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  • HTW Berlin  (16)
  • SeeCampus-Bibliothek
  • Stasi-Unterlagen-Archiv
  • Keefer, Philip  (16)
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant? (1999)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076237
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (54 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: March 2000 - Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutional and political conditions. The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital taxation and utilities regulation. One frequently advocated means of signaling credible commitment is to delegate authority to an agency that will not have an incentive to opportunistically change policies once the private sector has taken such steps as signing wage contracts or making irreversible investments. Delegating authority is suggested as a government strategy particularly for monetary policy.
    Content: And existing work on the independence of central banks generally assumes that government decisions to delegate are irrevocable. But delegation - in monetary policy as elsewhere - is inevitably a political choice, and can be reversed, contend Keefer and Stasavage. They develop a model of monetary policy that relaxes the assumption that monetary delegation is irreversible. Among the testable predictions of the model are these: · The presence of an independent central bank should reduce inflation only in the presence of political checks and balances. This effect should be evident in both developing and industrial countries. · Political actions to interfere with the central bank should be more apparent when there are few checks and balances. · The effects of checks and balances should be more marked when political decisionmakers are more polarized.
    Content: The authors test these predictions and find extensive empirical evidence to support each of the observable implications of their model: Central banks are associated with better inflation outcomes in the presence of checks and balances. The turnover of central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure protections supported by political checks and balances. And the effect of checks and balances is enhanced in more polarized political environments. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to identify the conditions under which regulatory reforms can be effective. The authors may be contacted at pkeefer@worldbank.org or d.stasavage@lse.ac.uk
    Additional Edition: Keefer, Philip Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Beyond Legal Origin And Checks And Balances : Political Credibility, Citizen Information, And Financial Sector Development (2007)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049074469
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: The existing literature emphasizes and contrasts the role of political checks and balances and legal origin in determining the pace of financial sector development. This paper expands substantially on one aspect of this debate: the fact that government actions that promote financial sector development, whether prudent financial regulation or secure property and contract rights, are public goods and sensitive to political incentives to provide public goods. Tests of hypotheses emanating from this argument yield four new conclusions. First, two key determinants of those incentives-the credibility of pre-electoral political promises and citizen information about politician decisions-systematically promote financial sector development. Second, these political factors, along with political checks and balances, operate in part through their influence on the security of property rights, an argument asserted but not previously tested. Third, contrary to findings elsewhere in the literature, the political determinants of financial sector development are significant even in the presence of controls for legal origin. Finally, and again in contrast to the literature, the evidence here suggests that legal origin primarily proxies for political phenomena. Legal origin is a largely insignificant determinant of financial sector development when those phenomena are fully taken into account
    Additional Edition: Keefer, Philip Beyond Legal Origin And Checks And Balances
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Do Informed Citizens Receive More...or Pay More? : the Impact of Radio on the Government Distribution of Public Health Benefits (2012)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048265389
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
    Content: The government provision of free or subsidized bed nets to combat malaria in Benin allows the identification of new channels through which mass media affect public policy outcomes. Prior research has concluded that governments provide greater private benefits to better-informed individuals. This paper shows, for the first time, that governments can also respond by exploiting informed individuals' greater willingness to pay for these benefits. Using a "natural experiment" in radio markets in northern Benin, the paper finds that media access increases the likelihood that households pay for the bed nets they receive from government, rather than getting them for free. Households more exposed to radio programming on the benefits of bed nets and the hazards of malaria place a higher value on bed nets. Local government officials exercise significant discretion over bed net pricing and respond to higher demand by selling bed nets that they could have distributed for free. Mass media appears to change the private behavior of citizens-in this case, to invest more of their own resources on a public health good (bed nets)-but not their ability to extract greater benefits from government
    Additional Edition: Keefer, Philip Do Informed Citizens Receive More...or Pay More?
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-5952
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Was Weber Right? : The Effects of Pay for Ability and Pay for Performance on Pro-Social Motivation, Ability and Effort in the Public Sector (2015)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048269529
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (32 p)
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Content: This paper examines the effects of pecuniary compensation on the ability and motivation of individuals in organizations with non-pecuniary or pro-social missions. In particular, the paper compares flat pay systems, unrelated with ability or effort, to two other systems that are considered superior: high-powered, pay for performance schemes and more traditional, "Weberian" schemes that calibrate pay to ability, independent of effort. The analysis uses a sample of future public sector workers and finds that all three pay schemes attract motivated workers into tasks with a pro-social mission. However, flat pay schemes also attract low ability workers. In the short run, pay-for-performance schemes generate higher effort than flat pay and pay-for-ability systems, a difference driven entirely by effects on unmotivated workers. Once selection effects are accounted for, however, workers with pay for ability and pay for performance exert statistically indistinguishable levels of effort in the pro-social task. Moreover, pay for ability elicits effort at lower cost than pay for performance
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Banuri, Sheheryar Was Weber Right? Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2015
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-7261
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Radio's Impact on Preferences for Patronage Benefits (2014)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048266365
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (51 p)
    Content: Citizens in developing countries support politicians who provide patronage or clientelist benefits, such as government jobs and gifts at the time of elections. Can access to mass media that broadcasts public interest messages shift citizens' preferences for such benefits? This paper examines the impact of community radio on responses to novel survey vignettes that make an explicit trade-off between political promises of jobs for a few versus public services for all. The impact of community radio is identified through a natural experiment in the media market in northern Benin, which yields exogenous variation in access across villages. Respondents in villages with greater radio access are less likely to express support for patronage jobs that come at the expense of public health or education. Gift-giving is not necessarily traded off against public services; correspondingly, radio access does not reduce preferences for candidates who give gifts. The pattern of results is consistent with a particular mechanism for radio's impact: increasing citizens' demand for broadly delivered health and education and thereby shaping their preferences for clientelist candidates
    Additional Edition: Keefer, Philip Radio's Impact on Preferences for Patronage Benefits
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6932
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    EUV Frankfurt
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    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians (2013)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048266081
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
    Content: Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral promises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitly models the trade-offs that politicians incur when they decide between mobilizing support with vote-buying or promises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely more on vote-buying when they are less credible, target vote-buying to those who do not believe their political promises, and only buy votes from those who would have received post-electoral transfers in a world of full political credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition on vote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted with vote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society
    Additional Edition: Hanusch, Marek Promises, Promises
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6653
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
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    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties (2013)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048266082
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (44 p)
    Content: This paper introduces a new explanation for political budget cycles: politicians have stronger incentives to increase spending around elections in the presence of younger political parties. Previous research has shown that political budget cycles are larger when voters are uninformed about politician characteristics and when politicians are less credible. The effects of party age can be traced to organizational differences between younger and older parties that also affect voter information and politician credibility. Parties organized around particular individuals, rather than around policy labels or a party machine, are less likely to survive the departure of party leaders, to adopt organizational attributes that promote voter information and political credibility, and to limit political budget cycles. Previous research has also shown larger political budget cycles in younger democracies. Evidence presented here indicates that party age accounts for this effect
    Additional Edition: Hanusch, Marek Political Budget Cycles and the Organization of Political Parties
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6654
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Collective Action, Political Parties and Pro-Development Public Policy (2011)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048265114
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
    Content: Broad consensus exists that the ability of political actors to make credible commitments is key to development. An important and little-explored determinant of the credibility of political commitments is the existence of organizations that facilitate citizen collective action to sanction political actors who renege. This paper focuses on one essential organization, the political party. Three measures of political parties are used to assess cross-country differences in the degree to which politicians facilitate the ability of citizens to act in their collective interest. Each of these measures is associated with superior development outcomes, above and beyond the effects of competitive elections. These results have implications for understanding the extraordinary economic success of some East Asian countries and notable lags among others: East Asian non-democracies exhibit more institutionalized ruling parties than other non-democracies, while East Asian democracies exhibit equally or less institutionalized parties. The evidence suggests that greater research and policy emphasis be placed on the organizational characteristics of countries that allow citizens to hold leaders accountable
    Additional Edition: Keefer, Philip Collective Action, Political Parties and Pro-Development Public Policy
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-5676
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Why Follow the Leader? : Collective Action, Credible Commitment and Conflict (2012)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048265614
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
    Content: Most analyses of conflict assume that conflicting groups act in a unitary fashion. This assumption is often violated: to reduce their risk of replacement, group leaders prevent both group members and soldiers from acting collectively, making it difficult for leaders to make credible commitments to them. Lifting the assumption that groups are unitary shifts the analysis of a wide range of conflict issues. The effects of income shocks and rents on conflict risk become contingent on collective action. Leader decisions regarding collective action explain the forcible recruitment of child soldiers and predation on civilians: leaders who prefer to limit military organization are more likely to pursue these tactics. Leader decisions regarding collective action also introduce an unexplored mechanism by which state capacity is created and a specific reason to regard state capacity as endogenous to conflict risk. This focus, finally, suggests that interventions to reduce conflict risk, such as safety net payments or service delivery, are likely to be most difficult to deliver precisely where leaders are most reluctant to allow collective action and where, therefore, conflict risk is highest
    Additional Edition: Keefer, Philip Why Follow the Leader?
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6179
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service (2013)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048266144
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (32 p)
    Content: Pay schemes in the public sector aim to attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent literature has found positive effects of higher pay on ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation. This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool, students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task. The model and experimental design allow for precisely measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for public sector missions; and (3) outside options when choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance
    Additional Edition: Banuri, Sheheryar Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6729
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