

Contents

1	Introduction	1
1.1	Understanding Village Elections and Governance in Contemporary Rural China	1
1.2	Approaches to Analysing Chinese Village Elections and Self-Governance	3
1.2.1	The Liberal-Democratic Approach: Bottom-Up Democratization?	3
1.2.2	The Authoritarian Approach: Bringing the State Back In	6
1.2.3	The Developmentalist Approach	8
1.3	Towards a Clientelist Analysis: The Interaction Between Peasants and State	10
1.4	Methodology: A Case Study of One Village Community	13
1.4.1	Why a Case Study?	13
1.4.2	Why B Village?	15
1.4.3	Sources of the Study	19
1.5	Structure of This Book	20
	References	21
2	The Social and System Background of Villagers’ Self-Governance	25
2.1	The Origin of Villagers’ Self-Governance	25
2.1.1	The Dismantling of the People’s Commune System	25
2.1.2	The Emergence of Villagers’ Committees (VCs)	26
2.1.3	Peng Zhen’s Pushing and the Constitutional Confirmation of VCs	27
2.2	The Legislation for Village Self-Governance: The Provisional Organic Law and Relevant Local Regulations Before 1998	28
2.2.1	A Controversial Legislative Start: 1984–1987	28
2.2.2	Irresolution and Implementation of the Provisional Organic Law at the Central Level: 1988–1998	30

2.2.3	Local Regulations for Implementing the Provisional Organic Law and Villagers' Self-Governance: 1988–1998	31
2.3	The Revised Organic Law and Relevant Local Regulations After 1998	35
2.3.1	The Revised Organic Law	35
2.3.2	Institutional Background in Shandong After 1998	38
2.4	Conclusion	41
	References	42
3	Villagers as Clients and “Locked-In” Voters	45
3.1	Villagers in the Reform Era: The Socioeconomic Structure of Rural Society	46
3.1.1	Improved Economic Well-Being	46
3.1.2	Absence of a Social Security System and Safety Nets	47
3.1.3	Market Reform and the Wealth Gap	48
3.1.4	Absence of Free Peasant Associations	49
3.1.5	Peasant Burdens and Official Corruption	50
3.2	<i>Guanxi</i> and Clientelism	51
3.2.1	<i>Guanxi</i> in Chinese Rural Society	51
3.2.2	<i>Guanxi</i> and Patron-Client Relationship	52
3.3	Why Do Villagers Participate in Village Elections?	53
3.3.1	Voting Subsidy	54
3.3.2	Local Issues	55
3.3.3	Political Efficacy	56
3.3.4	Social Connections	56
3.4	How Do Villagers Vote: The Development of Clientelism Under Direct Elections	58
3.5	Conclusion	60
	References	61
4	Candidates, Patrons and Factions	65
4.1	The Changing Composition of Village Patrons and Patrons as VC Candidates	66
4.1.1	The Composition of Village Patrons: Before and After the Reform	66
4.1.2	Candidates Arising from the Village Patrons	69
4.1.3	Candidates' Motivations for Running for VC Positions	70
4.2	Strategies for Winning Votes	73
4.2.1	La Piao: <i>Guanxi</i> Mobilization for Village Electoral Campaign	73
4.2.2	Patrons and the Formation of Factions	76
4.2.3	Taking Advantage of Proxy Voting	79
4.3	Patronage and Factional Politics in Three Rounds of Electoral Contest	80
4.3.1	The 1999 Election	80

4.3.2	The 2002 Election	81
4.3.3	The 2004 Election	82
4.3.4	Analysis of the Three Elections	83
4.4	Conclusion	84
	References.....	84
5	The Role of Local State Officials in Village Elections	87
5.1	Local State Officials as State Policy Implementers	88
5.2	Local State Officials' Attitudes Towards Direct Village Elections	89
5.2.1	Peasant Quality	90
5.2.2	Elections and the Party's Leadership	90
5.3	Free and Fair? Local State Officials' Strategies for Controlling Village Elections	92
5.3.1	Organizing Village Elections Strictly According to the Procedures.....	92
5.3.2	Defining the Qualifications of the Candidates	94
5.3.3	Pre-election Mobilization and Opinion Investigation.....	97
5.3.4	Influencing the Village Elites.....	98
5.3.5	Patron-Client Relationships Between Village Elites and Local State Officials.....	101
5.4	Conclusion	103
	References.....	104
6	Village Self-Governance: A "Democratic" Style?	107
6.1	The Role of the VPB and VPB-VC Conflict in Postelection Village Governance.....	108
6.1.1	VPB Before the Introduction of Direct Elections.....	108
6.1.2	VC-VPB Conflict Following the Introduction of Direct Elections	109
6.2	"Democratic" Supervision?	115
6.2.1	Villagers' Financing Small Team.....	115
6.2.2	Transparency in Village Affairs	117
6.2.3	The Recall and Impeachment of VC Cadres.....	120
6.3	The Villagers' Representative Assembly (VRA).....	121
6.3.1	The Institutional Status of the VRA.....	121
6.3.2	The Malfunctioning of the VRA in Practice.....	123
6.3.3	Institutional Deficiencies	124
6.3.4	The Influence of Clientelism.....	125
6.4	Conclusion	127
	References.....	128
7	The Local State's Sustained Control of Village Governance	131
7.1	The Village Guarantee Cadre System	132
7.1.1	The Introduction of Village Guarantee Cadre System.....	132
7.1.2	B Village's Guarantee Cadre.....	135

7.1.3	Village Guarantee Cadre System: Fixing the Disconnection Between the Local State and the Village Community	136
7.2	Direct Control over Village Finance	138
7.2.1	The Dual Proxy Management System	138
7.2.2	Controlling Village Cadres' Pay	140
7.3	Ensuring Obedience Through Clientelist Control.....	141
7.3.1	The Cultivation of Good Relations	141
7.3.2	Benefit/Patronage Exchange	143
7.3.3	The Use of Sanctions	144
7.3.4	Mediation of Factional Conflicts	145
7.4	Conclusion	146
	References.....	148
8	Conclusion	151
8.1	Village Elections: "Free and Fair" or Subject to Clientelist Control?.....	152
8.2	Village Governance: Self-Governance or Overwhelmed by the Administrative-Clientelist Dominance.....	153
8.3	"Grassroots Democracy"?.....	154
8.4	An Authoritarian System Supplemented with Informal Clientelist Structure	160
8.5	Clientelism, Developmentalism and Chinese Rural Society Under Transition	161
	References.....	162
	Appendices	165