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  • HTW Berlin  (7)
  • 2000-2004  (7)
  • 1980-1984
  • Klingebiel, Daniela  (7)
  • 1
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617079
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (40 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Content: September 2000 - Certain measures add greatly to the fiscal cost of banking crises: unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated recapitalization, debtor bail-outs, and regulatory forbearance. The findings in this paper tilt the balance in favor of a strict rather than an accommodating approach to crisis resolution. In recent decades, a majority of countries have experienced a systemic banking crisis requiring a major-and expensive-overhaul of their banking system. Not only do banking crises hit the budget with outlays that must be absorbed by higher taxes (or spending cuts), but they are costly in terms of forgone economic output. Many different policy recommendations have been made for limiting the cost of crises, but there has been little systematic effort to see which recommendations work in practice. Honohan and Klingebiel try to quantify the extent to which fiscal outlays incurred in resolving banking distress can be attributed to crisis management measures of a particular kind adopted by the government in the early years of the crisis. They find evidence that certain crisis management strategies appear to add greatly to fiscal costs: unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated recapitalization, debtor bail-outs, and regulatory forbearance. Their findings clearly tilt the balance in favor of a strict rather than an accommodating approach to crisis resolution. At the very least, regulatory authorities who choose an accommodating or gradualist approach to an emerging crisis must be sure they have some other way to control risk-taking. This paper-a product of Finance, Development Research Group, and Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the Bank to examine the effects of financial sector regulation. The authors may be contacted at phonohan@worldbank.org or dklingebiel@worldbank.org
    Note: Weitere Ausgabe: Honohan, Patrick: Controlling the Fiscal Costs of Banking Crises
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Honohan, Patrick Controlling the Fiscal Costs of Banking Crises 2000
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040616923
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (58 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Content: Asset management companies have been used to address the overhang of bad debt in a country's financial system - by expediting corporate restructuring or rapidly disposing of corporate assets. A study of seven cases suggests that such companies tend to be ineffective at corporate restructuring and are good at disposing of assets only when they're used to meet fairly narrow objectives in the presence of certain factors: an easily liquefiable asset (such as real estate), mostly professional management, political independence, adequate bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, skilled resources, appropriate funding, good information and management systems, and transparent operations and processes. - Asset management companies have been used to address the overhang of bad debt in the financial system. There are two main types of asset management company: those set up to expedite corporate restructuring and those established for rapid disposal of assets. A review of seven asset management companies reveals a mixed record. In two of three cases, asset management companies for corporate restructuring did not achieve their narrow goal of expediting bank or corporate restructuring, suggesting that they are not good vehicles for expediting corporate restructuring. Only a Swedish asset management company successfully managed its portfolio, acting sometimes as lead agent in restructuring - and helped by the fact that the assets acquired had mostly to do with real estate, not manufacturing, which is harder to restructure, and represented a small fraction of the banking system's assets, which made it easier for the company to remain independent of political pressures and to sell assets back to the private sector. Asset management companies used to dispose of assets rapidly fared somewhat better.
    Content: [Fortsetzung 1. Abstract] Two of four agencies (in Spain and the United States) achieved their objectives, suggesting that asset management companies can be used effectively for narrowly defined purposes of resolving insolvent and inviable financial institutions and selling off their assets. Achieving these objectives required an easily liquefiable asset - real estate - mostly professional management, political independence, adequate bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, appropriate funding, skilled resources, good information and management systems, and transparent operations and processes. The other two agencies (in Mexico and the Philippines) were doomed from the start, as governments transferred to them politically motivated loans or fraudulent assets, which were difficult for a government agency susceptible to political pressure and lacking independence to resolve or sell off. This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the management of banking crises. The author may be contacted at dklingebiel@worldbank.org
    Note: Weitere Ausgabe: Klingebiel, Daniela: The Use of Asset Management Companies in the Resolution of Banking Crises
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Klingebiel, Daniela The Use of Asset Management Companies in the Resolution of Banking Crises 2000
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 3
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617491
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (32 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Content: Laeven, Klingebiel, and Kroszner investigate the link between financial crises and industry growth. They analyze data from 19 industrial and developing countries that have experienced financial crises during the past 30 years to investigate how financial crises affect sectors dependent on external sources of finance. Specifically, the authors examine whether the impact of a financial crisis on externally dependent sectors varies with the depth of the financial system. They find that sectors highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a greater contraction of value added during a crisis in deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. They hypothesize that the deepening of the financial system allows sectors dependent on external finance to obtain relatively more external funding in normal periods, so a crisis in such countries would have a disproportionately negative effect on externally dependent sectors. In contrast, since externally dependent firms tend to obtain relatively less external financing in shallower financial systems (and hence have relatively lower growth rates in such countries during normal times), a crisis in such countries has less of a disproportionately negative effect on the growth of externally dependent sectors. This paper—a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to study the link between financial development and economic growth. The authors may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org, dklingebiel@worldbank.org, or randy.kroszner@gsb.uchicago.edu
    Note: Weitere Ausgabe: Klingebiel, Daniela: Financial Crises, Financial Dependence, and Industry Growth
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Klingebiel, Daniela Financial Crises, Financial Dependence, and Industry Growth 2002
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 4
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617985
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Edition: Also available in print.
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 3379
    Content: "The goals of financial restructuring are to reestablish the creditor-debtor relationships on which the economy depends for an efficient allocation of capital, and to accomplish that objective at minimal cost. Costs include direct costs to taxpayers of financial assistance and the indirect costs to the economy that result from misallocations of capital and incentive problems resulting from the restructuring. Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven review cases in which countries used alternative mechanisms to restructure their financial and corporate sectors. Countries typically apply a combination of tools, including decentralized, market-based mechanisms, and government-managed programs. Market-based strategies seek to strengthen the capital base of financial institutions and borrowers to enable them to renegotiate debt and resume new credit supply. Government-led restructuring strategies often include the establishment of an entity to which nonperforming loans are transferred or the government's sale of financial institutions, sometimes to foreign entrants. Market-based mechanisms can, in principle, resolve coordination problems that countries face in the wake of massive debtor and creditor insolvency, with acceptably low direct and indirect costs, particularly when those mechanisms are effective in achieving the desirable objective of selectivity. However, these mechanisms depend for their success on an efficient judicial system, a credible supervisory framework and authority with sufficient enforcement capacity, and a lack of corruption in implementation.
    Content: [Fortsetzung 1. Abstract] Government-managed programs may not seem to depend as much on efficient legal and supervisory institutions for their success, but in fact these approaches, in particular the transfer of assets to government-owned asset management companies, also depend on effective legal, regulatory, and political institutions for their success. Further, a lack of attention to incentive problems when designing specific rules governing financial assistance can aggravate moral hazard problems, unnecessarily raising the costs of resolution. These results suggest that policymakers in emerging market economies with weak institutions should not expect to achieve the same level of success in financial restructuring as other countries, and that they should design resolution mechanisms accordingly. Despite the theoretical attraction of some complex market-based mechanisms, simpler mechanisms that afford quick resolution of outstanding debts that improve financial system competitiveness, and that offer little discretion to governments, are most effective. This paper--a product of the Financial Sector and Operations Policy Department--is part of a larger effort in the department to study the containment and resolution of financial crises"--World Bank web site
    Note: Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 9/8/2004 , Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2004] , Weitere Ausgabe: Calomiris, Charles W: A taxonomy of financial crisis resolution mechanisms
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Calomiris, Charles W. A taxonomy of financial crisis resolution mechanisms 2004
    Language: English
    Keywords: Fallstudiensammlung
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 5
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076308
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (58 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: Asset management companies have been used to address the overhang of bad debt in a country's financial system - by expediting corporate restructuring or rapidly disposing of corporate assets. A study of seven cases suggests that such companies tend to be ineffective at corporate restructuring and are good at disposing of assets only when they're used to meet fairly narrow objectives in the presence of certain factors: an easily liquefiable asset (such as real estate), mostly professional management, political independence, adequate bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, skilled resources, appropriate funding, good information and management systems, and transparent operations and processes. - Asset management companies have been used to address the overhang of bad debt in the financial system. There are two main types of asset management company: those set up to expedite corporate restructuring and those established for rapid disposal of assets.
    Content: A review of seven asset management companies reveals a mixed record. In two of three cases, asset management companies for corporate restructuring did not achieve their narrow goal of expediting bank or corporate restructuring, suggesting that they are not good vehicles for expediting corporate restructuring. Only a Swedish asset management company successfully managed its portfolio, acting sometimes as lead agent in restructuring - and helped by the fact that the assets acquired had mostly to do with real estate, not manufacturing, which is harder to restructure, and represented a small fraction of the banking system's assets, which made it easier for the company to remain independent of political pressures and to sell assets back to the private sector. Asset management companies used to dispose of assets rapidly fared somewhat better.
    Content: Two of four agencies (in Spain and the United States) achieved their objectives, suggesting that asset management companies can be used effectively for narrowly defined purposes of resolving insolvent and inviable financial institutions and selling off their assets. Achieving these objectives required an easily liquefiable asset - real estate - mostly professional management, political independence, adequate bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, appropriate funding, skilled resources, good information and management systems, and transparent operations and processes. The other two agencies (in Mexico and the Philippines) were doomed from the start, as governments transferred to them politically motivated loans or fraudulent assets, which were difficult for a government agency susceptible to political pressure and lacking independence to resolve or sell off.
    Additional Edition: Klingebiel, Daniela The Use of Asset Management Companies in the Resolution of Banking Crises
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 6
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076152
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (40 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: September 2000 - Certain measures add greatly to the fiscal cost of banking crises: unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated recapitalization, debtor bail-outs, and regulatory forbearance. The findings in this paper tilt the balance in favor of a strict rather than an accommodating approach to crisis resolution. In recent decades, a majority of countries have experienced a systemic banking crisis requiring a major-and expensive-overhaul of their banking system. Not only do banking crises hit the budget with outlays that must be absorbed by higher taxes (or spending cuts), but they are costly in terms of forgone economic output. Many different policy recommendations have been made for limiting the cost of crises, but there has been little systematic effort to see which recommendations work in practice. Honohan and Klingebiel try to quantify the extent to which fiscal outlays incurred in resolving banking distress can be attributed to crisis management measures of a particular kind adopted by the government in the early years of the crisis. They find evidence that certain crisis management strategies appear to add greatly to fiscal costs: unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated recapitalization, debtor bail-outs, and regulatory forbearance. Their findings clearly tilt the balance in favor of a strict rather than an accommodating approach to crisis resolution. At the very least, regulatory authorities who choose an accommodating or gradualist approach to an emerging crisis must be sure they have some other way to control risk-taking. This paper-a product of Finance, Development Research Group, and Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the Bank to examine the effects of financial sector regulation. The authors may be contacted at phonohan@worldbank.org or dklingebiel@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Honohan, Patrick Controlling the Fiscal Costs of Banking Crises
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 7
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049075738
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: Laeven, Klingebiel, and Kroszner investigate the link between financial crises and industry growth. They analyze data from 19 industrial and developing countries that have experienced financial crises during the past 30 years to investigate how financial crises affect sectors dependent on external sources of finance. Specifically, the authors examine whether the impact of a financial crisis on externally dependent sectors varies with the depth of the financial system. They find that sectors highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a greater contraction of value added during a crisis in deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. They hypothesize that the deepening of the financial system allows sectors dependent on external finance to obtain relatively more external funding in normal periods, so a crisis in such countries would have a disproportionately negative effect on externally dependent sectors. In contrast, since externally dependent firms tend to obtain relatively less external financing in shallower financial systems (and hence have relatively lower growth rates in such countries during normal times), a crisis in such countries has less of a disproportionately negative effect on the growth of externally dependent sectors. This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to study the link between financial development and economic growth. The authors may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org, dklingebiel@worldbank.org, or randy.kroszner@gsb.uchicago.edu
    Additional Edition: Klingebiel, Daniela Financial Crises, Financial Dependence, and Industry Growth
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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