discrimination (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642808
    ISBN: 0444704345
    Content: As we indicated at the beginning of this chapter, price discrimination is a ubiquitous phenomenon. Nearly all firms with market power attempt to engage in some type of price discrimination. Thus, the analysis of the forms that price discrimination can take and the effects of price discrimination on economic welfare are a very important aspect of the study of industrial organization. In this survey we have seen some of the insights offered by the economic theory of price discrimination. However, much work remains to be done. For example, the study of marketing behavior at the retail level is still in its infancy. Retail firms use a variety of marketing devices — sales, coupons, matching offers, price promotions, and so on — that apparently enhance sales. The marketing literature has examined individual firm choices of such promotional tools. But what is the ultimate effect of such promotions on the structure and performance of market equilibrium? What kinds of marketing devices serve to enhance economic welfare and what kinds represent deadweight loss? One particularly interesting set of questions in this area that has received little attention concerns the computational costs involved in using complex forms of price discrimination. In the post-deregulation airline industry of the United States, airlines have taken to using very involved pricing schemes. Finding the most inexpensive feasible fight may involve a considerable expenditure of time and effort. What are the welfare consequences of this sort of price discrimination? Do firms appropriately take into account the computational externality imposed on their customers? Even in more prosaic case of public utilities, pricing schedules have become so complex that households often make the “wrong” choice of telephone service or electricity use. Questions of simplicity and ease-of-use have not hitherto played a role in the positive and normative analysis of price discrimination. Perhaps this will serve as a fruitful area of investigation in future studies of price discrimination.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 597-654, 0444704345
    In: 9780444704344
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:597-654
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01013-7
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  • 4
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    Chapter 11 Vertical contractual relations (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642794
    ISBN: 0444704345
    Content: This chapter discusses the contractual relationship between two parties at successive stages in the vertical chain of production and marketing for a good. Intermediate good markets differ from final good markets, and thus merit independent study. First, intermediate good markets often involve large transactions made by sophisticated buyers. Second, the products being sold may possess very complex bundles of attributes, making problems of moral hazard more severe or at least more complicated. Third, the buyers' demands for an intermediate good are interdependent when the buyers are productmarket competitors with one another. Fourth, the buyers of an intermediate good typically are involved in a game in the downstream product market, and the sales contract for the upstream product may affect the equilibrium of this downstream game. The buyers of intermediate goods often can credibly threaten to integrate backward into supply of the intermediate good. Given the sophistication of buyers and the large scale of individual transactions, complex selling schemes may be practicable intermediate good markets. Sellers may utilize sophisticated pricing mechanisms or nonprice contractual provisions. The chapter describes the private and social incentives to utilize such contracts.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 655-721, 0444704345
    In: 9780444704344
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:655-721
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01014-9
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  • 5
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    Chapter 12 Product differentiation (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642786
    ISBN: 0444704345
    Content: Any set of commodities closely related in consumption and/or in production may be regarded as differentiated products. Close relation in consumption depends on consumers' tastes. Elementary scientific methodology tells that theories aspiring to empirical relevance must be consistent with the observed facts. For this reason, awkward facts are to be welcomed; indeed, the more awkward they are, the greater are the constraints that they place on theorizing. Seven of the most important awkward facts that are available to constrain theorizing about product differentiation are described in the chapter. A complete model of product differentiation would specify (1) the set of possible products, (2) the technology associated with each product, (3) the tastes of consumers over the set of possible products, and (4) an equilibrium concept. There is little debate over the cost aspects of relevant models. Of the assumptions that are typically made, some are needed to accommodate one or another of the awkward facts, while others are employed merely for analytical convenience.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 723-768, 0444704345
    In: 9780444704344
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:723-768
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01015-0
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  • 6
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    Chapter 13 Imperfect information in the product market (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642778
    ISBN: 0444704345
    Content: Consumers are imperfectly informed. They do not know the characteristics of all the products in the market or the prices at which they are available at all sellers. There is no Walrasian auction ensuring that a particular commodity is sold at the same price by all stores. There is no Government Inspector ensuring that what appear to be two identical commodities are in fact identical. And given the myriad of variations in product characteristics, the consumer is constantly making decisions concerning whether the differences in qualities are worth the differences in prices. These informational imperfections have fundamental implications for the way product markets function, at least, for many of the commodities, which consumers purchase. These considerations may be relatively unimportant in the market for wheat or perhaps even in the market for steel. But elsewhere, they are potentially of considerable importance. They help explain why such markets are inherently imperfectly competitive, why prices may be considerably in excess of marginal costs, and why entry may be difficult. They help explain not only why equilibrium may be characterized by price dispersions but also why, in some circumstances, equilibrium must be characterized by price dispersions.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 769-847, 0444704345
    In: 9780444704344
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:769-847
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01016-2
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  • 7
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    Chapter 14 The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_183164276X
    ISBN: 0444704345
    Content: The analysis of the timing of innovation posits a particular innovation and examines the way the expected benefits, the cost of research and development, and interactions among competing firms combine to determine the pattern of expenditure across firms and over time, the date of introduction, and the identity of the innovating firm. In the case of a sequence of innovations, the expected lifetime of a given innovation and the pattern of technological leadership are also determined endogenously. Given that an innovation has been perfected, the extent and timing of its dissemination into use may be examined. This may depend upon a number of factors, including the existence of rival firms and institutions, which may facilitate or retard the dissemination of innovations. The chapter discusses the issues of innovation production in the context of symmetric noncooperative models. The chapter investigates the extent of dissemination of the innovation, where this dissemination is achieved through licensing.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 849-908, 0444704345
    In: 9780444704344
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:849-908
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01017-4
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  • 8
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    Chapter 15 The theory and the facts of how markets clear: Is industrial organization valuable for understanding macroeconomics? (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642751
    ISBN: 0444704345
    Content: This chapter has presented a survey of what industrial economists know about how markets clear. The evidence on price behavior is sufficiently inconsistent with the simple theories of market clearing that industrial economists should be led to explore other paradigms. The most useful extensions of the theory will be those that recognize that marketing is a costly activity, that an impersonal price mechanism is not the only device used to allocate goods, and that price methods in conjunction with non-price methods are typically used to allocate goods. Exactly what macroeconomists can learn from all this is less clear to me. Since both macroeconomists and industrial economists are interested in the same question of how markets clear, I have no doubt that there is the potential for the two groups to influence each other's research. Whether that potential is realized depends in part on how some of the new areas of research in industrial organization develop.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 909-946, 0444704345
    In: 9780444704344
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:909-946
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01018-6
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  • 9
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    Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642883
    ISBN: 0444704345
    Content: The theory of the firm has long posed a problem for economists. This chapter discusses the analytical models of the firm that go beyond the black-box conception of a production function. The firm is seen as a contract among a multitude of parties. The main hypothesis is that contractual designs, both implicit and explicit, are created to minimize transaction costs between specialized factors of production. This follows Coase's original hypothesis that institutions serve the purpose of facilitating exchange and can best be understood as optimal accommodations to contractual constraints rather than production constraints. There are three problems that need attention. A first step is to develop and apply techniques that deal with nonstandard problems, such as incomplete contracts, bounded rationality, and multi-lateral contracting. The second step ought to integrate observations from neighboring fields, such as sociology and psychology, in a consistent way into the theoretical apparatus. The third step will be to increase the evidence/theory ratio, which is currently very low in this field.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 61-133, 0444704345
    In: 9780444704344
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:61-133
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01005-8
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  • 10
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    Chapter 3 Transaction cost economics (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642875
    ISBN: 0444704345
    Content: This chapter discusses the operationalization of transaction cost economics. Vertical integration, an understanding of which serves as a paradigm for helping to unpack the puzzles of complex economic organization more generally, is described in the chapter. Some empirical tests of the transaction cost hypotheses are summarized in the chapter. Transaction cost economics adopts a contractual approach to the study of economic organization. As compared with other approaches to the study of economic organization, transaction cost economics (1) is more microanalytic, (2) is more self-conscious about its behavioral assumptions, (3) introduces and develops the economic importance of asset specificity, (4) relies more on comparative institutional analysis, (5) regards the business firm as a governance structure rather than a production function, (6) places greater weight on the ex post institutions of contract, with special emphasis on private ordering, and (7) works out of a combined law, economics, and organization perspective. Friction, the economic counterpart for which is transaction costs, is pervasive in both physical and economic systems.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 135-182, 0444704345
    In: 9780444704344
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:135-182
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)01006-X
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