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Electoral Rules and Political Selection


Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

Verfasser: Beath, Andrew    
Sonstige Pers.: Christia, Fotini ¬[Sonstige] ;     Enikolopov, Ruben ¬[Sonstige] ;     Egorov, Georgy ¬[Sonstige] ;     Beath, Andrew ¬[Sonstige]    
Ersch.-Ort, Verlag, Ersch.-Jahr: Washington, D.C, The World Bank, 2015
Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (42 p)

 

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Verfasser: Beath, Andrew
Sonstige Pers.: Christia, Fotini ¬[Sonstige]
Sonstige Pers.: Enikolopov, Ruben ¬[Sonstige]
Sonstige Pers.: Egorov, Georgy ¬[Sonstige]
Sonstige Pers.: Beath, Andrew ¬[Sonstige]
Titel: Electoral Rules and Political Selection
Titelzusatz: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
Verantwortlich: Beath, Andrew
Ersch.-Ort: Washington, D.C
Verlag: The World Bank
Ersch.-Jahr: 2015
Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (42 p)
Serie: World Bank E-Library Archive
Beziehung: Erscheint auch als, Beath, Andrew, Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan, Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2015, Druck-Ausgabe,
Abstract: Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences
Sprache: eng