Format:
1 Online-Ressource
ISBN:
9781784713201
Series Statement:
The international library of critical writings in economics series
Content:
Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols' impact on the success of cooperation. This Research Review identifies the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements
Content:
A. Caparrós, J.-C. Péreau and T. Tazdaït (2004), 'North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information', Public Choice, 121 (3-4), December, 455-80 -- Alejandro Caparrós and Jean-Christophe Péreau (2013), 'Forming Coalitions to Negotiate North-South Climate Agreements', Environment and Development Economics, Special Issue on Strategic Behaviour and Environmental Commons, 18 (1), February, 69-92 -- Bård Harstad (2012), 'Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations', Review of Economic Studies, 79 (4), October, 1527-57 -- Carlo Carraro, Carmen Marchiori and Sonia Oreffice (2009), 'Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties', Environmental and Resource Economics, 42 (3), March, 411-25 -- Astrid Dannenberg, Andreas Lange and Bodo Sturm (2014), 'Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods', Economica, 81 (322), April, 257-75 --
Content:
Scott Barrett (2006), 'Climate Treaties and "Breakthrough" Technologies', American Economic Review, 96 (2), May, 22-5 -- Michael Hoel and Aart de Zeeuw (2010), 'Can a Focus on Breakthrough Technologies Improve the Performance of International Environmental Agreements?', Environmental and Resource Economics, 47 (3), November, 395-406 -- Matthew McGinty (2007), 'International Environmental Agreements among Asymmetric Nations', Oxford Economic Papers, 59 (1), January, 45-62 -- Hans-Peter Weikard (2009), 'Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule', Manchester School, 77 (5), September, 575-93 -- Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus (2006), 'Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements', Review of International Organizations, 1 (4), December, 379-96 --
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover ISBN 9781782545095
Language:
English
Subjects:
Economics
,
General works
Keywords:
Spieltheorie
;
Anwendung
;
Umweltökonomie
;
Umweltpolitik
;
Aufsatzsammlung
Author information:
Finus, Michael 1965-
Bookmarklink
