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  • HTW Berlin  (20)
  • Akad. der Künste  (10)
  • Estache, Antonio  (17)
  • Senate
  • Shakespeare, William
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  • 1
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076438
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: July 1999 - Efficiency indicators can be useful to regulators assessing the efficiency of an operation and the wedge between tariff and minimum costs. They allow regulators to control for factors over which the operators have no control (such as diversity of water sources, or water quality or user characteristics). Estache and Rossi estimate a stochastic costs frontier for a sample of Asian and Pacific water companies, comparing the performance of public and privatized companies based on detailed firm-specific information published by the Asian Development Bank in 1997. They find private operators of water companies to be more efficient than public operators. Costs in concessioned companies tend to be significantly lower than those in public companies. Estache and Rossi compare the ranking of these companies by efficiency performance (obtained from econometric estimates) with rankings by more standard qualitative and productivity indicators typically used to assess performance. They show that rankings based on standard indicators are not always very consistent. Productivity indicators recognize simple input-output relations, such as the number of workers per client or connection. Frontiers recognize the more complex nature of interactions between inputs and outputs. Cost frontiers show the costs as a function of the level of output (or outputs) and the prices of inputs, and are generally more useful to regulators assessing the wedge between tariff and minimum costs. Production frontiers reveal technical relations between firms' inputs and outputs and provide a useful backup when cost frontiers are difficult to assess for lack of data. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. Antonio Estache may be contacted at aestache@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Estache, Antonio Comparing the Performance of Public and Private Water Companies in the Asia and Pacific Region
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049074186
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (29 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: This paper summarizes the evidence on the evolution of transport PPPs over the last 15 years or so. In the process, it provides a primer on the associated policy issues, including of the central role of project finance in the implementation of PPP policies and the debates on risk allocation in the design of PPPs. The paper also offers a discussion of the increasingly well recognized residual roles for the public sector in transport, with an emphasis on the regulatory debates surrounding the adoption of PPPs
    Additional Edition: Estache, Antonio Public-Private Partnerships In Transport
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 3
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049074543
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: This paper shows empirically that "privatization" in the energy, telecommunications, and water sectors, and the introduction of independent regulators in those sectors, have not always had the expected effects on access, affordability, or quality of services. It also shows that corruption leads to adjustments in the quantity, quality, and price of services consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior that one would expect from monopolies in the sector. The results suggest that privatization and the introduction of independent regulators have, at best, only partial effects on the consequences of corruption for access, affordability, and quality of utility services
    Additional Edition: Estache, Antonio Utilities Reforms And Corruption In Developing Countries
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 4
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076206
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (54 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: July 2000 - This guide to the issues at stake when toll roads are privatized answers many questions that privatization teams and regulators should be asking-providing useful information to project specialists, many of whom are now learning how much they did not know when they started. Road transport has long been the dominant form of transport for freight and passenger movement throughout the world. Because most road projects require investments with long amortization periods and because many projects do not generate enough demand to become self-financing through some type of user fee or toll, the road sector remains in the hands of the public sector to a much greater extent than other transport activities. But governments throughout the world, including those of many poor African and South Asian countries, are commercializing their operations to cut costs, improve user orientation, and increase sector-specific revenue.
    Content: There seems to be demand for toll roads in specific settings, but the problems met by many of this first generation of road concessions-from Mexico to Thailand-have given toll projects a bad reputation. Many mistakes were made, and tolling is obviously not the best solution for every road. Most of the alternatives aim at improving efficiency (lowering costs). But there are many ways of getting the private sector involved in toll roads, thus reducing public sector financing requirements for the sector. Understanding the context in which toll roads are viable is essential both for their initial success and for effective long-run regulation. Estache, Romero, and Strong provide a broad overview of issues at stake from the viewpoint of both privatization teams and regulators responsible for supervising contractual commitments of private operators and the government, to each other and to users.
    Content: This paper-a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at aestache@worldbank.org or jstrong@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Estache, Antonio The Long and Winding Path to Private Financing and Regulation of Toll Roads
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 5
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076343
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (42 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: Learning to regulate fairly, effectively, and at arm's length may be the main challenge governments face in attracting private investment and financing to the transport sector. - Governments should increasingly be able to rely on the private sector for help supporting (and financing) the transport sector - especially infrastructure support services for which there is heavy demand - but first they must improve their regulatory tools and sort out the institutional mess surrounding the regulatory process. Some countries have put together creative restructuring models and financing designs that tap potential in the private sector. Roads will continue to need significant public funding, but there are innovative ways (including shadow tolls) to attract private financing for road maintenance and investment. Partnerships between the public and private sectors have remained largely untapped at ports and airports.
    Content: To attract more private capital to the sector, regulators must know the cost of capital, know how to be fair to captive shippers, and have a better handle on demand - so they have more credibility when conflicts arise. Governments have overemphasized making deals and have generally underestimated the difficulty of taking on their new job as regulators. They are increasingly switching to contract-based regulation, to firm up the commitments of all parties involved, but are not adequately emphasizing contract design that anticipates problems and addresses unpredictable situations. This increases the risk of arbitrary regulatory rulings, which increases regulatory and political risks, which raises the expected rate of return required by potential investors. And all that makes future projects costlier or more difficult, adding to the effects of the 1998-99 financial crisis.
    Content: As a result of increased risk, the two groups most interested in the sector are: · Large, strong operators in the sector - typically in tandem with local construction companies - that feel confident they can take on regulators in case of conflict. · Risk-takers carving a niche for themselves. Either way, taxpayers and transport users are exposed to government, regulator, or operator failures that result in contract renegotiations (the norm, rather than the exception, in transport infrastructure projects). Gains from privatization might not reach consumers, simply because governments are ignoring the importance of ensuring fair distribution of long-run gains through the early creation of independent and accountable regulatory institutions that work closely with effective competition agencies. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation.
    Additional Edition: Estache, Antonio Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 6
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076208
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: July 2000 - Many transport projects undertaken during the boom period of the 1990s came to a crashing halt in 1997, and conditions in emerging markets worsened in 1998 and 1999. Many projects failed, victim of everything from overoptimistic forecasts to excessive debt to an inability to refinance bridge loans. As available financing dried up, many projects went bankrupt, had to be renegotiated, or were taken over by the government. What have we learned from all this? Recent developments in emerging financial markets have dramatically changed the appetite for (and terms of) transport infrastructure projects. As a result of defaults in Asia and Russia and devaluations in Asia, Brazil, and Russia, political and currency and exchange risk premia have increased dramatically. Given large needs for sovereign debt financing, infrastructure project finance will be seeking guarantees at the same time as governments are issuing primary securities.
    Content: Large portfolio outflows in emerging market funds mean that the sources of both equity and debt capital that became available in the mid-1990s are drying up for all but the most creditworthy projects. Moreover, real economic effects from financial events have consequences in the transport sector, since transport is a derived demand. Any decline in real economic activity is felt quickly in traffic levels and revenues. Currency devaluations that help spur exports may generate higher volumes for seaports and air cargo activity. These effects vary by sector, especially over the medium to longer term. Declines in real economic activity make matters especially difficult for toll roads, as drivers shift to free alternatives and reduce the number of trips taken. What does all this mean for project finance in transport? Risks have increased. Debt finance costs more. The available tenor of debt instruments has shortened and more equity is required for projects.
    Content: The sources and availability of equity finance have changed. Project finance efforts have shifted from new projects to the privatization, rehabilitation, and expansion of existing facilities. And a superclass of sponsors, bankers, and investors has emerged. Failures and mistakes in project finance deals in the 1990s were sharp and persistent. But much has been learned about sound project economics, conservative financial structures, comprehensive sensitivity analysis, the effects of macroeconomic factors, and the need for proper incentives and sound institutional and regulatory arrangements. This paper-a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at aestache@worldbank.org or jstrong@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Estache, Antonio The Rise, the Fall, and . . . the Emerging Recovery of Project Finance in Transport
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 7
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049073957
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: To utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to take full advantage of competition in public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool their financial and experiential resources and remove barriers to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce the degree of competition and can be used as a cover for collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in Official Development Assistance procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. It reveals the possible risk of relying too much on a foreign bidding coalition and may suggest the necessity of overseeing it. The data reveal no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are compatible with competition policy, except for a few cases. In road procurements, coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In the water and sewage sector, local joint bidding may be useful to draw out better offers from potential contractors. Joint bidding composed of only foreign companies is mostly considered anti-competitive
    Additional Edition: Estache, Antonio Joint Bidding In Infrastructure Procurement
    Language: English
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  • 8
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076341
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: The structural changes that come with privatization may induce a reconsideration of the regulations defined during the early stages of privatization. - Chisari and Estache summarize the main lessons emerging from Argentina's experience, including universal service obligations in concession contracts. They discuss free-riding risks, moral hazard problems, and other issues that arise when social concerns are delegated to private operators. After reporting on Argentina's experience, Chisari and Estache suggest some guidelines: · Anticipate interjurisdictional externalities. Users' mobility makes targeting service obligations difficult. · Minimize the risks imposed by elusive demand. In providing new services, a gradual policy may work better than a shock. · Realize that unemployment leads to delinquency and lower expected tariffs. Elasticity of fixed and usage charges is important. · Deal with the fact that the poor have limited access to credit.
    Content: Ultimately, plans that included credit for the payment of infrastructure charges were not that successful. · Coordinate regulatory, employment, and social policy. One successful plan to provide universal service involved employing workers from poor families in infrastructure extension works. · Beware of the latent opportunism of users who benefit from special programs. Special treatment of a sector may encourage free-riding (for example, pensioners overused the telephone until a limit was placed on the number of subsidized phone calls they could make). · Fixed allocations for payment of services do not ensure that universal service obligations will be met. How do you deal with the problem that many pensioners do not pay their bills? · Anticipate that operators will have more information than regulators do. If companies exaggerate supply costs in remote areas, direct interaction with poor users there may lead to the selection of more cost-effective technologies.
    Content: · Tailored programs are often much more effective than standardized programs. They are clearly more expensive but, when demand-driven, are also more effective. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at ochisari@uade.edu or aestache@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Estache, Antonio Universal Service Obligations in Utility Concession Contracts and the Needs of the Poor in Argentina's Privatizations
    Language: English
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Champaign, Ill : Project Gutenberg
    UID:
    b3kat_BV035410254
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe Boulder, Colo NetLibrary Online-Ressource E-Books von NetLibrary Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 22382847
    Edition: Boulder, Colo NetLibrary
    ISBN: 0585005494
    Uniform Title: Twelfth night
    Note: Access may be limited to NetLibrary affiliated libraries
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Shakespeare, William, 1564-1616 Twelfth night, or, What you will [199-?]
    Language: English
    Keywords: Patentschrift
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Eugene, Or : Oregon Renascence Editions
    UID:
    b3kat_BV035412658
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe Boulder, Colo NetLibrary Online-Ressource E-Books von NetLibrary Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 22382847
    Edition: Boulder, Colo NetLibrary
    ISBN: 0585137005
    Note: Access may be limited to NetLibrary affiliated libraries
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Shakespeare, William, 1564-1616 The passionate pilgrim [199-?]
    Language: English
    Keywords: Patentschrift
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