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1
UID:
gbv_1655665057
Format: Online Ressource (xx, 962 Seiten) , Illustrationen
Edition: Online-Ausg.
ISBN: 0080929826 , 9780080929828 , 9780444508942
Series Statement: Handbooks in economics 19
Content: This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define.€ Contributors draw on lessons from€philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute€goods.€ Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice
Note: Includes bibliographical references and index. - Print version record , pt. 5. Foundations -- pt. 6. Developments of the basic arrovian schemes -- pt. 7. Fairness and rights -- pt. 8. Voting and manipulation.
Additional Edition: ISBN 0444829148
Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Handbook of social choice and welfare Amsterdam ; Boston : Elsevier, 2002-©2011
Language: English
Subjects: Economics
RVK:
Keywords: Wohlfahrtstheorie ; Kollektiventscheidung ; Electronic books
URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
Author information: Sen, Amartya 1933-
Author information: Suzumura, Kōtarō 1944-2020
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Associated Volumes
  • 2
    UID:
    gbv_1831649195
    ISBN: 0080929826
    Content: This chapter presents a simple introduction to the main results in topological social choice theory. Given a continuous social welfare function, these results show the following: (i) Unanimity and Anonymity are incompatible; (ii) Weak Pareto and No Veto are incompatible; and (iii) Weak Pareto implies the existence of a Strategic Manipulator. Given the role of continuity in all these results, its justification is critically discussed. Finally, a remarkable proof of Arrow's theorem using topological methods is presented.
    In: Handbook of social choice and welfare, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2011, (2011), Seite 301-334, 0080929826
    In: 9780080929828
    In: 9780444508942
    In: year:2011
    In: pages:301-334
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
    UID:
    gbv_1831649225
    ISBN: 0080929826
    Content: A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a nonbinary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals’ preferences concern only their own personal consumption. This chapter begins by discussing which Pareto efficient allocations can be characterized as competitive equilibria with lump-sum transfers. It also discusses existence and characterization of such equilibria without lump-sum transfers. The second half of the chapter focuses on continuum economies, for which such characterization results are much more natural, given that agents have negligible influence over equilibrium prices.
    In: Handbook of social choice and welfare, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2011, (2011), Seite 47-151, 0080929826
    In: 9780080929828
    In: 9780444508942
    In: year:2011
    In: pages:47-151
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
    UID:
    gbv_1831649233
    ISBN: 0080929826
    Content: Any procedure of social choice makes use of some types of information and ignores others. For example, the method of majority decision concentrates on people's votes, but pays no direct attention to, say, their social standings, or their prosperity or penury, or even the intensities of their preferences. The differences between distinct procedures lie, to a substantial extent, on the kind of information that each procedure uses and what it has to ignore. The informational bases of the different social choice procedures tell us a great deal about how they respectively work and what they can or cannot achieve.
    In: Handbook of social choice and welfare, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2011, (2011), Seite 29-46, 0080929826
    In: 9780080929828
    In: 9780444508942
    In: year:2011
    In: pages:29-46
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
    UID:
    gbv_1831649187
    ISBN: 0080929826
    Content: Economists have used the term “nonbinary” to describe both choice functional nonbinariness (choice functions that cannot be rationalized as the maximizing outcome of a binary preference relation) and structural nonbinariness (the structure of the model dictates that pairs of alternatives do not belong to the domain of the social choice function). Here we have described necessary and sufficient conditions for oligarchy and dictatorship results in social choice models that are nonbinary in both senses.
    In: Handbook of social choice and welfare, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2011, (2011), Seite 335-366, 0080929826
    In: 9780080929828
    In: 9780444508942
    In: year:2011
    In: pages:335-366
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
    UID:
    gbv_1831649209
    ISBN: 0080929826
    Content: This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.
    In: Handbook of social choice and welfare, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2011, (2011), Seite 191-299, 0080929826
    In: 9780080929828
    In: 9780444508942
    In: year:2011
    In: pages:191-299
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 7
    UID:
    gbv_1831649217
    ISBN: 0080929826
    Content: Traditional economics identifies a person's well-being with the goods and services the person consumes and the utility that the person gets from such consumption. This, in turn, has led to the widely used approach of welfarism that uses individual utilities as ingredients for evaluating a society's aggregate welfare. This approach has long been contested as being too restrictive in its view of what constitutes human well-being and for its commodity fetish. What has injected new life into this critique is the emergence of an alternative approach, which replaces the traditional concern for commodities and utility with functionings and capabilities. While the origins of this “capabilities approach” go back to the works of John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, and, in spirit if not in form, to Aristotle, it was the seminal contribution of Amartya Sen in the form of his 1979 Tanner Lectures that gave it shape and structure. Subsequent works by Sen and an enormous outpouring of writing by various authors in economics, philosophy, and sociology have made this a major field of inquiry, which has also led to important practical applications. The present chapter is a survey of this new field of study. In Sen's terminology a “functioning” is what an individual chooses to do or to be, in contrast to a “commodity,” which is an instrument which enables her to achieve different functionings. While functioning is central to the notion of human well-being, it is not merely the achieved functionings that matter but the freedom that a person has in choosing from the set of feasible functionings, which is referred to as the person's “capability.” Beginning with a discussion of these ideas in history, the present chapter tries to present a comprehensive review of the recent literature, including formalizations and applications. It is important to recognize that a full formalization may not be feasible, since there are important dimensions of life that are germane to the capabilities approach that may be impossible to capture in a single formalization. Nevertheless, the capability approach itself has been immensely useful in the context of studying poverty, gender issues, political freedom, and the standard of living. It has also resulted in the creation of the Human Development Index (HDI), popularized by UNDP's Human Development Reports since 1990. This chapter critically examines the HDI and recent advances in the human development literature.
    In: Handbook of social choice and welfare, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2011, (2011), Seite 153-187, 0080929826
    In: 9780080929828
    In: 9780444508942
    In: year:2011
    In: pages:153-187
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 8
    UID:
    gbv_1831649241
    ISBN: 0080929826
    Content: Kenneth Arrow founded the modern form of social choice theory in a path-breaking contribution at the middle of the twentieth century. The editors of the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare other than Arrow begin this final volume by noting the continuing need to read Arrow's decisive contribution in his epoch-making book Social Choice and Individual Values , which started the contemporary round of research on social choice theory. This chapter also includes an interview that Kenneth Arrow gave to Professor Jerry Kelly a few years ago, which was published in Social Choice and Welfare . This presents Arrow's thinking on the subject as it developed because of his own pioneering contribution. Finally, this chapter also includes some new observations by Arrow, The Classification of Social Choice Propositions, dealing particularly with the distinction between normative and descriptive statements in social choice theory. These notes, which Arrow has written for this volume at a very difficult time for him, reflect inevitably in a highly compressed form, some recent thoughts of the founder of the discipline on an important methodological issue in social choice theory.
    In: Handbook of social choice and welfare, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2011, (2011), Seite 3-27, 0080929826
    In: 9780080929828
    In: 9780444508942
    In: year:2011
    In: pages:3-27
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 9
    UID:
    gbv_1831649128
    ISBN: 0080929826
    Content: This chapter surveys the literature on strategy proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models.
    In: Handbook of social choice and welfare, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2011, (2011), Seite 731-831, 0080929826
    In: 9780080929828
    In: 9780444508942
    In: year:2011
    In: pages:731-831
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 10
    UID:
    gbv_1831649136
    ISBN: 0080929826
    Content: This paper reexamines key results from the measurement of opportunity freedom , or the extent to which a set of options offers a decision maker real opportunities to achieve. Three cases are investigated: no preferences, a single preference, and plural preferences. The three corresponding evaluation methods—the cardinality relation, the indirect utility relation, and the effective freedom relation—and their variations are considered within a common axiomatic framework. Special attention is given to representations of freedom rankings, with the goal of providing practical approaches for measuring opportunity freedom and the extent of people's capabilities.
    In: Handbook of social choice and welfare, Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2011, (2011), Seite 687-728, 0080929826
    In: 9780080929828
    In: 9780444508942
    In: year:2011
    In: pages:687-728
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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