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  • Philosophy  (219,073)
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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Optimizing Engines: Rational Choice in the Neolithic?
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2015
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 82, No. 3 ( 2015-07), p. 402-423
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 3 ( 2015-07), p. 402-423
    Abstract: This article has both substantive and methodological goals. Methodologically, it shows that rational choice theory (in its behavioral ecology form) is an especially important tool for guiding research in contexts in which agents appear to be acting against their best interests. The Neolithic transition is one such case, and the article develops a substantive conception of that transition, illustrating the heuristic power of behavioral ecology.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/681602
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2015
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
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    BTU Cottbus
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    How Valuable Are Chances?
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2015
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 82, No. 4 ( 2015-10), p. 602-625
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 4 ( 2015-10), p. 602-625
    Abstract: Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this article is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centerpiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but that Linearity is not and, hence, that Chance Neutrality is not rationally required.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/682915
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2015
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
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    BTU Cottbus
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Problem of Intransigently Biased Agents
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2015
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 956-968
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 956-968
    Abstract: In recent years the social nature of scientific inquiry has generated considerable interest. We examine the effect of an epistemically impure agent on a community of honest truth seekers. Extending a formal model of network epistemology pioneered by Zollman, we conclude that an intransigently biased agent prevents the community from ever converging to the truth. We explore two solutions to this problem, including a novel procedure for endogenous network formation in which agents choose whom to trust. We contend that our model nicely captures aspects of current problems in medical research and gesture at some morals for medical epistemology more generally.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/683344
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2015
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
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    BTU Cottbus
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2015
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 879-891
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 879-891
    Abstract: The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puzzling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, they constitute a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made in a Bayesian framework that represents credal states by single credence functions to avoid these conclusions, but none of them can do so for all versions of the Doomsday argument. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of ignorance and explains away these puzzles.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/683326
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2015
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
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    BTU Cottbus
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    How Explanatory Reasoning Justifies Pursuit: A Peircean View of IBE
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2015
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 749-760
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 749-760
    Abstract: This article develops and defends an account of inference to the best explanation according to which it first and foremost justifies pursuing hypotheses rather than accepting them as true. This sidesteps the issue of why better explanations should be more likely to be true. I defend an account of justification for pursuit, inspired by Peirce’s mature account of abduction, and develop it as a formal decision-theoretic model. This account provides a straightforward connection between explanatoriness and justification for pursuit.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/683262
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2015
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
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    BTU Cottbus
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Why Most Sugar Pills Are Not Placebos
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2015
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 1330-1343
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 1330-1343
    Abstract: The standard philosophical definition of placebos offered by Grünbaum is incompatible with Cartwright’s conception of randomized clinical trials. I offer a modified account of placebos that respects this role and clarifies why many current medical trials fail to warrant the conclusions they are typically seen as yielding. I then consider recent changes to guidelines for reporting medical trials and show that pessimism over parsing out the cause of “unblinding” is premature. Specifically, using a trial of antidepressants, I show how more sophisticated statistical analyses can parse out the source of such effects and serve as an alternative to placebo control.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/683817
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2015
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
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    BTU Cottbus
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Embodiment, Interaction, and Experience: Toward a Comprehensive Model in Addiction Science
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2015
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 1023-1034
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 82, No. 5 ( 2015-12), p. 1023-1034
    Abstract: Current theories of addiction try to explain what addiction is, who experiences it, why it occurs, and how it develops and persists. In this article, I explain why none of these theories can be accepted as a comprehensive model. I argue that current models fail to account for differences in embodiment, interaction processes, and the experience of addiction. To redress these limiting factors, I design a proposal for an enactive account of addiction that follows the enactive model of autism proposed by Hanne De Jaegher.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/683437
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2015
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Front Matter
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1943
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 10, No. 2 ( 1943-04)
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 10, No. 2 ( 1943-04)
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/phos.10.2.184287
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1943
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Front Matter
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1943
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 10, No. 3 ( 1943-07)
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 10, No. 3 ( 1943-07)
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/phos.10.3.184899
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1943
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Front Matter
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1946
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 13, No. 3 ( 1946-07)
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 13, No. 3 ( 1946-07)
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1086/phos.13.3.184891
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1946
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
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