Table of Contents

knowledgementsvii				
ble of Contentsix				
t of Figuresxiii				
List of Tablesxv				
Synthesis of the Book1				
1.1 Case Study System: German Recreational-Fisheries Governance5				
1.2 Analytical Framework9				
1.2.1 Analyzing Social-Ecological Systems				
1.2.2 Combining New Institutional Economics with Resilience Thinking				
1.3 Research Objectives				
1.4 Methodological Overview22				
1.5 Main Findings and Discussion				
1.6 Conclusions				
Fishing-Rights Regimes in Germany and the USA33				
2.1 Property Rights Regimes and Agents of the Governance Structure33				
2.1.1 Germany				
2.1.2 United States				
2.2 Legal Frameworks and Common Management Actions39				
2.2.1 Germany				
2.2.2 United States				
2.3 Fit of Common and Public Fishing Rights Regimes with Institutional Design Principles for Robust Common-Pool Resource Management				
2.3.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries				
2.3.2 Proportional Equivalence between Benefits and Costs				
2.3.3 Collective Choice Arrangements				
2.3.4 Resource and Resource-User Monitoring				

	2.3.5	Graduated Sanctions	53
	2.3.6	Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms	54
	2.3.7	Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize	56
	2.3.8	Nested Enterprises	56
	2.4 C	onclusions	57
3		tutional Persistence, Adaptation, and Transformation in East nan Recreational Fisheries	61
	3.1 P	ersistence and Change in German Recreational Governance	62
	3.2 R	esilience Thinking and New Institutional Economics	66
	3.2.1	Resilience Thinking	66
	3.2.2	Integrating New Institutional Economics and Resilience Thinking	67
	3.2.3	Implications and Propositions for the Case Study	69
	3.3 A	nalytical Approach, Operationalization, Data Sources, and Coding	,70
	3.3.1	Three Analytical Steps and Operationalization of Theoretical Concepts	70
	3.3.2	Data Sources	72
	3.3.3	Data Coding	73
	3.4 R	esults	75
	3.4.1	System Characteristics before and after the Disturbance	75
	3.4.2	Attributes of the Disturbance and the Reorganization Process	80
	3.4.3	Actor's Motivation	83
	3.5 D	iscussion	85
4		es of Change in East German Recreational-Fisheries	93
		iterature Review and Theoretical Background	
	4.2 M	1ethods and Material	98
	4.3 R	esults	104
		System Origin and Growth of Internal Connections: Connectedness	
	4.3.2	Accumulation of Internal System Resources: Potential	105
	4.3.3	The Governance Alternative in West Germany: External	105

4.3.	.4 Externally Induced Disturbance in 1989 and System Reorganization	106
4.3	.5 Persistence of Central Governance Characteristics after 1989	107
4.3.	.6 Content Analysis of Cover Articles	107
4.3.	.7 The Time Frames of the Four Phases Synthesized from Interviews and Cover Articles	111
4.4	Discussion	112
4.5	Conclusion	116
	ersistence and Change of Property Rights Institutions in German ecreational-Fisheries Governance	
5.1	Property Rights Institutions in German Recreational Fisheries	119
5.2	Analytical Strategy, Case Selection, and Data Collection	122
5.2.	.1 Natural Experiment	123
5.2.	.2 Case Selection	124
5.2	.3 Data Collection Methods (Interviews, Local Visits, Survey)	126
5.2	.4 Analytical Procedures	127
5.3	Results	129
5.3	.1 County 1: Up-Scaling to Regional River Governance (North-West)	129
5.3.	.2 County 2: Persistence of Local Governance (South-West)	130
5.3	.3 County 3: Persistence of Central Governance (North-East)	130
5.3	.4 County 4: Down-Scaling to Local Pond Governance (South-East)).131
5.3	.5 Summary and Complementary Information from the Survey	136
5.4	Discussion	141
Refere	ences	145
Annex	1: List of Papers	163
Annex	2: Questionnaires (in German)	165