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1
Online Resource
Online Resource
Handbook of game theory with economic applications : volume 1 (1992)
Amsterdam : North-Holland
Details
UID:
gbv_789703963
Format: Online Ressource (xvi, 733 pages)
ISBN: 0444880984 , 9780444880987
Series Statement: Handbooks in economics 11
Content: This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines. The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics
Content: This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines. The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics
Note: Includes bibliographical references and indexes , Vol. 1.Game of chess , Games in extenive and strategic forms , Games with perfect information , Repeated games with complete information , Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum , Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum , Noncooperative models of bargaining , Strategic analysis of auctions , Location , Strategic models of entry deterrence , Patent licensing , Core and balancedness , Axiomatizations of the core , Core in perfectly competitive economics , Core in imperfectly competitive economies , Two-sided matching , Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets , Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus , Game and decision theoretic models in ethics
Language: English
Subjects: Economics , Mathematics
RVK:
QH 430
RVK:
SK 860
Keywords: Spieltheorie ; Wirtschaftswissenschaften ; Electronic books
URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
URL: lizenzpflichtig
URL: Inhaltstext
Author information: Aumann, Robert J. 1930-
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  • 2
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    Chapter 1 The game of chess (1992)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_183164195X
    ISBN: 0444880984
    Content: The game of chess has sometimes been referred to as the Drosophila of artificial intelligence and cognitive science research a standard task that serves as a test bed for ideas about the nature of intelligence and computational schemes for intelligent systems. Both machine intelligence how to program a computer to play good chess (artificial intelligence) and human intelligence how to understand the processes that human masters use to play good chess (cognitive science) are discussed in the chapter but with emphasis on computers. Classical game theory has been preoccupied almost exclusively with substantive rationality. Procedural rationality is concerned with procedures for finding good actions, taking into account not only the goal and objective situation, but also the knowledge and the computational capabilities and limits of the decision maker. The only nontrivial theory of chess is a theory of procedural rationality in choosing moves. The study of procedural or computational rationality is relatively new, having been cultivated extensively only since the advent of the computer (but with precursors, e.g., numerical analysis). It is central to such disciplines as artificial intelligence and operations research. Difficulty in chess is computational difficulty. Playing a good game of chess consists in using the limited computational power (human or machine) that is available to do as well as possible. This might mean investing a great deal of computation in examining a few variations, or investing a little computation in each of a large number of variations. Neither strategy can come close to exhausting the whole game tree.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1992, (1992), Seite 1-17, 0444880984
    In: 9780444880987
    In: year:1992
    In: pages:1-17
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80004-9
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
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    Chapter 10 Strategic models of entry deterrence (1992)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831641860
    ISBN: 0444880984
    Content: This chapter discusses the strategic models of entry deterrence that the models fall into three categories: (1) Preemptionthese models explain how a firm claims and preserves monopoly position. The incumbent obtains a dominant position by arriving first in a natural monopoly, or more generally, by early investments in research and product design, or durable equipment and other cost reduction. The hallmark is commitment, in the form of (usually costly) actions that irreversibly strengthen the incumbent's options to exclude competitors. (2) Signalingthese models explain how an incumbent firm reliably conveys information that discourages unprofitable entry or survival of competitors. They indicate that an incumbent's behavior can be affected by private information about costs or demand either prior to entry (limit pricing) or afterwards (attrition). The hallmark is credible communication, in the form of others' inferences from observations of costly actions. (3) Predation hese models explain how an incumbent firm profits from battling a current entrant to deter subsequent potential entrants. In these models, a predatory price war advertises that later entrants might also meet aggressive responses; its cost is an investment whose payoff is intimidation of subsequent entrants. The hallmark is reputation: the incumbent battles to maintain other's perception of its readiness to fight entry. Most models of preemption do not involve private information; they focus exclusively on means of commitment. Signaling and predation models usually require private information, but the effects are opposite. Signaling models typically produce separating equilibria in which observations of the incumbent's actions allow immediate inferences by entrants; in contrast, predation models produce pooling equilibria (or separating equilibria that unravel slowly) in which inferences by entrants are prevented or delayed.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1992, (1992), Seite 305-329, 0444880984
    In: 9780444880987
    In: year:1992
    In: pages:305-329
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80013-X
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
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    Chapter 11 Patent licensing (1992)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831641852
    ISBN: 0444880984
    Content: This chapter focuses on the patent licensing. Game-theoretic methods have made it possible to address questions with regard to patent licensing. The common modes of patent licensing are a royalty, possibly nonuniform, per unit of output produced with the patented technology, a fixed fee that is independent of the quantity produced with the patented technology, or a combination of a fixed fee plus a royalty. The patentee can choose which of these modes of licensing to employ and how to implement them. The interaction between a patentee and licensees is described in terms of a three-stage noncooperative game. The licensees are assumed to be members of an n -firm oligopoly, producing an identical product. Entry into the industry is assumed to be unprofitable, i.e., the cost of entry exceeds the profits an entrant could realize. The firms in the oligopoly can compete either through quantities or prices. The industry's aggregate output and product price is determined by the Cournot equilibrium in the former case and the Bertrnd equilibrium in the latter. In the simplest version of the game, the oligopoly faces a linear demand function for its product. The patented invention reduces the cost of production, i.e., it is a process innovation. Licensing of a product innovation can also be analyzed in this game-theoretic framework. The chapter discusses the licensing by means of an auction, fixed fee licensing of a cost-reducing innovation and then of a new product, licensing by means of a royalty, fixed fee plus royalty licensing, optimal licensing mechanism or the chutzpah mechanism, and patent licensing in the presence of Bertrand competition.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1992, (1992), Seite 331-354, 0444880984
    In: 9780444880987
    In: year:1992
    In: pages:331-354
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80014-1
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
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    Chapter 12 The core and balancedness (1992)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831641844
    ISBN: 0444880984
    Content: Of all solution concepts of cooperative games, the core is probably the easiest to understand. It is the set of all feasible outcomes (payoffs) that no player (participant) or group of participants (coalition) can improve upon by acting for themselves. Once an agreement in the core has been reached, no individual and no group could gain by regrouping. In a free market, outcomes should be in the core; economic activities should be advantageous to all parties involved. For many games, feasible outcomes that cannot be improved upon may not exist.. In such cases one possibility is to ask that no group could gain much by recontracting. It is as if communications and coalition formations are costly. The minimum size of the set of feasible outcomes required for non-emptiness of the core is given by the so-called balancedness condition. The sets containing outcomes upon which nobody could improve by much are called -cores. The chapter discusses the theory of cores in the case of transferable utility (TU) game, the theory of cores of games with non-transferable utility (NTU), and some economic applications of the theory.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1992, (1992), Seite 355-395, 0444880984
    In: 9780444880987
    In: year:1992
    In: pages:355-395
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80015-3
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
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    Chapter 13 Axiomatizations of the core (1992)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831641836
    ISBN: 0444880984
    Content: The core is, the most intuitive solution concept in cooperative game theory. An intuitively acceptable axiom system for the core might reinforce its position as the most natural" solution. An axiomatization of the core may serve two other, more important goals: (1) by obtaining axioms for the core, those important properties of solutions are singled out that determine the most stable solution in the theory of cooperative games. Thus, the core of transferable utility (TU) games is determined by individual rationality (IR), superadditivity (SUPA), and the reduced garne property (RGP). Also, the core of non-transferable utility (NTU) garnes is characterized by IR and RGP. Furthermore, the converse reduced game property (CRGP) is essential for the axiomatization of the core of TU market games. Four properties, IR, SUPA, RGP, and CRGP, play an important role in the characterization of the core on some important families of games. A solution is acceptable if its axiomatization is similar to that of the core. There are some important examples of this kind: (a) the prenucleolus is characterized by RGP together with the two standard assumptions of symmetry and covariance, (b) the Shapley value is characterized by SUPA and three more weaker axioms, and (c) the prekernel is determined by RGP, CRGP, and three more standard assumptions. The chapter discusses the TU games, several properties of solutions to coalitional games, an axiomatization of the core of balanced games, the core of market games, the results that are generalized to games with coalition structures, the results for NTU games, reduced games of NTU games, axiom system for the core of NTU games, and Keiding's axiomatization of the core of NTU games.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1992, (1992), Seite 397-412, 0444880984
    In: 9780444880987
    In: year:1992
    In: pages:397-412
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80016-5
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
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    Chapter 14 The core in perfectly competitive economies (1992)
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    UID:
    gbv_1831641828
    ISBN: 0444880984
    Content: This chapter presents the results on the cores of perfectly competitive exchange economies, that is economies in which the endowment of each agent is negligible on the scale of the whole economy. In the contributions of Edgeworth, Debreu and Scarf, and Aumann, the conclusion is: the core (in Aumann's case) or the intersection of the cores of all replicas (in the other cases) coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria. One of the key elements of the Debreu and Scarf argument, the equal treatment property that permitted one to collapse the cores of all the different replicas into the same space, does not generalize even to sequences with different numbers of traders of the various types. The strong statement that the core (in Aumann's continuum setting) or the intersection of the cores (in the Debreu and Scarf replica setting) coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria is simply not true in the case of general sequences of finite economies. Weaker forms of convergence must be substituted. Convexity of preferences, which plays no role whatever in Aumann's theorem, is seen to make a crucial difference in the form ofconvergence in large finite economies. The type of convergence that holds depends greatly on the assumptions on the sequence of economies. The various possibilities can best be thought of as lying on four largely (but not completely) independent axes: the type of convergence of individual consumptions to demands, the equilibrium nature of the price at which the demands are calculated, the degree to which the convergence is uniform over individuals, and the rate at which convergence occurs.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1992, (1992), Seite 413-457, 0444880984
    In: 9780444880987
    In: year:1992
    In: pages:413-457
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80017-7
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
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    Chapter 15 The core in imperfectly competitive economies (1992)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_183164181X
    ISBN: 0444880984
    Content: This chapter discusses the core in imperfectly competitive economies, and presents the study of mixed markets that includes in particular the study of alternative cooperative game-theoretic solution concepts in the framework of mixed markets and the problem of approximating mixed markets by finite exchange economies. The chapter begins with a brief comment about some surprising features of the core's behavior in such markets. The model of mixed markets has also been used to examine the behavior of other cooperative concepts, like the von Neumann and Morgenstern (v-N.M.) solutions, the bargaining set, and the transferable Shapley value. This survey is mainly concerned with the concept of the core. The problem of approximating mixed markets via large, but finite, economies, in the tradition for the approximation of atomless economies is discussed in the chapter.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1992, (1992), Seite 459-483, 0444880984
    In: 9780444880987
    In: year:1992
    In: pages:459-483
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80018-9
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 9
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    Chapter 16 Two-sided matching (1992)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831641801
    ISBN: 0444880984
    Content: This chapter discusses the games that are two-sided matching markets. The phrase two-sided refers to the fact that agents in such markets belong, from the outset, to one of two disjoint sets-e.g, firms or workers. The term matching refers to the bilateral nature of exchange in these markets. The game-theoretic analysis of these markets has proved useful in various empirically oriented studies. This chapter describes some of the phenomena the theory should be able to explain, and concludes by returning to consider how the theory addresses the empirical questions raised at the beginning. The chapter focuses on both the core of the game and the dominant and equilibrium strategies under various rules about how the game might be played. The distinction between cooperative and noncooperative game theory is often somewhat artificial because the tools of both kinds of theory can be used to study the same phenomena.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1992, (1992), Seite 485-541, 0444880984
    In: 9780444880987
    In: year:1992
    In: pages:485-541
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80019-0
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 10
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    Chapter 17 Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets (1992)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831641798
    ISBN: 0444880984
    Content: Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) presented the first general model and solution concept for the multiperson cooperative theory. Stable set theory is viewed as only one of several approaches for analyzing coalitional games. This chapter focuses on the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, describes their original model for the coalitional games along with some illustrations, analyzes the three-person case in detail, and discusses some of the mathematical properties of stable sets. Stable sets are defined in terms of two simple conditions: internal and external stability; along with a rather simple preference relation called domination. These stability concepts are rather basic and fundamental mathematical notions, and presume very little about the nature or structure of social institutions and interactions. Stable sets often predict likely social structures and how groups will organize themselves. They show the important role of minimal winning coalitions and minimal-sized veto (or blocking) coalitions. They often show how a game will decompose into subgames between critical coalitions. They exhibit a variety of standards of behavior and delineate bargaining ranges. They predict the formation of cartels and illustrate the stability of discrimination and its limits. Few assumptions can lead to many insights into coalition formation, competition, and distributions of wealth. There are also many situations where stable set theory matches well with experimental results. The chapter also discusses some highly undesirable properties of stable set theories.
    In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1992, (1992), Seite 543-590, 0444880984
    In: 9780444880987
    In: year:1992
    In: pages:543-590
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80020-7
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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