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Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
Gespeichert in:
| Autor:in: | |
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| Beteiligte: | |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: | Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2015 |
| Schriftenreihe: | World Bank E-Library Archive
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| Umfang: | 1 Online-Ressource (42 p) |
| Gedruckte Ausgabe: | Erscheint auch als:
Beath, Andrew : Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. - Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2015
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| DOI: | 10.1596/1813-9450-7361 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences |