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Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan / Beath, Andrew

Christia, Fotini ; Enikolopov, Ruben ; Egorov, Georgy ; Beath, Andrew

Englisch

Washington, D.C : The World Bank [2015], 2015

1 Online-Ressource (42 p)

Erscheint auch als: Druck-Ausgabe- Beath, Andrew: Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. - Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2015

DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-7361

Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences

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