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1
Online Resource
Online Resource
Handbook of industrial organization : volume 2 (1989)
Amsterdam : North-Holland
Details
UID:
gbv_789728540
Format: Online Ressource (xvi, 951-1555 pages) , illustrations.
Edition: Online-Ausg.
ISBN: 0444704353 , 9780444704351
Series Statement: Handbooks in economics 10
Content: v. 2. pt. 3. Empirical methods and results. Inter-industry studies of structure and performance / Richard Schmalensee -- Empirical studies of industries with market power / Timothy F. Bresnahan -- Empirical studies of innovation and market structure / Wesley M. Cohen and Richard C. Levin -- An updated review of industrial organization : applications of experimental methods / Charles R. Plott -- pt. 4. International issues and comparisons. Industrial organization and international trade / Paul R. Krugman -- International differences in industrial organization / Richard E. Caves -- pt. 5. Government intervention in the marketplace. Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation / Roger G. Noll -- Optimal policies for natural monopolies / Ronald R. Braeutigam -- Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions / David P. Baron -- The effects of economic regulation / Paul L. Joskow and Nancy L. Rose -- The economics of health, safety and environmental regulation / Howard K. Gruenspecht and Lester B. Lave
Note: Includes bibliographical references , v. 2. pt. 3. Empirical methods and results. Inter-industry studies of structure and performance , Empirical studies of innovation and market structure , An updated review of industrial organization : applications of experimental methods , pt. 4. International issues and comparisons. Industrial organization and international trade , International differences in industrial organization , pt. 5. Government intervention in the marketplace. Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation , Optimal policies for natural monopolies , Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions , The effects of economic regulation , The economics of health, safety and environmental regulation
Language: English
Subjects: Economics
RVK:
QR 500
RVK:
QC 131
RVK:
QR 200
RVK:
QR 000
RVK:
QP 340
Keywords: Industrieökonomie ; Electronic books
URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
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    Chapter 16 Inter-industry studies of structure and performance (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642700
    ISBN: 0444704353
    Content: This chapter discusses inter-industry studies of the relations among various measures of market structure, conduct, and performance. It discusses that tradition has indeed uncovered many stable, robust, and empirical regularities. Inter-industry research has taught much about the way markets look, especially within the manufacturing sector in developed economies, even if it has not shown exactly the way markets work. Work in some areas has produced no clear picture of the important patterns in the data, and non-manufacturing industries have not received attention commensurate with their importance. But cross-section studies are limited by serious problems of interpretation and measurement. Future inter-industry research should adopt a modest, descriptive orientation and aim to complement case studies by uncovering robust empirical regularities that can be used to evaluate and develop theoretical tools. Much of the most persuasive recent work relies on nonstandard data sources, particularly panel data that can be used to deal with disequilibrium problems and industry-specific data, which mitigate the problem of unobservable industry-specific variables.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 951-1009, 0444704353
    In: 9780444704351
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:951-1009
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02004-2
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  • 3
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    Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642697
    ISBN: 0444704353
    Content: This chapter describes the econometric studies of market power in single markets and in groups of related markets. The recent increase in the number of such studies and substantial advances in the methods for carrying them out constitute a dramatic shift in the focus of empirical work in the industrial organization (IO) field. The chapter discusses time series data from single industries or on data from closely related markets. The new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) is clearly somewhat different than the previously dominant empirical method in the field, the structureconductperformance paradigm (SCPP). The chapter presents the formation and enforcement of tacitly collusive arrangements, the nature of noncooperative oligopoly interaction in the world, the degree of single-firm market power under product differentiation, and the size and determinants of the industry price-cost margin. It reviews the various empirical models of monopoly power and of oligopoly interaction and describes the theoretical and empirical arguments for why it is monopoly power that is being measured.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 1011-1057, 0444704353
    In: 9780444704351
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:1011-1057
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02005-4
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  • 4
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    Chapter 18 Empirical studies of innovation and market structure (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642689
    ISBN: 0444704353
    Content: This chapter discusses the perceptible movement of empirical scholars from a narrow concern with the role of firm size and market concentration toward a broader consideration of the fundamental determinants of technical change in industry. Although tastes, technological opportunity, and appropriability conditions themselves are subject to change over time, particularly in response to radical innovations that alter the technological regime, these conditions are reasonably assumed to determine inter-industry differences in innovative activity over relatively long periods. Although a substantial body of descriptive evidence has begun to accumulate on the way the nature and effects of demand, opportunity, and appropriability differ across industries, the absence of suitable data constrains progress in many areas. It has been observed that much of the empirical understanding of innovation derives not from the estimation of econometric models but from the use of other empirical methods. Many of the most credible empirical regularities have been established not by estimating and testing elaborate optimization models with published data but by the painstaking collection of original data, usually in the form of responses to relatively simple questions.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 1059-1107, 0444704353
    In: 9780444704351
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:1059-1107
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02006-6
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  • 5
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    Chapter 19 An updated review of industrial organization: Applications of experimental methods (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642670
    ISBN: 0444704353
    Content: Real markets are easy to create. The difficult part is creating a market that demonstrates a point that remains valid upon replication in other subject pools and by other experimenters. Because market behavior is sensitive to both individual preferences and to the details of the structure of the institutional arrangements, the experimenter must avoid contaminating these variables with poorly developed experimental procedures. If the experimental procedures do not control these variables adequately, attempts to replicate the results may fail, because the experimenter has unknowingly failed to conduct the same experiment. The laboratory experiments in economics have been motivated by the theories of industrial organization. The chapter reviews the question regarding the relevance of laboratory methods. Several common criticisms of experimental methods are outlined in the chapter. The recent explosion of professional interest in experimental methods reflects, in part, recognition that experimental methods provide a source of shared experience for scholars who are developing and evaluating theories about complicated, naturally occurring processes. While laboratory processes are simple in comparison to naturally occurring processes, they are real processes in the sense that real people participate for real and substantial profits and follow real rules in doing so.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 1109-1176, 0444704353
    In: 9780444704351
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:1109-1176
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02007-8
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  • 6
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    Chapter 20 Industrial organization and international trade (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642662
    ISBN: 0444704353
    Content: The monopolistic competition model of trade began with an empirical observation. The most influential of trade models is the HeckscherOhlinSamuelson model, which tells that trade reflects an interaction between the characteristics of countries and the characteristics of the production technology of different goods. Specifically, countries will export goods whose production is intensive in the factors with which they are abundantly endowedfor example, countries with a high capitallabor ratio will export capitalintensive goods. The monopolistic competition model has had a major impact on research into international trade. By showing that increasing returns and imperfect competition can make a fundamental difference to the way people think about trade, this approach has been crucial in making work that applies industrial organization (IO) concepts to trade respectable. In effect, the monopolistic competition model has been the thin end of the IO/trade wedge.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 1179-1223, 0444704353
    In: 9780444704351
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:1179-1223
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02008-X
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  • 7
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    Chapter 21 International differences in industrial organization (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642654
    ISBN: 0444704353
    Content: Some of the most conspicuous and intriguing international differences in institutions lie in the control, ownership, and integration of enterprises. It is widely accepted that Coase's classic questionWhy does the boundary between the firm and the market fall where it does?is answered by identifying the transactioncost advantages that may attach to either the market or the firm as allocators of resources. The actual boundaries are drawn in a Darwinian process by which the more efficient institution displaces the less efficient one. If this Darwinian competition worked the same way in every country and the transactioncost efficiencies of firms and markets have been independent of laws, cultural traits, and other distinguishing traits of nationhood, then the allocation between firms and markets should be expected to differ only inessentially from country to country. If industrial groups' roles are related to the diversification and internalization, they also show affinity for the problem of agency in the ownership and control of firms. The concept of agency provides the tool needed to analyze the split between ownership and control in the large, public corporation, and it suggests the sort of device that might be expected to emerge to avert the slippage in diffuse agency relationships.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 1225-1250, 0444704353
    In: 9780444704351
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:1225-1250
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02009-1
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  • 8
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    Chapter 22 Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642646
    ISBN: 0444704353
    Content: This chapter discusses the three themes of economics research on regulation. The first and oldest deals with market failures and the corrective actions that government can undertake to ameliorate them. The second examines the effects of regulatory policies and asks whether government intervention is efficient or more efficient than doing nothing. The third investigates the political causes of regulatory policy. The motivation arises from the disjointness in the first two areas of research: regulation as practiced commonly has been found to be inefficient and to adopt methods that do not appear to be the best choices for tackling their associated market failures. The chapter presents an interpretative survey of the third category of research. It focuses on research that employs the conceptual model and methods of economicsthat is, it assumes rational, goal-directed behavior by all relevant agentsthat uses economic theoretic discussions to make predictions about political behavior and, where relevant, that employs the methods of testing theoretical hypotheses that economists commonly employ. Regardless of the motives of political actors, an essential ingredient to a theory of regulatory policy when the Coase Theorem fails is the way political officials control agencies. Whether the aim of regulation is to maximize efficiency or to transfer wealth to a special interest, politicians face a principal agent problem in trying to assure reasonable bureaucratic compliance with the objectives behind a legislative mandate.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 1253-1287, 0444704353
    In: 9780444704351
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:1253-1287
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02010-8
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  • 9
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    Chapter 23 Optimal policies for natural monopolies (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831642638
    ISBN: 0444704353
    Content: This chapter examines some of the optimal policies that are used to control a natural monopoly. Although the traditional view suggests that government intervention and natural monopoly go hand in hand, economic analysis since the late 1960s has suggested rather forcefully that there are ways to introduce competition for a market, even if a natural monopoly structure exists within a market. The chapter provides an overview of possible competitive approaches to the natural monopoly problem. It discusses some of the major concepts in optimal pricing in regulated industries. These include peak load pricing, Ramsey pricing, and nonlinear outlay schedules. The chapter reviews a set of issues related to the fairness of regulated prices is discussed in the context of cross-subsidy or interservice subsidy.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 1289-1346, 0444704353
    In: 9780444704351
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:1289-1346
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02011-X
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  • 10
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    Chapter 24 Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions (1989)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_183164262X
    ISBN: 0444704353
    Content: This chapter focuses on the design of regulatory policies that take into account the opportunities for strategic behavior provided by incomplete information and limited observability on the part of the regulator. The design of regulatory mechanisms is straightforward, albeit complex, in such a case where the regulator or mechanism designer has the same information as the regulated firm, observes the actions taken by the firm and has the authority to exercise control. The chapter presents the design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions in settings in which the regulator has incomplete information and limited ability to observe the actions of the firms under its jurisdiction. Incomplete information and limited observability create opportunities for strategic behavior on the part of both the regulator and the regulated. The mechanisms considered are reflections of that strategic behavior and are characterized as equilibria of a game whose structure corresponds to the authority granted to the regulator. Regulatory policies are, thus, viewed as endogenous responses to informational asymmetries and limited observability rather than as exogenously specified mechanisms descriptive of actual regulatory arrangements. Although the mechanisms are weak in their descriptive power, they reflect the incentives present in regulatory relationships and take into account the way the parties involved respond to those incentives.
    In: Handbook of industrial organization, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1989, (1989), Seite 1347-1447, 0444704353
    In: 9780444704351
    In: year:1989
    In: pages:1347-1447
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02012-1
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