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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    San Diego, Calif. [u.a.] :Acad. Press,
    UID:
    almahu_BV014252654
    Format: XI, 303 S. : , graph. Darst.
    ISBN: 0-12-426297-X
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics , Mathematics
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Auktion ; Unvollkommene Information ; Spieltheorie ; Auktionstheorie
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    San Diego :Academic Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9948026520902882
    Format: 1 online resource (318 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-281-05230-2 , 9786611052300 , 0-08-047596-5
    Content: Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.*The standard re
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Auction Theory; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I: Single Object Auctions; Chapter 2: Private Value Auctions: A First Look; Chapter 3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Chapter 4: Qualifications and Extensions; Chapter 5: Mechanism Design; Chapter 6: Auctions with Interdependent Values; Chapter 7: The Revenue Ranking (""Linkage"") Principle; Chapter 8: Asymmetries and Other Complications; Chapter 9: Efficiency and the English Auction; Chapter 10: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Chapter 11: Bidding Rings; Part II: Multiple Object Auctions , Chapter 12: An Introduction to Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 13: Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Chapter 14: Some Revenue Considerations; Chapter 15: Sequential Sales; Chapter 16: Nonidentical Objects; Chapter 17: Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Part III: Appendices; Appendix A: Continuous Distributions; Appendix B: Stochastic Orders; Appendix C: Order Statistics; Appendix D: Affiliated Random Variables; Appendix E: Some Linear Algebra; Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information; Appendix G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions; References; Index , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0-12-426297-X
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    San Diego :Academic Press,
    UID:
    almafu_BV045342516
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xi, 303 Seiten) : , Illustrationen.
    ISBN: 978-0-08-047596-7
    Note: Das Online-Erscheinungsjahr wurde der Titelliste vom Verlag entnommen , Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
    Additional Edition: Elektronische Reproduktion von Krishna, Vijay Auction theory San Diego : Academic Press, 2003 ISBN 0-12-426297-X
    Additional Edition: ISBN 978-0-12-426297-3
    Language: English
    Keywords: Auktion ; Unvollkommene Information ; Spieltheorie ; Auktionstheorie
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    San Diego :Academic Press,
    UID:
    almafu_9958063394102883
    Format: 1 online resource (318 p.)
    Edition: 1st ed.
    ISBN: 1-281-05230-2 , 9786611052300 , 0-08-047596-5
    Content: Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.*The standard re
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Auction Theory; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I: Single Object Auctions; Chapter 2: Private Value Auctions: A First Look; Chapter 3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Chapter 4: Qualifications and Extensions; Chapter 5: Mechanism Design; Chapter 6: Auctions with Interdependent Values; Chapter 7: The Revenue Ranking (""Linkage"") Principle; Chapter 8: Asymmetries and Other Complications; Chapter 9: Efficiency and the English Auction; Chapter 10: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Chapter 11: Bidding Rings; Part II: Multiple Object Auctions , Chapter 12: An Introduction to Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 13: Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Chapter 14: Some Revenue Considerations; Chapter 15: Sequential Sales; Chapter 16: Nonidentical Objects; Chapter 17: Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Part III: Appendices; Appendix A: Continuous Distributions; Appendix B: Stochastic Orders; Appendix C: Order Statistics; Appendix D: Affiliated Random Variables; Appendix E: Some Linear Algebra; Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information; Appendix G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions; References; Index , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0-12-426297-X
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 5
    Book
    Book
    San Diego, Calif. [u.a.] : Acad. Press
    UID:
    gbv_52803295X
    Format: XI, 303 S , graph. Darst , 24 cm
    Edition: [Nachdr.]
    ISBN: 012426297X , 9780124262973
    Note: Literaturverz. S. [289] - 297
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Auktionstheorie ; Auktion ; Spieltheorie ; Einführung
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 6
    Book
    Book
    San Diego 〈〈[u.a.]〉〉 : Academic Press
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023529222
    Format: XI, 303 S. , graph. Darst.
    Edition: [Nachdr.]
    ISBN: 012426297X
    Note: Literaturverz. S. 289 - 297
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Auktion ; Unvollkommene Information ; Spieltheorie ; Auktionstheorie
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 7
    Book
    Book
    San Diego [u.a.] :Academic Press,
    UID:
    almafu_BV023529222
    Format: XI, 303 S. : graph. Darst.
    Edition: [Nachdr.]
    ISBN: 0-12-426297-X
    Note: Literaturverz. S. 289 - 297
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Auktion ; Unvollkommene Information ; Spieltheorie ; Auktionstheorie
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    San Diego :Academic Press,
    UID:
    edocfu_BV045342516
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xi, 303 Seiten) : , Illustrationen.
    ISBN: 978-0-08-047596-7
    Note: Das Online-Erscheinungsjahr wurde der Titelliste vom Verlag entnommen , Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
    Additional Edition: Elektronische Reproduktion von Krishna, Vijay Auction theory San Diego : Academic Press, 2003 ISBN 0-12-426297-X
    Additional Edition: ISBN 978-0-12-426297-3
    Language: English
    Keywords: Auktion ; Unvollkommene Information ; Spieltheorie ; Auktionstheorie
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    San Diego :Academic Press,
    UID:
    edoccha_BV045342516
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xi, 303 Seiten) : , Illustrationen.
    ISBN: 978-0-08-047596-7
    Note: Das Online-Erscheinungsjahr wurde der Titelliste vom Verlag entnommen , Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions *Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information *Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory
    Additional Edition: Elektronische Reproduktion von Krishna, Vijay Auction theory San Diego : Academic Press, 2003 ISBN 0-12-426297-X
    Additional Edition: ISBN 978-0-12-426297-3
    Language: English
    Keywords: Auktion ; Unvollkommene Information ; Spieltheorie ; Auktionstheorie
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
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