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Electoral Rules and Political SelectionTheory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan Verfasser: Beath, Andrew Sonstige Pers.: Christia, Fotini ¬[Sonstige] ; Enikolopov, Ruben ¬[Sonstige] ; Egorov, Georgy ¬[Sonstige] ; Beath, Andrew ¬[Sonstige] Ersch.-Ort, Verlag, Ersch.-Jahr: Washington, D.C, The World Bank, 2015 Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (42 p) in die Merkliste | |
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Volltext:
hier klicken Volltext: hier klicken Verfasser: Beath, Andrew Sonstige Pers.: Christia, Fotini ¬[Sonstige] Sonstige Pers.: Enikolopov, Ruben ¬[Sonstige] Sonstige Pers.: Egorov, Georgy ¬[Sonstige] Sonstige Pers.: Beath, Andrew ¬[Sonstige] Titel: Electoral Rules and Political Selection Titelzusatz: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan Verantwortlich: Beath, Andrew Ersch.-Ort: Washington, D.C Verlag: The World Bank Ersch.-Jahr: 2015 Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (42 p) Serie: World Bank E-Library Archive Beziehung: Erscheint auch als, Beath, Andrew, Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan, Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2015, Druck-Ausgabe, Abstract: Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences Sprache: eng |
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