Umfang:
XVI, 406 S.
,
graph. Darst.
,
24 cm
ISBN:
0521680468
,
0521862094
,
9780521680462
,
9780521862097
Serie:
Political economy of institutions and decisions
Inhalt:
Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits -- Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy / J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes -- Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems / Helen V. Milner -- Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality / Lisa L. Martin -- Delegation and discretion in the European Union / Mark A. Pollack -- Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability -- How agents matter / Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby -- Screening power : international organizations as informative agents / Alexander Thompson -- Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO / Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson -- Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity / Erica R. Gould -- Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power / Karen J. Alter -- Directions for future research -- The logic of delegation to international organizations / David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins
Anmerkung:
Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
,
Includes bibliographical references (p. 369 - 393) and index
,
Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory
,
Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits ; Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid
,
US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy
,
Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems
,
Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality
,
Delegation and discretion in the European Union
,
Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability ; How agents matter
,
Screening power : international organizations as informative agents
,
Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO
,
Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity
,
Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power
,
Directions for future research ; The logic of delegation to international organizations
,
Enth. 12 Beitr.
Weitere Ausg.:
Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe Delegation and agency in international organizations Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006 ISBN 0521680468
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 0521862094
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 9780521862097
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 9780521680462
Sprache:
Englisch
Fachgebiete:
Politologie
,
Rechtswissenschaft
,
Soziologie
Schlagwort(e):
Staat
;
Kompetenzdelegation
;
Internationale Organisation
;
Politisches Handeln
;
Sammlung von Beiträgen
;
Aufsatzsammlung
URL:
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0664/2006023322-t.html
URL:
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0733/2006023322-b.html
URL:
http://scans.hebis.de/HEBCGI/show.pl?18159393_toc.pdf
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